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The economy of Europe is undergoing a difficult period of transition. Much structural
weakness has become apparcnt or become worse following a reduction in demand
eccompanied by increased pressure of imports. If structural change is essential in order
to reach a new economic balance, it is as well to teaLize that this will be difficult to
echieve in a dimate of poor economic growth unless clear perspectives are maintained.
The role of the Commission must therefore be to promote and establish structural
change within a socially acceptable framework. The illusion must be resisted that enter-
prises can protect themselves against those necessary changes by coming to terms with
their competitors or by seeking excessive protection frorn narional authorities.
Competition policy plays an important role in the application of the basic rules which
govefn the integration of markets. The flow of trade creates the need for constant
structural adaptation. The maintenance of non-competitive behaviour or anti-competitive
practices, on the other hand, leads to partitioning of markets in the sectors directly
involved, which then tends to spill over into related sectors in the downstream markets.
It is no coincidence that these simple but basic rules should be challenged at a time
when the forces of competition s€em to demand excessive sacrifices in certain sectors,
particularly so far as employment is concerned, following a lasting slowing-down in the
growth of or a switch in demand. Private arrangements for organizins markets or govern-
rnent intervention affecting the competitive ability of undertakings have the object of
softening the rigours of market forces. If some of these measures are prompted by the
market, others on the other hand substitute themselves for the market, the decisions in
such cases being centralized, whether they concern production capacities or govern
production itself or prices.
Vhatever the means chosen to'organize' a sector, that is to say protect it frosr competi-
tion, one should bear in mind that the direct or implicit object is always to re-establish
et least temporarily an artificial profitability by raising prices. Thus the cost of the
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salvage opefation is supported by the market, that is the user, the Pfocessor and finally
the ultimate consurner ot th. tr*p"yer. Measures for organizing the market therefore tend
to have repercussions and to ipread, especially to later stages in the manufacturing
process, particulady when these remain exposed to the competitive Pressure of imports'
Accordingly it is essential that public intervention in the markets should be governed by
the des and procedures which correspond best with the common interest in the sense
of the Treaty. In particular, restrictions of competition should be part of a plan for
reinforcing competitivity not only in the sector concerned but in the Comrnunity economy
as a whole. The latter cannot support indefinitely the high costs of poorly adapted
structures.
Market structures have been a priority concern of competition policy during the year
1977. The work of analysing digree of concentration, competition and price formation
has been extended, the object being to highlight the undedying causes of the poor
functioning of competition. About a hundred markets have been identified in which the
most important undertaking holds more than a half-share. It has also been possible to
establish that there is a strong tendency towards concentration in the distribution field
and that there are some important price differences for the same product at all levels
even on the purely local level.
The Commission has the firm intention of systernatically applying Article 86 against
undertakings in a dominant position which directly or indirectly impose discriminatory or
unfair prices. It is not the Commission's objective to set itself up as a price control
organization, nor to put ao end to price variations which are an essential part of the
competitive process, but solely to attacl< practices which become illegal when they are
camied out by undertakings in a dominant position; the reason is the injury which these
practices can cause to the user and the consumer.
The Commission considers that the recent Decision in the United Brands case is of
great importance for the development of an effective policy regarding the control of
abuse of dominant position. The considerations expounded by the Court of Justice have
given concrete forrr to the question of the applicability of Article 86 to abnormal price
situations. Though it may remain very difficult to specify in general terms the criteria
which enable one to define an unfair price, nevertheless the Court has provided highly
valuable pointers which will guide the Commission's work.
In its desire to safegrard competitive structures the Conrmission has also strengthened
its policy of support for small and medium-sized firms. The Cornmission shares the
view expressed by the European Padiament in its Resolution of 16 February 1978,
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when it stated that the existence 'of a healthy and strongly developed sector of small
and medium-sized firms is a condition for the smooth functioning of a modern
economy'.
The Commission has therefore taken certain measures which enlarge the possibilities of
extensive cooperation between such firms. It has revised in this direction the Notice
on agreements of minor importance and the Regulation exempting certain categories of
specialization agreements. The work undertaken in the field of sub-contracting agree-
ments and of patent licensing has the same objective.
For the present it is in the area of State aids that competition policy has been subjected
to the greatest pressures.
The general policy objectives remain valid. Aids should not be granted except where
they are really necessary and only at an intensity proportionate to the real difficulties of
each national situation. They should be accorded in such a manner that in practice they
rapidly contribute to and provoke the necessary changes.
The airn is to assure the efficacity of the Community economy and society in facilitating
free and equal competition between the different economic agents, to safeguard the
mobility of the factors of production both temporally and spatially by preventing their
sterilization which would inevitably be costly and to leave open possibilities for progress
and innovation. Necessary corrective actions must, of course, be accepted: protective
measures which are really transitory and which enable the break-down of threatened
structures to be avoided during the time necessary to bring about a restructuring, regional
aids, aids to industrial adaptation, compensatory measures for certain ariificial distor-
tions provoked by third countries, liberal social measures.
Nevertheless, as regards the latter, even in the contsrt of the Present employment
position, it is necessary to avoid a situation where these measures would lead to a
prolonged subsidization of undertakings or the production of goods the survival of
which would not justify the sacrifice of resources for their benefit by the community in
general. Such resources, if they were better utilized, would guarantee gteater employ-
ment in the future.
The activities of the Commission concerning aids can appe:at to be er.cessively rigorous
having regard to the social consequences of unemployment in the present economic
situation. They are, however, completely justified when account is taken of the fact that
the measures concerned are essentially palliatives. On the one hand, the Commissiqn's activ-
ities enables the exporting of unemployment to be limited considerably and reactions by
way of outbidding and escalation to be prevented. They also prevent the perpetoation
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of hopeless situations and stimulate the public and private authorities to seek more positive
solutions than the simple preservation of redundant jobs.
In this regard, action in relation to aids is an important element in the policy airned at
restoring employment. The criteria on which it is based ought to take account of the
two major justifications mentioned above while at the sarne time facilitating the necessary
transition. It is in this context that aids to ernployment have in particular been introduced;
such aids, under different forms, have had a tendency to multiply. The Commission
accepts t.hat the present social circumstances can justify protective measures for employment
in the sectors which are partianlarly stricken by the crisis when implemented in conjunction
with measures favouring the creation of new employrnent. However, aids to the mainten-
ance of employment must not be perpetuated in undertakings which can benefit in a
manner which allows them to maintain without change non-competitive production likely
to aggravate the crisis to the dertriment of other undertakings.
These considerations influenced most of the positions taken by the Commission in 1977
in relation to State aids.
As regards sectoral aids, the Commission drafted a fourth directive on national aids in
the shipbuilding sector. This retains the concept that aids in this sector should be
abolished once the sector has re-established its competitivity on the basis of more limited
and fundamentally renovated productive capacity. The present draft, while providing for
adequate discipline, takes into consideration all the measures which could prove to be
necessary in the context of the existing serious crisis.
In the case of steel, the Commission defined the principle orientations of its policy on
aids to this sector which is also faced with a serious crisis. It is at present examining the
need to complete this work by a more precise framework, based on Article 95 ECSC,
after unanimous Council approval, for aids and other interventions by the Member
States in this sector.
In the synthetic fibres sector, the Commission defined its policy on the basis of the
existence of surplus productive capacity. It asked the Member States to suspend the
granting of aids which would have the effect of leading to a further increase in produc-
tive capacity. It stressed that it envisaged not only the specific aids to the sector con-
cerned, but in principle also all aids which could find their basis in general or regional
aid systems.
In addition, the Commission considers that in these sectors the coordination of sectoral
aids ought to be accompanied by a policy of thorough re-organization, defined at the
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level of the Community, to resolve the structural problems common to several Member
States.
The Commission will take initiatives of the same ord.er in relation to aids when
this is called for by the situation in a sector. It must be emphasized in this regard that this
is-not to be taken 
"5 
a gPg of veiled industrial planning which would be effecied by means
of a general secioral modulation of regional or geneial aids. The Commission considers
that in certain cases, where at the level of ttre Community branches of industry face
an extremely grave situation which aPPears destined to continue, aids which contribute to
the development of capacity are harmful from the sectoral point of view and do not assure
development on a sound basis from the regional point of view.
As regards regional aids, the commission has pursued, with the experts from the Mem-ber States, the technical work necessary for the development of the coordination of
regional aids both at the general level of the coordinatioir principles applicable to such
aids and at the level of the examination of the different-systems of-regional aids in
Jorce in the Member States.
It should be reaffirmed that all the disciplines which the Community fixes for aids to
sectors in difficulty run the risk of being evaded where State intervention is alreadv
strong and is susceptible to be reinforced precisely to take account of the difficulties
encountered. The Commission will use the possibilities available to it under Article 90(3)
E_E! to clarify the financial relationships befween public undertakings and their t rpon-
sible authorities. The Commission will also actively take account of-tfris problem iri the
disciplines which it develops in relation to State aids.
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Part One
Competition policy towards enterprises
I7
Chapter I
Main developments in Community policy
$ I 
- 
Prlce disparitles in the Communlty
L' The Commission continued its efforts to end those price disparities in the Com.
munity which are due to a lack of competition. The work proceeded on two levels. The
price analyses the Commission is carcying out under the concentration study programme
were extended and rnade more comprehensive, and the Commission continued to take
decisions against firms which enter into restrictive agreements to keep prices up in the
corlmon market. The Court's judgment in United Brands Corporation (Chiquita bana-
nas)l will be of fundamental importance for further decisions on abusive price policies
followed by dominant firms.
1. Price analysis in the programme of studies on concentrction
2. In order to make the results of the price analyses2 more reliable for assessing the
competitive situation of selected products of importance to consumers, a two-phase plan
has been developed.s In the first phase prices and mark-ups at the different stages of
distribution are to be collated in as detailed a form as possible, and price trends, broken
down by sales point, country, brand and size of package, are to be investigated. The
second phase follows on from the first and is intended to give a better idea of the com-
petitive relationships between dealers and consumers and between dealers and manufac-
turers. The scale and growth of market power in distribution are described by reference
to strucfural measures of concentration and indicators of the behaviour of dealers.
3. Preliminary results are beginning to take shape.a The process of concentration in
distribution has gone so far now that there is a growing danger of substantial restriction
of cornpetition. The Commission will have to be very alert here. Price analyses have
given some indication that consumers are in the end paying the price of insufficient
competition. It remains to be seen whether or not the discernible increase in imports into
high-price countries of some branded goods from low-price countries continues, and
r Commission Decision of t7 December 1975: OI L 9J of 9.4.L976i Fifth Report on Competition
Policy, point 71; judgment of 14.2.1978.
z Sixth Report on Competition Policy, points 306 to 318.3 Part Three of this Report.
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broadens to include other branded goods, so that price disparities are narrowed' Short-
term price alignments are abeady to be found at all events'
2. Measures against individual firms
4. In its administrative practice too the commission has been taking particular care to
ensure that firms do not 
-enter into agreements to shore up price disparities between
Membet states. Examples are its BMIT Belgiumt a1d pistillers2 decisions.
The importance of both cases goes beyond their individual circumstances, howevef, since
they make it clear once again that on principle the Commission is not prepared. to accePt
moves by firms to p..u.nt parallel imports in order to maintain existing price
differentials.
This applies to organizational measufes used by a business to Put Pressure on retailers in
order to prevent exports-through a distribution network, for instance (BM\f Belgium).
It also applies to terms of sale under which price concessions are given to dealers
depending-on whether they intend to sell on the domestic market or in other Member
States (Distillers).
S2 
- 
Information agreements
5. In times of economic difficulty firms are increasingly tempted to evade the tougher
competition with which they are confronted. Information agreements are Particulafly
important here.
Under information agreements firms work together to exchange information, through a
central agency, on quantities, prices, discounts and other terms of business, and on their
supplieriana customers. A distinction can be drawn between agreements which are for
purely statistical purposes and those which identify individual firms-depending on how
ihe central reporting agency collates and passes on the information.
6. In its Cobelpa/VNP3 and Vegetable parchment4 decisions the Commission further
clarified its attitude to the exchange of information between comPetitors. Aspects of
1 Point 126 of tlis Report.
2 Point 125 of this Report.
3 Point l0l of this Report.
a Point 103 of this Report.
COMP. REP. EC 1977
M^IN DEVELOPIVIENTS IN COMMUNITY POIICY 19
this problem had already been treated in the WVF decision,l in the IFTRA decisions,2
and in other cases which were ended without a formal decision,s
In most cases it has been established that the parties to information agreements have also
entered into further cooperation agreements. The cases have invariably arisen in markets
with very few buyers and sellers; the information has always been accessible only to the
sellers; and in every case the agreement weakened price competition on domestic and
international markets.
7. The essential points in the assessment of an information agreement were stated by
the Commission as long ago as 1968, in the Cooperation Notice.a There is an important
distinction between information arrangements which do not affect competition and
arrangements in which the exchange of information has to be regarded as being in
restraint of competition. The distinction can of course only be drawn case by case, after
consideration of all the circumstances. But the following general criteria may be stated.
(1) The type of information exchanged is the first material point. The provision of
collated statistical material is not in itself objectionable from the point of view of
competition policy. The Commission has no fundamental objection where national
trade associations representing the same economic interests in different countries
exchange statistics, either direct or through a reporting ageftcy, which set out pro-
duction and sales figures for the industry in question without identifying individual
businesses, as is the practice in official statistics. Nor will the Commission as a rule
object to a breakdown of data by product, country or period of time which goes
beyond what is required in official statistics. But the Commission does reserve the
right to investigate such cases where the breakdown of figures might enable an indi-
vidual party to an information arrangement to identify the competitive behaviour of
the other parties.
On the other hand, the organized exchange of individual data from individual firms,
such as figures on quantities produced and sold, prices and terms for discounts,
higher and lower rates, credit notes and general terms of sale, delivery and payment,
will generally be regarded by the Commission as ptactices which have as their
object or effect the restriction or distortion of competition within the common
market, and which are therefore prohibited.
1 OJ L 168 of 10.7.1969; First Report on Cornpetition Policy, point 37.2 IFTRA-Giass containers: OJ L 160 of 77.6.1974, Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 62;
IFTRA-Aluminium: OJ L 228 of 29.8.1975, Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 31.3 Dutch Sporting Cartridges Agreement: Third Report on Competition Poiicy, point 55; Ships'
cables: Fifth Report on Cornpetition Policy, point 40; Non-ferrous semi-manufactures: Frfth
Report on Competition Policy, point 39; OFITOMEP: Sixth Report on Lompetition Policy,
point 134.
4 OJ C 75 of 29.7.1968.
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The area between permissible and prohibited exchange of information is thus
defined by the distinction between a purely statistical arrangement with a break-
down of 'data by product, country and period of time which is not conducive to
collusion, and the kind of arrangement which cleady relates to individual firms'
One circumstance which in the Commission's view would certainly suggest a Pfo-
hibited agreement or practice would be the regular communication of invoices or
other information on an individual firm to the central reporting agency. This sort of
information normally constitutes a trade secret and is not required for the PrePara'
tion of periodical statistics. The Commission believes that in such cases it is enough
to provide the agency with collated figures on quantities supplied and turnover in
the period covered.
Parties to an information agreement which lies in the area between what is peffnis-
sible and what is prohibited must be prepared to have the Commission investigate
their actions particularly closely if the trend on the relevant markets Points to covert
market sharing or price fixing.
(2) In assessing information agreements the Commission also pays close attention to the
structure of the relevant market. The tendency for firms to fall in line with the
behaviour of their competitors is particulady strong in oligopolistic markets. The
improved knowledge of market conditions aimed at by information agreemeots
strengthens the connection befween the undertakings, in that they are enabled to
react very efficiently to one another's actions, and thus lessens the intensity of
competition.
(3) Lastly, the Commission also takes into account the fact that this forrn of cooPeration
between firms normally improves only the sellers' knowledge of the market. And
that debars buyers frorn exploiting whatever 'concealed competition' subsists
between sellers in oligopolistic markets and from thus preventing the price struc-
ture from becoming rigid.
8, The Commission's attitude to information agreements follows the line indicated by
the Court of Justice in relation to concerted practices in its judgment against European
sugar manufacturers:
'The criteria of coordination and cooperation ... must be understood in the light of the
concept inherent in the provisions of the Treaty relating to competition that each econo-
mic operator must determine independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the
cornmon market ... Although it is corect to say that this requirement of independence
does not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the
existing and anticipated conduct of their competitors, it does however strictly predude
any direct or indirect contact befween such operators, the object or effect whereof is
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either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to
disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided
to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market.'1
S 3 
- 
Excluslve purchasing agreements
9. During 1977 the Commission further developed its guidelines for the assessment of
exclusive purchasing agreements.
These are agreements under which the purchaser accepts an obligation to purchase
particular goods from a single supplier only, over a relatively long period. They have an
important business function in that they give a goa:z;fltee of ensured sales to one party
arrd a goarantee of continuous supplies to the other. Exclusive purchasing agreements are
consequently normal in almost all branches of the economy, as a de in very large
numbers; they are particularly common between manufacturers and processors of a
particular product, and befween manufacturers and dealers. In return for his part of the
agreement, the purchaser is frequently given special privileges of the most varied kind,
ranging from priority for deliveries and the assurance of technical assistance, through
special prices, discounts, bonuses, premiums and fidelity rebates, and the guarantee of a
specified margin, to long-term loans. These neady always help to strengthen the exclu-
sive links between the parties to the agreement.
Exclusive purchasing agreements may endanger competition, because they limit the
purchaser's freedom of choice and therefore at least potentially restrict the sales outlets
open to other suppliers. The Cornmission has grounds for intervention to the extent that
in any given case competition within the common market and trade between Member
States are in consequence appreciably affected.
The Commission has examined the compatibility of exclusive purchasing and similat
agreements with the EEC rules of competition in cases where the arrangement operated
to the advantage of a manufacturer in a dominant position and to the disadvantage of
several industrial processors.
IO. In the Europenn sugar industry case, a fine was imposed on Siidzu&er Verkaufs-
GmbH for infringement of Article 86, one reason being that the firm had given fidelity
rebates to its customers. It emerges from the Commission decision2 and the subsequent
1 CJEC t6.r2.197t (Coilpemtiwe Vereniging 'Suiker Unie' UA and Others v Commission), 40 to
48, 50, 54 to t6, 111, 113 and rr4/h: [197r] ECR 1661, 1942 (Grounds of Judgment 173
and rz4); Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 19 to 24.
2 Decision of 2.t.197t: OJ L t4o of 26.5.1973; Second Report on Competition Policy, point 48.
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judgment of the Court,l which affirmed the decision on this count, that such rebates,
given by a dominant firm, constitute abuse for the following reasons:
(i) Firstly, they have the result that two customers who purchase the same quLantity of a
particular product from the producer pay different net prices if one of them also
purchases the product from another producer.
This is an application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them-if they are comPetitofs-at a comPetitive
disadvantage (Article A6(c) ).
(ii) Secondly, such rebates are likely to limit markets to the prejudice of consumers,
because they remove or restrict other producers' opportunities of competing with
the first producer in sales of his products (Article 86(b)).
(iii) Thirdly, they help to consolidate the producers' dominant position, which is
incompatible with the concept inherent in Article 86.
11. In the Vitamins case2 (Hoffmann-La Roche) the Commission further developed its
views on the position of fidelity clauses with respect to Article 86, emphasizing the point
that whether such clauses may appreciably restrict the customer's freedom of choice aod
thus the degree of competition between different manufacturers is a matter to be decided
pn economic considerations. The fact that the arrangements in question, individually or
taken together, are such as to bind the customers to the dominant manufacturer
for their supplies is of decisive importance. If the contract is liable to produce this result,
its form, which may of course vary from case to case, is immaterial.
12. For a finding of abuse there is no need, in the Commission's view, to show that
customers take their supplies of the products covered by the agreement exclusively from
the dominant manufacturer. It is enough if supplies from him account for the major part
of their requirements. Nor is there any need of a legal obligation on the customer to
obtain his supplies exclusively or mainly from the dominant firm. \fhere there is no
exPress provision to this effect in the agreement, it is sufficient if the expected result is
actually achieved. There may be abuse if the dominant manufacturer's terms of sale make
it economically attractive for customers to take their supplies exclusively or mainly from
him. By what means this is done is immaterial. The dominant firm may offer financial
1 CJEC 16.12.7975 (Codperatieve Vereniging 'Suiicer Unie' UA and Others v Commission), 40 to
48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and t14/73: [1975] ECR 1663,2000 to 2OO5; Fifth Report on Com-
petition Policy, points 19 to 24,
2 Decision of 9.6.197G OJ L 223 of 16.8.1976; Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 170.
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advantages (special prices or fidelity and other rebates) or threaten financial disadvan-
tages (demands for the return of rebates already given, refusal to allow any price
concessions in future).
13. The fact that a particular exclusive purchasing agreement falls within Article 86
does not necessarily mean that it will not be caught by Article 85 as well. If the tests of
both provisions are satisfied, the Commission may after due consideration decide to base
proceedings on Article 8), Article 86 or both. In the Billiton/Metal & Thermit Chemicals
casel the Commission proceeded against a regularly notified exclusive agreement under
Article 86. The agreement was between a dominant manufacturer and the largest indus-
trial consumer of the product in guestion. Application of the expedited procedure of
Article 15(6) of Regulation No 17 enabled the Commission to secure very quickly the
deletion of all the restrictive clauses from the agreement.
14. The applicability of Article 85(1) to exclusive purchasing and other such arrange-
ments depends on whether or not the arrangement, either alone or in conjunction with
other similar arrangements between the same ot different firms, may appreciably affect
entry to the market and sales by third parties. The Commission felt that this was the case
in Billiton/M & T, because both parties are large firms possessed of market Power.
This rule applies not only to agreements between producers but also to agreements
befween producers and dealers. In the Liebig case,2 the Commission applied the prohibi-
tion of Article 8)(1) to exclusive purchasing agreements entered into by a spice manu-
facfurer and three supermarket chains. The amangements concerned the Belgian market,
where the three chains, with a combined share of about 30/o of the food distribution
market, are the largest retailers of spices.
15. Exemption under Article 8) (1) was refused in both Billition/M & T and Liebig, but
the two cases do indirectly give sorne idea of the circumstances under which exemption
can be given.
The Commission considers that exclusive purchasing agreements can contribute to
improving the production and distribution of goods, because they make it possible for
the pariies to the agreement to plan their production and sales more precisely and over a
longer period, to limit the risk of market fluctuation and to lower the cost of production,
storage and marketing. And in many cases agreements of this kind give small and
medium-sized firms their only opportunity of entering the market and thus increasing
competition.
1 See point 131 of this Report.
2 Decision of 21 Decembet 1977: OJ L Ji of 24.2.1978; point 129 of this Report.
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However, exemption can only be given where the firms involved do not retain the whole
of the benefit. Consumers must be allowed their fair share as well. The benefits must
also be great enough to balance out the restrictions of competition they bring with thern.
These tests are not satisfied if the exclusive arrangements make it more difficult for
other firms to sell on the market, and especially if they raise barriers to market entry.
In such cases an application for exemption will usually fail, because the agreements will
afford the parties the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial
part of the products in question, and this is in direct conflict with Article 85 (3) (b).
In Billiton/M & T and Liebig it was these considerations which led the Commission to
refuse exemption. In both cases particular attention was paid to the market share which
the manufachrrers had secured by means of exclusive purchasing agreements. The share
of all manufacturers' sales on the relevant market accounted for by supplies covered by
the agreements was 35/o in the first case and L7/o in the second.
16, Similar considerations lie behind the draft Regulation amending Regulation No 67/
67 /EEC.I The Commission intends that block exemption of exclusive purchasing agree-
ments relating to products intended for resale should depend on the manufacturer's
having a market share of not more than L1/o.
g 4 
- 
Communlty-wlde guarantee service
17. Leaving aside the question of imposing on manufacturers a general guarantee
obligationz or a standardized set of guarantee terms for like products,s the Commission
considers it necessary to ensure that guarantee tems are compatible with the des of
competition.
The guarantee offered as part of their after-sales service by manufacturers of consumer
durables is an important factor-sometimes a decisive factor-in the consumer's choice.
Refusal of. a gaanntee for products which have not been exported through the manu-
facturer's own nefwork may be a substantial barrier to the normal development of trade
1 OJ C 31 of 7.2.t97s; point 38 of this Report.
2 The consumer's right to benefit from satisfactory after-sales service is one of the items in the
preliminary programme of the European Economic Community for a consumer protection and
information poliry: OJ C 92 of 25.4.L971.
a Differences in tl-re extent and duration of the guarantee offered to customers by manufacturers and
dealers are in some cases evidence of keen competition. See, for instance, the Commission answer
to \trlitten Question No 473/73 by Mr Fellermaier concerning the differing guamntee terms for
motor vehicles; OJ C 14 ot 12.2.L974.
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within the Community. This barrier is particulady harmful to the consumer's interest
where there are appreciable differences in the price for a given product from one
Member State to another.
Accordingly the Commission considers that the manufacturer's guarantee of his products
should be valid throughout the Community, irrespective of the place of purchase.
18. In the past, the Commission has che&ed compliance with this obligation in deci-
sions exempting distribution systems in which manufacturers confine the sale of their
products to dealers authorized selectively (selective distribution). In the various cases
considered, covering clocks and watches,l motor vehiclesz and consumer electronics,s the
Commission ensured that where the manufacturer gave a guarantee on branded goods,
guarantee service was available through any of. the approved dealers, even if the product
had been bought from another dealer.
19. In the electrical appliances industry the guarantee can be of particular importance.a
But difficulties have arisen because of different technical and safety standards in the
Member States of the Community. Certain manufacturers have invoked these differences
as grounds for refusing to grant a guarantee for parallel imports or use of their products
in a Member State other than that to which they were originally imported. The Commis-
sion has not accepted the argument. It has concluded that these differences are not so
great as to raise an insurmountable barrier to trade in the relevant goods and that the
relevant exporters ought to be free to assess the business value of making any alterations
that may be necessary.s
20. It took action in one caseo to have the terms of the guarantee given by SpA Indus-
trie A. Zanussi, Pordenone, Italy, changed.
Zanussi operates primarily in the household appliances industry, as a manufacturer of
refrigerators, cookers, dishwashers, washing machines and television sets, which its sub-
r Decision of 28.1o.t97o, Omega: OI L 242 of 5.rr.r97o; First Report on Competition Policy,
point 56.
2 Decision of 13.12.1974, Bayerische Motoren lferke AG: OJ L 29 of 5.2.1975i Fourth Report on
Competition Policy, point 86.
a Decision otr5.r2.r975, SABA:OJL28of i.2.L976; FifthReportonCompetitionPolicy,point54.
a In the Constructa case (Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 109) the Commission per-
suaded the manufacturer to organize after-sales service in such a way that it would be available
throughout the common market, regardless of the country of purchase.
s ln 1974 the Commission got the German firm AEG-Telefunken to remove the export ban imposed
on its German distributors of household electrical appliances. AEG-Telefunken had claimed that
the German appliances did not conform to the safety regulations applying in the country of
destination, the Dutch market: Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 106.
6 The Commission is also considering whether the guarantees offered by other manufacturers in the
same industry are compatible with the rules on competition.
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sidiaries in the common market countries distribute under a variety of trademarks, such
as 'Zanussi', 'Rex', 'Castor' and'Zoppas' ,
Under the original version of the Zanussi guarantee, as notified to the Commission, a
consumer could not have the manufacturer's guarantee unless the appliance had been
imported by the Zanussi subsidiary for that Member State, or if the appliance had been
re-exported. The Commission regarded these restrictions on guarantee service as incompa-
tible with the EEC Treaty rules of competition because they were apt to discourage
parallel imports. Zanussi altered its guarantee terms and set uP a new system rvhich will
become fully operational on 15 February 1978. The guarantee will be available for all
appliances bearing Zanussi's trademarks, regardless of their counffy of origin, and service
will be provided by the Zanussi subsidiary in the Member State where the appliance is
used.
The consumer can now obtain Zanussi appliances in any part of the Community, without
running the risk of losing the guarantee on the appliance. The Commission has stated its
intentionl of taking a favourable decision on the amended guarantee terms.
S 5 
- 
Measures to assist snnall business
21. The gradual merging of national markets into a single Community market has given
a new dimension to the field of action of small business. The importance of small and
medium-sized firms to the economic, technical, industrial and business development of
the Community is unquestioned, as is their ability to adapt to changing economic circum-
stances and to meet specific demands for goods or services. They employ more than half
of the common market's labour force and are a factor making for equilibrium in the
European economy.
Nevertheless, these firms are now f.acing a number of problems. For this reason the
Economic and Social Committee and Padiament have begun to consider the position of
small business in order to identify the line of action which should, in their opinion,
constitute the policy to be followed.
The Commission is continuing its work to expand and add to measures already taken
with the aim of assisting small and medium-sized undertakings to overcome their diffi-
culties and to profit fully from the advantages which the single market of the EEC can
offer. These measures will be implemented progressively, after discussion with relevant
business circles and appropriate government bodies.
1 Notice pursuant to Article t9(3) of Council Regulation No 17: OJ Cali of 29.12.1977.
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22. In applying the rules of competition the Commission has had to deal with various
aspects of the economic activity of small and medium-sized firms ever since issuing its
first individual decisions jn L964. Of the L25 or so decisions taken since then, roughly
a third are directly in point in that at least one of the firms concerned could be regarded
as small or medium sized. Of these decisions, forty gave negative clearance under Article
S)(1) or exemption under Article 85(3), and sixteen were prohibition orders under
Article 85.
Such firms also have a prime interest in all decisions affecting major firms and either
oPen uP markets or bring abuse of dominance to an end. As competitors, suppliers and
customers they are the very first to suffer from restrictive or abusive practices of larger
firms.
23. In the context of Community competition law, it must be emphasized that the
importance of a firm is measured by the influence of its economic activity and by any
restrictive effect it may have, which will vary in degree with a firm's market power. Yet
market power basically depends on market share and turnover. NTorking from this as-
sumption but wi.thout wishing to define the small or medium-sized firm, the Commission
gave a practical and realistic interpretation of these two criteria in a notice published in
19701 to facilitate greater cooperation between small businesses. It specified that restric-
tive practices of firms below certain aggtegate thresholds (1/o maket share, turnover of
1) million u.a. for manufacturing firms and 20 million u.a. for distributive firms) are
regarded as having no appreciable effect on inter-State trade and competition. Agree-
ments between firms below these thresholds are accordingly untouched by Article 85(1).
The Commission has recently raised the sales threshold to >o million u.a., not only to
take account of the impact of inflation but also to reflect experience to date, which shows
that the aggregate turnover of small and medium-sized firms taking part in agreements
of minor importance does not in fact exceed this new limit.'z
24. There are other measures of general scope, which are of particular interest to small
and medium-sized firms:
1. The 1968 notice concerning cooperation between undertakingss enumerates the types
of agreement which by their very nature do not restrict competition and may be of
great practical value, notably, joint market research; the joint establishment of statis-
tics and statistical formulas; cooperation in book-keeping and accounting; the collec-
1 oJ c 64 of 2.6.1970.
2 Point 42 of this Reoort.
3 OJ C 75 of 29.7.1i68; corigenda in OJ C 84 ol 28.8.1968 (French and Dutch) and OJ C 93
of 18.9.1968 (German and ltalian).
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tion of revenue; research and development; advertising and the use of plant and
machinery; storage and carfiage; and the formation of temporary consortia for the
joint performance of orders.
Regulation No 67/67 grants exemption under Article S5(3) for certain categories of
exclusive dealing agreementl and thus enables efficient selling systems to be set up in
other common market countries. This Regulation will shortly be amended in the light
of a recent judgment of the Court of Justice. The value to small business of maintain-
ing access to goods throughout the Community will be borne in mind.z
Regulation No 2779/72 grants exemption under Article 85(3) to certain specializa-
tion agreements between firms which do not exceed specified ag$egate market shares
(L0%) and sales levels (150 million u.a.). These figures have been nised to l5/o
and 300 million u.a. by a recent Regulation3 which will primarily benefit independent
firms of medium size.
By its rapid growth subcontracting has become one of the modern forms of division
of labour. As it has also become important in cross-frontier business relations in the
Community, the Commission deems it necessary to inform firms of the general con-
siderations which will guide its assessment of subcontracting agreements in relation to
Article 8t(1).4 \Vhile it is accepted that subcontracting agreements in general do not
intrinsically fall within the prohibitioo on cartels, there may be doubts where they
impose restrictions on the subcontractor's freedom of action in order to protect the
principal contractor's contribution to the manufacture of the subcontracted goods or
the provision of the subcontracted services.s The Commission will publish its views
during the first half of t9le.
25. Apart from all the measures that have been or are about to be taken to assist small
and medium-sized firms, the Commission has been asked whether, to encourage coopera-
,tion between them even further, it should not simply publish a list of those forms of
cooperation which can never be authorized.e However, the 1970 and L977 notices on
agreements of minor importance, based on the Commission's administrative practice and
on judgments of the Court of Justice, make it clear that Article 85 does not contain an
absolute prohibition. The operation of the Community competition des has thus been
relaxed quite considerably in favour of small business.
L OI 57 of. 25.3.1967; the validity of this Regulation was extended to 31 December 1982 by Regu-
lation No 259r/72 (OI L 276 of 9.r2.r972).
2 Point 38 of this Report.
3 OJ L 318 of 28.12.1977; point 36 of this Report.
a Point 46 of this Report.
5 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, points 5 to 9.
e lrritten Question No 671/76 by Mr Coust€: OJ C t0 of 28.2.7977.
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26, Small and medium-sized undertakings which nevertheless, by combining, acquire
aggreg te market shares that enable them to impose appreciable restrictions on competi-
tion are caught by Article 8t(1). This Article, which lists a number of forbidden prac-
tices by way of example, was actually applied in the sixteen decisions mentioned eadier
which impose prohibition orders. The following infringements were fou.nd to have been
committed:
(i) in five cases, export bans, market-sharing and quota-fixing;1
(ii) in two cases, aggregated rebate cartels taking account of purchases exclusively from
home-based manufacturers ;2
(iii) in three cases, national cartels involving manufacturers and deal:rs fixing prices
and sales terms;8
(iv) in three cases, collective buying arrangements between manufacturers or importers
and dealers in a single country;4
(v) in two cases, restrictions on admission and exclusive buying obligations at certain
auction arrangements for farm produce.s
This list illustrates the fact that one of the main principles of Community competition
policy is to ensure that the conrmon market is an open market in which access to sources
of supply and sales outlets is not appreciably restricted. An open matket for goods and
services is indispensable if small and medium-sized firms are to have any prospect of
growth and they must not be allowed to put the market at risk by combining in large
numbers to attain objectives which correspond to their mutual interests.
, OJ L 242 of 5.lr.t97o (Julien/Yan Karwijk); First Report on Competition Policy, point 3.Ol L 29 of. 1.2.1975 (Preserved mushrooms); Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 32.
OJ L 6 of rt.r.I976 (AOIP,zBeyrard); Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 61. OI L 2ir
ol 21.8.1976 (Pabst & Richarz/Bureau national interprofessionnel de l'armagnac); Sixth Report
on Competition Policy, point rL7. Ol L 39 of 10.2.1977 (Theal,,'\7ats)r; Sixth Report on Com-
petition Policy, point 149.
2 OI L 10 of 13.1.1971 (German ceramic tiles manufacturers); First Report on Competition Policy,
point 24. OJ L 217 ot 6.8,1973 (Gas water heaters); Third Report on Competition Policy,
point 53.
3 OJ L 13 of L7.1.1972 (Vereniging van Cementhandelaren); First Report on Competition Policy,
point 9. OJ L 3o3 of 11.12.t972 (GISA); Second Report on Competition Policy, point 32.
OJ L 159 oI 21.6.L975 (Haarden-/en Kachelhandel); Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 43.
4 OJ L 264 of 23.11.1972 (Central heating); Second Report on Competition Policy, point 33.OI L 129 ol 2i.12.197, (Bomee-Stichting); Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 42.
OI L 20 of.2t.1.1978 (Centraal Bureau voor de Rijwielhandel); point 105 of this Report.
u OJ L 237 of 29.8.1974 (Frubo); Fourth Report oo Competition Policy, point 71. OJ L 2L of
26.1.L978 (Cauliflowers); point 108 of this Report.
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S 6 
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Supply obligations of undertakings in a dominant position
27. In December t972 the Comm,ission published a decision finding that a de facto
monopolist of an interrnediate product abused a dominant position by refusing to con'
tinue to supply a firm operating on the market for the end product. The Commission
found such refusal to sell likely to eliminate one of the few manufacturers in the market
for the end product and hence likely to strike a serious blow at the maintenance of
effective competition in the common market.l The Court of Justice upheld the Commis-
sion'sdecisionbyajudgmenton6MarchlgT4.2InitsChiquitadecisionstheCommission
restated this principle, fining the United Brands Company for refusing, without objective
reason, to supply its Chiquita brand of bananas to one of its main Danish customers.
The Commission has since taken two more decisions which deal with the supply obliga-
tions of undertakings in a dominant position.
28. In the first,a the Commission held that it is an abuse of a dominant position if, at
a time of shortage, a dominant undertaking reduces supplies to a regular customer of
long-standing more sharply than to other comparable customers. The differentiation was
not justified on objective grounds taking account of the importance, continuity or regu-
larity of business relations and was likely to result in a change in the structure of the
market through the disappearance of that customer as a substantial, independent distri'
butor of the relevant product.
In the second case,5 the Commission considered a f.irm with a monopoly in the manu-
facture of spare parts for repairing and reconditioning the machines it makes, and
absolute control of their distribution, abuses its dominant position by a refusal to supply
independent, qualified repairers. The dominant firm was limiting or eliminating comPe'
tition on after-sales services and repairs and also, in this case, preventing independent
operators from renting out and selling or reselling its machines, strengthening its own
already dominant position on the market. The Commission emphasized that there was no
1 Decision ol 14.72.1.972, Zola v CSC-ICI: OJ L 299 of 31.L2.L972; Second Report on Competition
Policy, point 47.
2 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation v Commission, Joined
Cases 6 and 7"/73: U974) ECR 223.
3 Decision of t7.t2.r97i, Chiquita: OJ L 9, of 9.4.1976; Fifth Report on Competition Policy,
polnt /r.
I becision of. t2.4.197i, ABG/Oil companies operating in the Netherlands: point 144 of this Report.
0 Hugin/Liptons: point 146 of this Report'
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objective reason for the refusal to supply a customer who had the ability and training
required to maintain and repair the manufacturer's machines as well as competing
machines.
It must also be emphasized that a dominant firm has to set the prices of products
it is bound to supply to its customers in a way which allows them a reasonable margin,
sufficient to enable them to stay in business long term, even if the customer is a
competitor.l
S 7 
- 
Horizontal groups and economic entities
29. The question of the position of horizontal groups in relation to the EEC rules of
competition was raised in the Commission's proceedings against a number of European
zip-fastener manufacturers. As with joint ventures,z the main problem is to draw the line
between a restrictive agreement and a merger. The difficulty arises because of the
peculiar structure of the horizontal group: unlike the parent-and-subsidiary group, the
horizontal group is not made up of a parent company and one or more companies
dependent on it; the distinguishing legal feature of horizontal groups is that two or more
firms set up-often by contract-a single body to manage them. This single management
must actually run the participating firms. The formation of a horizontal group of this
kind does not, however, affect the legal independence of the participants, and it does not
necessarily bnng their business independence to an end either.
The setting-up of a horizontal group often leads to coordination of the participants'
market conduct. In addition, such a group depends for its foundation and continued
existence not on the unilateral assertion of authority but on voluntary agreement, which
can in principle be ended at any time. Because it is always possible for one of the firms
taking part to withdraw, attempts to manage the group in the common interest may run
into serious difficulties in practice. These considerations bring out the similarity which
often exists between a horizontal group and a restrictive agreement of the classical type
and they preclude in consequence 
^ny systematic categorization of such groupings as
mergers. The choice of this legal form of grouping amounts to no more than inconclusive
evidence of merger.
On the other hand, the formation of a horizontal group may be accompanied by coordina-
tion within the firms involved covering the major part if not the whole of their business
1 National Carbonizing Company: point 148 of this Report.
z Sixth Report on Competition Policy, points 5t to ,9.
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and often amounting to a real merger to which Article 86 of the Treaty, rather than
Article 85, may apply.
30. In the Commission's view horizontal groups are to be regarded tts new economic
entities once the member firms have finally given up their independence and have lost
any real possibility of re-entering the market as independent buyers or sellers in the
future. This point may coincide with the formation of the group; but it may come later,
particulady if the participants' activities are integrated in stages, either in accordance
with a timetable or with one line of business following another.
So in assessing the position of a horizontal group under competition law, it is necessary
to look beyond the text of the agreement setting up the group. All the legal and eco-
nomic circumstances, including the actual behaviour of those taking part, must also be
considered. The question whether such a group is caught by Article 85 can therefore
only be answered case by case. The Commission believes, however, that an economic
entity, and hence also a merger, can be said to exist at least in cases where the following
three tests are satisfied:
1. The joint management body provided for when any horizontal group is being formed
must actually operate. It must control financial planning, investment and the most
important areas of the business carried on by all participating firms.
2. The assets of all participants must be under the permanent control of the joint
management.
3. There must also be a system for spreading business and financial risks, so that all
those taking part have a similar interest in pursuing the common aims.
31. In the case concerning the European zip-fastener industry, the Commission received
a complaint from the Japanese group Yoshida Kogyo KK (YKK), the largest zip-
fastener manufacturer in the world, against the British group Imperial Metal Industria
(IMI) and the German-Swiss group Heilmann. The main accusation in the complaint
was that the European groups had entered into agreements and concetted practices which
enabled them to monopolize the Community market in zip-fasteners. The Commission
found the facts to be as follows:
(a) The IMI and Heilmann groups are two of the largest Community undertakings
engaging in the developmert, production and sale of zip-fasteners and machines
for making thern, and both have extensive networks of subsidiaries; they were
otiginally competitors in the common market and elsewhere. Faced with increasing
competition from firms in non-member countries, IMI and Heilmann decided to
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combine their interests in the zip-fastener market. They took a series of measures
aimed at intedocking their finances and business, and coordinating the policies they
followed.
(b) In L964 and 1965 IMI and Heilmann each took a 5O/o share in the capital of each
other's subsidiaries. The stated aim of this exchange was to share equally between
both parties profits and losses made within the two groups.
(c) In 1965 IMI and Heilmann formed a joint management company, each holding half
the capital. This company was to coordinate the activities of all the subsidiaries in
certain important areas, particularly financial planning, investment, and the use
made of industrial property rights. At the same time Heilmann was made responsible
for running the day-to-day business of a number of subsidiaries based in certain
specified countries, while IMI was to do the same in the case of subsidiaries in all
other countries. The form of organization they had chosen enabled the participants
to establish a single decision-making centre for all important policy measures, and
to delegate the implementation of these decisions along with day-to-day running to
the partner who was most familiar with each particular market.
(d) In 1967 IMI and Heilmann decided to grant each other licences in respect of all
their existing and future patents. This resulted in common use of all the industrial
and commercial property rights possessed by the two groups.
(e) More recently, IMI and Heilmann have continued to rationalize the development and
production activities of their subsidiaries and to redefine the subsidiaries' objectives
by reference to the overriding consideration of their common interest. Such a degree
of mutual dependence has arisen between firms which formedy belonged either to
the IMI or to the Heilmann group that a separation of the two groups would be
difficult to imagine.
(f) In 1975 IMI and Heilmann finally announced in a joint statement that the combined
assets of the whole of the IMl/Heilmann group would be used to cover the liabili-
ties of any single subsidiary.
32. After considering these circumstances the Commission came to the conclusion that
the formedy separate IMI and Heilmann groups had merged into a single economic
entity. There were therefore no grounds for intervention under Article 85 against the
agreemeots and decisions entered into for that purpose. Article 86 did not apply either,
because the merged groups did not occupy a dominant position either in the common
market as a whole or in a substantial part of it. The Commission was accordingly able
to terminate its proceedings.
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S S 
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The Commission's policy on intra'Community dumping
Apptication ot Artictes 136 and 137 ot the Treaty ol Accession
1. Introduction
33. The First Report on Competition Policy included an account of the Commission's
policy on dumping (application of Article 91 of the Treaty of. Rome).l This section of
th. n.pott seets to give a similar review of the corresponding Article in the Treaty of
Accession,
Article L36 of the Treaty of Accession made provision (drawing upon the terms of
Article 91(1) of the Treaty of Rome) for the regulation of intra-Community dumping.
The currency of this Article was moreover five years as compared with the twelve years
adopted by the original six Member States.
Intra-Community dumping could take place until 31 December 1977 between any two of
the new Member States themselves or between a new and an original Member State.
Obviously a complaint could not arise where both parties were original Member States.
Article 136 of the Treaty of Accession stated that if the Commission made a finding that
dumping was being practised it should address recommendations to the originating
parties to cease. In the case of the practice continuing the Commission should authorize
ihe irrj,rred Member State to take protective measures which the Commission considered
appropriate.
In addition to Article 136 the Treaty of Accession contained Article 137 which provided
for unilateral action in cases of extreme urgency until 31 December L977 ort the part of
Ireland, subject to afl ex post lacto abolition or modification by the Commission.
2. The application of Article 136 (Treaty of Accession)
There was no occasion on which it was necessary to rnake use of the provisions of Article
136. In practice where an investigation was initiated on receipt of a complaint either no
dumping was found to be taking place, or the parties came to a voluntary agreement or
the problem resolved itself during investigation. There can be little doubt that the
existence of the Article inhibited dumping and that Commission interest was an important
deterrent.
1 First Report on Competition Policy, point LO6 et req,
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The general question of defining intra-Community dumping arose once again when Ire-
land found difficulty in accepting the principles decided upon in L96l by the original
six Member States which allowed exporters to absorb import duties during the transitional
period. Given the difficulfy of comparing like with like in a meaningful fashion it has
proved by experience necessary to adopt a flexible approach, as was the case in the first
transitional period,l
Comparison with the transitional period of the original six Member States is difficult
rfor many reasons, in particular economic circumstances and attitudes have changed sub-
stantially. The first yeat of the transitional period was notable for the number of cases
originating in Ireland against United Kingdom firms whilst the latter end of the period
saw many complaints arising in the United Kingdom against Italian producers. The
number of complaints concerning Denmark has been very small. It is most noteworthy
that during the transitional period no complaint was introduced by any of the six original
Member states against any of the new Members, although the Treaty made provision
for this.
Contrary to the situation experienced under Article 91 (1) of the Treaty of Rome, com-
plaints increased towards the end of the transitional period particulady if weight is given
to the sizes of the industries involved, with the result that in the last months there were
several major complaints still under examination which even if well founded could have
led to only a very short period of protective action within the terms of Article 136
(Treaty of Accession).
During the five years that Article 136 was applicable the Commission received iL alle-
gations of dumping. of these 9 showed misconceptions of the meaning of dumping and
were rejected or, where appropriate were transferred to other Directorates of the Com-
mission. There was one case under Article 137. In some cases it was not clear whether
dumping or abuse of a dominant position, Article 86, or state aids, Article 92, of the
Treaty of Rome, was involved and simultaneous consideration was adopted.
The large number of Irish cases started in L973 against British companies was dominated
by questions in the paper products industry. Perhaps more striking is the fact that no
Irish organization saw the necessity to lodge an allegation against companies in any of the
other seven Member States. This is believed to be due to the fact that the Irish economy
is still very closely linked to the UK, either by trade or by British subsidiary companies
operating in Ireland. The predominance of complaints arising in the United Kingdom in
the last three years depended upon a number of factors. The transport sector had wit-
nessed the container revolution and other improvements in door-to-door transportation;
these had facilitated the importation of products which traditionally enjoyed a degree of
1 First Report on Competition Policy, point 108.
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natural protection in the United Kingdom. The highly concentrated nature of much Uni-
ted Kingdom wholesaling and retailing activity could also provide an external suPPlier
with a single organization capable of distributing a significant Percentage of his ou{>ut.
Investigation of complaints frequently led to the conclusion that the 'pull' from the
United Kingdom importing organizations for the products in question was more impor-
tant than the'push' from the exporting country.
The Table below refers only to dumping complaints which warranted investigation:
Year of
allegation
Allegation
by an industry against an industrY
tn ln
Product group
Paper products
Paper products
Paper products
Paper products
Paper products (Article 137 case)
Plastics
Chemicals
Pet foods
I 
Non-fe.rous metals
Security products
Textiles
Plastics
Vood-based products
Textiles
r97)
r974 Denmark
r97 5 UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
Denmark
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
Germany
Germany
Italy
rr^ | 
-.
Germany
Germany
Ceramics
Industrial cleaning equiPment
Domestic appliances
Plastics
Specialized building products
Electronics
r977 Bathroom equipment
Hand tools
The following are some of the cases of particular interest which arose during the transi-
tional period. One involving PaPer products, Produced in a large vafiety' caused so much
confusion in the realm of comparing like with like that the alleged dumper agfeed to
use the same price list in Ireland as in the United Kingdom. A textile case involving
British and ltiian.industries highligtrrted the significance of the 'pull' effect as mentioned
4feys-fe the point where many United Kingdom clothing manufacturers had become
completely dependent upon imported material.
Germany
France
Italy
Ireland
Belgium
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
vUK
vUK
vUK
vUK
vUK
vUK
vUK
vUK
UK v ItalyUK v Nethedands
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Modern transport methods and very different market structures rendered comparison of
like with like extremely difficult in three cases: a case concerning United Kingdom and
Irish producers of plastic products, a case concerning United Kingdom and Italian
manufacturers of domestic appliances and in the same countries a case concerning a type
of bathroom equ.ipment. The common feature of these cases was that the domestic market
of the alleged dumper was either small or fragmented (or both) whereas the United
Kingdom market was dominated by a small number of large firms and transport to it
was relatively simple to arrange.
A strange difficulty arose in a case concerning security products whereby a similar
product rendered a service which was said to be valued differently for insurance purposes
from one country to another thereby implying the need for a price structure to match.
A textile case raised the question of how much local value must be added to a cheap
non-Community material to render it a Community product and avoid 'back door'
dumping.
By contrast, where international specifications for basic products permitted straightfor-
ward calculations as in a non-ferrous metal case between producers in Denmark and
Getmany the work of the Service of the Commission was much simplified. At the same
time, the fluctuating nature of the prices of primary materials can raise problems concern-
ing the stability of. any settlement. Similarly, frequent fluctuations in rates of exchange
have caused problems.
3. The application of Article 137 (Ireaty of Accession)
The purpose of this Article was to give an additional safeguard to the small Irish market
where, by reason of the size of the local industries, dumping could have a far more
rapidly injurious effect than would be likely to larger economies.
Article I37 gave Ireland the power to take emergency measures. The decision of the
Irish authorities and the measures taken were subject to review by the Commission which
could decide to abolish or modify the measures.
In the event there was only one case introduced under Article 137 concerning two paper
products. For one product it was concluded that there was no margin of dumping, and
for the other the dumping had ceased before Ireland took its temporary measures. Duties
on both products were abolished.
4. Conclusioru
There was no general feature concerning the types of products involved. The most re-
current asPect was that the complaining enterprise was often located in an area of above
average unemployment or was a major employer in a small area.
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As no formal action was taken on the basis of dumping, the question of material injury
did not have to be faced. However, it is clear that the separation of the effects of general
market recession from the effect of any dumping would have been very difficult'
Finally, as indicated in eadier Reports the submission, or threat of submission, of a
complaint to the Commission exerted a strong 'moral pressure'. This supported the
adoption of flexible methods of investigatinn which usually involved a visit to one or
both of the parties concerned.
S 9 
- 
Findings of the inquiry into the markel for naphtha for petrochemical
use and into the behaviour ol the oil companies
l. Subiect of the inquiry
34. In its report on the behaviour of the oil companies during the cisisl the Com-
mission found that, for certain products such as kerosene and naphtha, there were
'specific market situations and price differences which justify closer investigation'.2
The naphtha inquiry was undertaken to consider the compatibility with the competition
rules of the oil companies' behaviour in the Community market for non-energy naphtha
between 1973 and L975, the period immediately following the oil crisis.
The Commission has also carried out an inquiry into the use by oil companies of Platt's
Oilgram quotations for naphtha. Platt's quotations are used as indicators of spot market
trends for the various petroleum products. These quotations have a majot influence on
price formation in a variety of transactions, notably when period supply contracts are
indexed to them.
The inquiry was inspired by the sudden pressure on naphtha prices following the oil
crisis. Its origin also lay in the Commission's fear that, in this highly concentrated oligo-
polistic market, the major international companies might use their power and their
privileged access to crude oil, the raw material for making naphtha, as the basis for
conduct conflicting with the Treaty rules on competition.
2. Naphtha
Naphtha is a light fraction resulting from the distillation of crude oil. Like crude it is a
variable mixture of various hydrocarbons-paraffins, olefins, naphthenes and aromatics
1 Commission Report on the Behaviour of the Oil Companies in the Community during the period
from October 1973 to March 1974, Brussels, 14 December 1975 (Studies, Competition Series
No 26), p. 161; see also Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 9.).
2 The Commission is still conducting an inquiry into the jet fuel (kerosene) market.
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-and it has energy and petrochemical properties. These two-fold properties affect the
use of and market for naphtha.
The energy property of naphtha is used in the production of manufactured gas and
especially motor spirit, where those naphtha fractions richer in aromatics are used.
As a petrochemical base, which is the concern of this inquiry, naphtha is used for
manufacturing major intermediate products such as ethylene, propylene and butadiene,
which are olefins. These are then made into finished products, mainly plastics and
synthetic rubber. Some man-made fibres and detergents are also derived from naphtha.
Lastly, with the hydrogen obtained from the hydrocarbons in naphtha, methanol is
produced, also ammoniac from which nitrogenous fertilizers are derived.
The price of naphtha currently represents about 70/o df the cost of manufachrring basic
petrochemicals.
3. Analysis ot naphtha market trends trom 1973 to 1975
The rise in total naphtha consumption in rVestern Europe came to a sudden halt at the
end of 1974 and was followed by a decline in 1971, largely because of the drop in
consumption by the petrochernicals industry. Petrochemical naphtha consumption fell
sharply both in absolute terms and in relation to naphtha used for energy.l
The decline began in the Community only in the last quarter of 1974. According to the
findings of the inquiry, annual petrochemical naphtha consumPtiion2 among the Nine
was 33 070000 tonnes in L973 and stayed at much the same level in 1974 (33779000
tonnes), falling then to 24L95 000 toones in 1975.
The decline in demand for finished petrochemical products in the Community did not
rcally affect the naphtha processing industry until 1975.
1 According to figures based on OECD statistics and expert estimates, naphtha consumption in
Itrestern Europe developed as follows (in million tonnes):
1973 1974 197t 1976 1977
Total naphtha consumption
(excluding manufactured gas and solvents) 129 128 116 Llo lt3
of which:(a) energy naphtha (/s)(b) petrochemical napb$a (/o)
(including deliveries between refineries and
company).
D Exduding deliveries between refineries and petrochemical installations belonging to the same
c.|rlnPany.
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36 t9 11 j6 36
petrochemical installations belonging to the same
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But apart from the effect of demand for finished products and for motor spirit, other
factors also influenced the naphtha market during the reference period: price controls in
France, Italy and Belgium, trade befween Community countries and with the rest of the
wodd, demand for middle and heavy distillates, representing four-fifths of all refinery
products in Europe, and, most important, the price of crude.
The rise in crude prices was the source of the pressure on the naphtha market which
began to apper in 1973. From the second quarter of t9l3 to the first quarter of 1974,
naphtha prices rose sieadily, increasing fourfold. Prices then f.ell again but were still
more than twice the price for the second quarter of tglt; by the end af L97l they were
back up to three times their original level (Graph 1).
Users reacted rather slowly. Naphtha demand only began to fall in October 1974,
reaching its lowest point in 197r. At a time when prices were rising, petrochemical users
continued producing naphtha intermediates and increased their stocks, on the assumption
that prices might rise even further. From October L974 the effects of declining demand
for finished petrochemical products as a result of price increases and anti-inflation mea-
sures (credit squeeze) made them run down their stocks and cut back production, which
in turn caused a sharp drop in naphtha consumption from the end of L974 to the end of
197 r,
The drop in total imports directly affected not only intra-Community trade in naphtha
but also imports from non-member countries. The consequences of the fall were felt by
all exporting non-member countries except those in Europe and in North Africa, which
expanded their exports to the Community because favourable geographical location gave
them an advantage as regards freight costs; they thereby consolidated the traditional
flows of trade between the Community and its neighbours.
4. Suppliers and users ot naphtha in the European Community
4.1 The strucfure of naphtha production and processing
The production of naphtha (by refining crude oil) and its processing into basic petro-
chemical products are closely linked. The two stages may be integrated:
(i) either fully, in a single company or group of companies possessing the two kinds of
plant-refining and naphtha transforming ;(ii) or by a combination of two or morc comp^nies or groups of companies which are
in the petroleum or chemical industries, setting up a joint venture at one of the two
stages.
'Ihese two forms of integration are practised both by oil companies and by chemical
companies.
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The rapid growth of petrochemicals which began in the 1960s was the reason fot large-
scale investment by petroleum companies. The price of naphtha exerts a decisive influence
on the manufacture of basic petrochemical products, and the refining techniques are
similar to those used in petrochemicals. The oil companies therefore set up either wholly
owned subsidiaries or joint ventures generally with chemical groups to transform naPhtha.
Certain chemical companies also did the same and, already having petrochemical plants,
gained access to refineries either by integtating refinery companies into their own grouP
(or company) or by taking shares in refinery joint ventures.
And so the chemical companies have played their part in the integration of the refining
and transforming stages.
The extent of integration, measured in terms of the quantities of naphtha delivered
within a group of companies or to joint ventures by parent companies as a proportion
of total deliveries by all suppliers in a given country,l varies from country to country.
The figures were 69/o in the United Kingdom, 76/o in France and 80/6 in Germany.
The percentage was higher still is Belgium but much lower in the Nethedands and Italy
being only 27/o and 49/o respectively. The transport structufe also reflects this level of
integration, since the volumes carried by pipeline in each country are very nearly in direct
proportion to the degree of integration. Pipeline is the normal method of moving naph-
tha from refinery to petrochemical plant within an integrated group.2
Two-thirds of the petrochemical naphtha traded within the Community moves within
completely integrated groups or bebween joint ventures and their parent comPanies. The
remaining third is handled by non-integrated transactions, most of it under period supply
contracts and a little through spot transactions. Although the non-integrated share of the
market is less than one-third of total purchases of naphtha in the first four countries
mentioned above, it is more than one-third in Italy and the Nethedands, these being
countries where there is also a larger number of suppliers with substantial shares of the
period supply contract market.
4.2 The position of the suppliers in the integrated and non-integrated
markets for naphtha in the Community
To indicate cleady the pre-eminent position held by a limited number of suppliers on
the integrated market and on the non-integrated (period supply contract) market, Table L
breaks down suppliers into three categories:
1 Volumes delivered by a refinery to a petrochemical plant where both are directly owned by the
szrme company are disregarded for this purpose.
2 But pipeline is not the only means of transport used by these groups for their internal deliveries,
and in addition it may also be used for deliveries to third parties.
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TABLE 1
The structure of the integrated market (wholly owned subsidiaries and ioint venftree)
and of the non-integrated market (period supply contracts) in the Community
between 1973 atd 1975
Suppliers
Maior international companies(1) National companics(2)
D F I NL B UK EEC D E rl
.9
..5 ^g;s
5EE
a6d
*! )xo
F E.E
Fo ".9E >,_
Number of
suppliers
Per cent share
of integrated
market
Per cent share
of supplies tojoint ventures
94
to
z
48
/o
I
z1
3
100
i
83
6
42
I
1 <)
6t
,
69
27
o!
*x
xe
E99x
!:. a.
d6
'i -o
.e .tz6&
Number of
suppliers
Per cent share
of non-integrated
market (period
supply contracts)
2
r9
z
9'
5
20
6
46
t
49
a
6
4r
2
46
2
5
5
5Z
t Groups of suppliers.
o
.l.
e)
600
(i) the major international firms-Exxon, Shell, BP, Texaco, Gulf, Mobil Oil and
Chevron:
(ii) national companies such as Elf, CFP, their joint ventures (Saarland Raffinerie and
Antar), ENI, Moratti, Monti, Petrofina and VEBA;
(iii) other suppliers, and chiefly:
(a) the independent American firms Phillips, Amoco and Conoco;
(b) the chemical firms Dow and BASF;
(c) companies in various countries, including those in Eastern Europe (Sojuznefte-
export and Nafta USSR) and the Mediterranean region occupying a position
of substantial power in the period suPPly contract market.
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Other companies(r) All companies(l)+(2)+(3)
l*' * l*. 'l
:.
L7
1
t8
B IUKIEECI D
The table shows the position occupied on the two markets-integrated and period supply
contract-by all companies in each of these three categories of suppliers.
Market shares are calculated from the relative importance of supplies by one category of
suppliers as compared with total integrated or contract supplies in a given Member
State and in the Community.
The figure for supplies to joint ventures expresses internal deliveries between parent
companies and jo,int ventures as a Percentage of total integrated deliveries.
It can be seen from this table that a limited number of suppliers, consisting mainly of
the international majors, account for the bulk of the integrated market and a sizeable
share of the non-integrated market throughout the Community. But there is a perceptible
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difference between countries with a high degree of integration (France, Germany, Bel-
gium and United Kingdom) and the less-integrated countries (Italy and Nethedands).
The importance of the role played by certain national companies in the integrated market
and in the period supply contract market is also evident. In the Community as a whole
their share of the integrated market and their share of the non-integrated market are
smaller though far from negligible. In the two markets they attain shares of 2l/o and
18lo respectively.
Lastly, in all the Member States except ltaly, the United Kingdom and the Nethedands,
the joint venture is a more highly developed form of integration than the wholly owned
subsidiary.l
Analysis of the structure of the market gives indications of the strategy adopted by
petroleum companies on the European naphtha market. The major American oil com-
panies face the competition on their owo through wholly integrated subsidiaries, whereas
Shell, BP, the other European oil companies and the independent American companies
practise total integration or combination with other groups which are sometimes in the
chemical industry and sometimes in the oil industry.
In the two countries where the degree of integration is low, the chemical firms have
remained independent of the major international oil groups: in the Nethedands they are
not associated with oil firms and in Italy they are associated with national oil groups.
The fact that users in these two countries have greater freedom of supply than users
elsewhere in the Community can be explained by the greater variety of sources of supply
available in their non-integrated markets.
4.3 The position of users in the Community
The number of user firms surveyed is thirty-swen, controlled by thirty oil or chemical
gfouPs.
Among the groups that are both suppliers and users of petrochemicals there are both
petroleum firms and a few American or European chemical firms. These groups, with
their subsidiaries and joint ventures, account for two-thirds of all petrochemical users.
The major international firms control most of the users and, as groups, are the largest
users in the Community.
Six major chemical firms are among the sixteen largest users.
1 Belgium and the Netheda,nds each has only one form of integration - the joint venture in Belgium
and the whollv owned subsidiarv in the Netherlands.
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In no Member State does the number of naphtha users exceed ten; there are only about
half-a-dozen in Italy, the Nethedands and the United Kingdorn, while there are three
countries where user firms are either non-existent or only of minor importance.
It may be concluded that oligopoly in this market is confronted by oligopsony.l
5. Naphtha prices
In many cases the prices charged on the naphtha market differ appreciably, and this
applies also to transfer prices, prices charged to joint ventures, contract prices and spot
prices.
5.1 Trarufer prices anil prices chargeil to ioint ventures
Prices in such dealings as these depend to a large extent on the degree of integration of
the firms involved:
(i) Transfer prices generally tend to follow the prices for non-integrated dealings
(period supply contracts), though they may be above or below, depending on the
particular policy applied by the international company concerned'
(ii) Prices charged to joint ventures generally reflect the balance of interests between
the two parent companies. Although these prices sometimes reflect contract prices
more closely than transfer prices, there are other cases where the interests of the
two parent cornpanies are such that they will charge prices well below the prices
charged on non-integrated dealings (period supply contracts).
5.2 Contract prices and the lack of infonnatlon on trem
There is no such thing as a market price for naphtha common to the whole Community'
Firstly, contract prices vary from one Member State to another.
Substantial differences over time and from one country to another, and, similarly, dif-
ferences in regional naphtha markets, naturally affected prices and dealings on these
markets between l9n a^d L97).
In France the official fixing of maximum prices curbed the rise in prices and kept them
lower than in other Member States.
r Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 9.
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In Italy the same result was achieved but there it was due to the large number of sources
of supply available to certain users rather than to price controls.
In the United Kingdom the highest prices paid at a time when the market was unsettled
were those for imported naphtha, which helped to raise aggregate price levels. Imports
from Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean countries helped to moderate price move-
ments when the market was reverting to stability.
Secondly, it has been found that contract prices vary sharply even within the same
country when the price of naphtha is not subject to controls.
Some of the larger-scale user firms find themselves with highly diversified sources of
supply in the form either of refineries that they themselves own or of contracts with
Eastern European countries involving very large volumes of naphtha. These sources of
supply give the firms that have access to them a definite price advantage over other
firms that do not enjoy such access.
Thirdly, there are also substantial differences in the prices charged by different suppliers
in dealing with the same customer, especially when the customer is only a medium-sized
,firm. Prices charged to the largest customers are usually within a narrov/er range than
those to medium-sized custqmers.
Observed differences in contract prices, often for deliveries rnade on broadly comparable
terms, are explained not only by the specific circumstances of the market and of the
inequality of bargaining strength of buyer and seller, but also by the absence of trans-
Parency, i.e. general information about the market. There is no arrangement for publica-
tion of contract prices. Certain prices are however, periodically renegotiated, which places
the weaker customers at a disadvantage because they have less extensive sources of
information than the larger customers.
5.3 Spot prices for naphtha and Platfs Oilgmm quotatiore for this martet
Spot prices are prices charged for occasional purchases of s,mall quantities of naphtha,
bought to complete supply requirements. Although these quantities are only marginal,
representing no more than 5/o of all purchases in the Community, they have expanded
since the oil crisis.
Although the spot market concerns only fairly small quantities of naphtha, spot prices
are used as market indicators through Platt's Oilgram quotations.
To a varying extent the quotations, which are the only daily indications available of the
high and low prices charged in naphtha spot dealings on the preceding day, influence
the prices in other dealings, i.e. period contracts and internal transactions, which together
cover 95% of all naphtha dealings in the Community.
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Platt's quotations for naphtha began in April 1973, when they cornpleted the quotations
for the European markets for petroleum products in Rotterdam and in Italy (European
bulk quotations), published daily by the American publisher McGraw Hill in Platt's
Oilgram.l
Platt's quotations for naphtha serve as a basis for indexing many period supply contracts
but are also used by governments as a reference for setting maximum prices (Belgium)
or for verifying cost analyses (Italy).
5.3.L. Deaelopments in Platt's quolations and real cleueloptnents in spot prices
Graph 1 reveals two important points-firstly, that Platt's quotations for Rotterdam and
Italy move in parallel and, secondly, that most of the prices actually charged on the spot
market sharply diverge from the quotations.
There are two distinct phases in the recent development of Platt's quotations:
(i) a first phase of instability, when naphtha prices rose sharply and then fell sharply
again (April L973 to August L974);
(ii) a second phase which, in contrast, began with a period of price stability (August
1974to February 1975) and was followed by two successive price rises, less matked
than the first.
During the first phase most market prices lie below Platt's quotations while prices are
rising and above them while they are falling. In the second phase prices that are outside
the quotation bands are similar to those of the first phase in that they lie above qu,ota-
tions during periods of stability and below them when prices are rising.
Now if the two phases are compared, it is found that during the second phase spot
prices diverge from the quo,tations less frequently than in the first phase: but even then
they represent more than half of the spot prices and more than half the quantity of all
the spot naphtha delivered.
In the second half of 1975, however, Platt's quotations give a much closer translation of
European naphtha spot market trends.
It may therefore be concluded that in general, before the second half of 1975, these
quotations anticipated market trends-whether they were upward or downward.
1 Until October 1975 therc were two European bulk quotations - Barges fob Rotterdam and Cargoes
fob (Mediterranean basis) Italy. Since October 1975 there has been a third - Cargoes cif (North
West Europe basis) Rotterdam.
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The next two graphs highlight the extent of the gap between trends in actual spot prices
and trends in Platt's quotations, contrasting Rotterdam and Italy spot price variations
with Platts' quotations for those two markets.
Graphs 2 and 3 show that Platt's Rotterdam quotations are even less realistic than its
Italian quotations as a reflection of the prices achrally charged on the two sPot markets
during the period under review.
5.3.2. The reliability ol Platt's quotations for naphtba
The analysis of Platt's quotations for naphtha raises a number of points which lead to
reservations as to the rcliability of these quotations.
(i) As spot dealings on the market are comparatively rare, most of the quotations
published between APril L973 and Decembet L97) (L t47 out of 1 475) show
that the price bra&et was carried over unchanged from one day to the next.
(ii) The other 328 quotations, where the price bracket moved, roughly correspond to
the 350 spot deals actually entered into by petrochemical users between L973 ard
1975.1 There are, therefore, not enough of these deals to allow an equivalent
number of quotations to be reliably established, assuming that several actual prices
are needed if a price bracket is to be established.
(iii) Since it does not have a sufficiently ample spot price basis to establish its naphtha
quotations, Platt's has to make faidy frequent use of offers for sale or purchase that
are not followed up. This explains why Platt's quotations (making use of offers)
amplify spot market trends.
(iv) This method, which may enable interested operators to influence the price quota-
tion by launching speculative offers on the market, must therefore be treated with
caution.
1 Three other points should be made concerning the 350 deals and the 350 spot deliveries of naphtha
to petrochemical users:
First, these deals are often the last in a chain of intermediate deals by speculators in the same
parcels of naphtha; the prices in these intermediate deals are very often speculative prices con-
cerning one and the same quantity.
Second, these 350 spot transactions concern petrochemical naphtha only; those conceming energy
naphtha have been -excluded. But since energy naphtha transactions represent only a very low
percentage, the conclusions reached in this chapter are not affected.
Nor are the conclusions invalidated by the third point: a number of spot transactions are con-
cluded by oil companies not as suppliers but as buyers of naphtha seeking to balance their oper-
ations.
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6. Conclusions
Examination of the quantities of naphtha traded and of price trends has not led the Com-
mission to conclude that there are restrictive practices between firms or abuses of domi-
nant positions, calling for action under Articles 85 and S6 of the EEC Treaty.
One of the obvious reasons for this is to be found in the naphtha market structure, where
competitive transactions, meaning those involving the free play of supply and demand,
are somewhat rare. Furthermore, there are often considerable differences in the terms for
these deals which makes it very difficult to compare prices.
In cases where the quantities delivered were smaller during the crisis, the Commission
found that this was not because of restrictions operated by suppliers but because some
users, with refinery capacity, preferred to produce more naphtha themselves.
In those countries where contract price analysis has shown substantial differences from
one user to another, they have been found to be due to differences in the power of the
users on the market. No actual instances of price discrimination have been revealed.
The Commission has also found that in those Member States where the structure of
suPPly and demand for naphtha is most highly concentrated, joint ventures are very
important users. Even if they are seen in relation to the Community as a whole, they are
found to be as important as wholly owned subsidiaries in terms of the volume of naphtha
handled. The Commission's attention will have to be directed to the way in which the
controlling companies compete with each other.
Lastly, the period under review, with its different phases of price instability and relative
stability, offered an opportunity for assessing the value of Platt's Oilgram quotations as
naphtha market indicators over a reasonably significant time span. The comparative
rarity of the spot transactions concluded in the period calls into question the reliability
of Platt's quotations for naphtha.
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Amendment of existing regulallons and notlces
1. Extension and amendment of Regulatlon (EEC) No 2V9/72
(s pe c i a I i zat i o n ag r eeme ntsl
35. Article 1 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2779/72 of 21 December 1972 on
the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialization agreementsl
states that that Regulation is to expire on 31 December 1977.
The Commission has extended the validity of the Regulation for a further five years.2
The reasons for making the Regulation remain valid, notably the desire to promote
cooperation between small and medium-sized firms so as to strengthen their ability to
compete.,
36. However, it was found necessary to make a number of changes to the quantitative
thresholds for the operation of the Regulation:
(i) The limit for market share was raised from 10/6 in each Member State to l5/o in a
substantial part of the common market, and the limit for aggregate sales was raised
from 150 million to 300 million u.a.
(ii) The method of calculating market shares was altered: account will now be taken not
only of the products which are the subject of agreement, but also of other products
manufactured by the participating undertakings and considered by consumers to bc
similar by reason of their characteristics, price or use. It was also necessary to
establish the undertakings to be taken into account for this purpose: the under-
takings that are party to the agreement and undertakings associated with them are
now covered.
These amendments taken together will substantially broaden the scope of Regulation
(EEC) No 2779/72, to the particular benefit of small business.
a OJ L 292 o( 21.12.1972i Second Report on Competition Policy, point 8.
z Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2901/77 of 23 December 1977 extending the period of validity
of and amending Regulation (EtsC) No 2779/72 on the application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty tn categories of specialization agreements: OJ L )38 of. 28.12.1977,
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2. Amendment ot Regutation No 67167lEEC (exclusive dealing agreements)
37. During the year the Commission continued its workl on the amendments to be
made to thJlock exemPtion Regulation No 67 /67 /EEC.z After consulting the Advisory
Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, it Published the draft of an
amending regulation in order to give interested parties the opportunity to make their
views knownr3
38. The planned amendments are all aimed at bringing Regulation No 67 /67 /EEC into
line with the continuing development of C-ommunity law and the case law of the Court
of Justice.
Experience gained in the application of the Regulation shows that some of its provisions
allow of interpretations whLh are incompatible with its objects. These will have to be
corrected. The Court has also newly defined the scope of the Regulation. \7ith the Con-
cordia judgment4 it became clear that exclusive purchasing agreements qualify for the
blocJ< exemption even where no defined resale territory is allocated to the purchaser'
Concordia further confirmed that 'national' exclusive dealing agreements are covered by
the Regulations in so far as they may appreciably affect trade between Member States.
The judgment makes it imperative that the text of the Regulation, which was originally
tailored for exclusive distribution agreements and the like, be completely revised to
embrace exclusive purchasing agreements.
The draft amending regulation would make the following changes:
(1) Article t(2) of the Regulation, under which the block exemption does not aPPly to
agreements to which undertakings from one Member State only are party and which
concern the resale of goods within that Mernber State, would be deleted.
(2) Article 2(2) would make clear that the obligations to promote sales referred to may
also be included in exclusive purchasing agreements.
(3) Article 3(a) would state that agreements between competing manufacturers contain-
ing exclusive supply or purchase obligations are in future excluded from block
exemption, whether the obligations are on one side only or, as under the present
text, are mutual.
r Sixth Report on Competition Policy, points 10 to 14.
2 Commission Regulation No 67/67/EEC oI 22 March 1967 on the application o-f Article 85(3)
of the Treaty to certain categories of exclusive dealing agreements (OJ 57 of 25.1.1967), as
amended by Regulation (EEC) No 259L/72 of 8 December 1972 (OJ L276 of.8'12.1972).
3 oJ c 3r of 7.2.1978.
4 CjEC l.2.tgi7 (A. de Norre and his wife Martine, n€e de Clerq v NV Brouwerij Concordia),
47/76: U977) ECR 6t and 92.
. See also CJEC l.z.ple (Fonderies Roubaix v Fonderies Roux), 63175: [1976] ECR 111 and 119'
COMP. REP. EC I97
GENERAL RULES APPLYING TO FIRMS t,
(4) A new provision, Article 3(c), would state that the population of the territory
covered by an exclusive dealing agreement may not as a de exceed 100 million.
Exceptions would be admissible only where intermediaries or consumers are able to
obtain the goods to which the contract relates in the common market from at least
three independent undertakings established in different Mernber States at the same
stage of distribution as the exclusive dealer.
()) Another new provision, Article 3(d), would tie block exemPtion of exclusive pur-
chasing agreements to the condition that a producer who enters into such agreements
with one or more dealers must not in a substantial part of the cosrmon market
account for more than $/o of total sales of the relevant goods and of other goods
considered similar by the consumer. This is intended in particular to prevent a single
firm from raising substantial barriers to market entry by other undertakings by
means of a nefwork of exclusive purchasing agreements. It would thus ensure that
the tests for exemption laid down by Article 85(3) are satisfied.
(6) Article 6 of the Regulation, which allows the Commission to withdraw block
exemption of exclusive dealing agreements, would be reworded to apply to exclu-
sive purchasing agreements as well. The main case where the Commission might
consider withdrawing block exemption would be when the cumulative effect of
several networks of such agreements, built up by different manufacturers, has the
effect of shielding national markets from one another.
(7) In order to make the changeover to the new legal position easier for firms, the
present form of the Regulation would continue to apply to existing agreements for
a one-year transitional period.
39. Council Regulation No L9/6/EEC requires the Cornmission to consult the Advi-
sory Committee a second time. This will be done at the beginning of t978, and the
Regulation could be adopted shortly afterwards.
3. Amendment ot ECSC Decision No 25-67 (exemption trom the requircment
of prior authorization)
40. By Decision No 25'67, adopted on 22 J:une 1967 under Article 66(3) of the ECSC
Treaty, the High Authority exempted from prior authorization certain mergers and take-
overs which satisfied the tests of Article 56(2).a
Since that Decision came into force in 1967, Community steel output has expanded
sharply, there have been major changes in the structure of the steel and coal industries
L O! L54 of 14.7.1967.
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and new Member States have joined the Community. For these reasons, and in the light
of several years' experience of applying the 1967 Decision, it was found that the limits
and terms laid down in the Decision should be brought into line with current economic
realities.
Accordingly the Commission has transmitted for the Council's assent Pursuant to Article
66(3) of the Trcary a draf.t decision to amend Decision No 25-67.r
As regards mergers between producers, the new thresholds for exemption rePresent the
same percentages of Community production as h L966 (approximately 5%). The new
limits for mergers between distribution firms are set to take account of inflation (despite
the crisis, steel prices have risen by neady )0/6 since L967).
This draft seeks mainly to adapt the Decision to changed market circumstances, not to
extend the scope for exemption. There will accordingly be no change in the structure of
the coal and steel markets to the detriment of small and medium-sized firms. If the
existing Decision were retained unchanged the possibility of exemption would be
restricted and the Commission would have to issue decisions under Article 66 even
authorizing mergers that have no appreciable effect on the competitive state of the
market.
4. Amendment of the Commission Notice of 27 May 1970 concerning
agreements of minor importance
4t' The commission also decided2 to amend its Notice of zl May 1970 on agreements
of minor importance,s
The object of this Notice is to encourage cooperation between small and medium-sized
firms. It set limits-l/o market share and aggregate annual turnover of 15 million u.a.
for manufacturing firms and 20 million u.a. for distributive firms-below which restric-
tive practices in agreements between firms would not be regarded as appreciably affecting
trade between Member States or competition.4
'42. The amendments are designed:
1. To raise the limit for aggregate annual turnover of the parties to the agreement to
50 million u.a. in order to take account of inflation and also to define eligible firms
1 Bull. EC V-7977, point 2.1.1).
z Notice of 19 December 1977: OJ C 113 of 29.12.1977.3 Commission Notice of 27 May 1970 concerning agleements of minor importance which do not fall
under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community: OJ C 64 af
2.6.r970,
a First Report on Competition Policy, point 127.
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in broader terms. This substantial increase also provides an opportunity to rernove the
distinction between industrial firms and commercial firms, which has caused difficul-
ties in practice because many firms are engaged both in production and in distribution.
2. To align the definition of the relevant market-both product and geographic markets
-with the definition used in the Commission Regulation amending Regulation(EEC) No 2779/72 of 21 December 1972 on the application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty to categories of specialization agreements.l
S 2 
- 
New regulations and notices
1. Proposed merger control regulation
43. ln L977 the Committee of Permanent Representatives considered the interim report
submitted to it in L976 by the Council's r$Torking Party on Economic Questions. The
report called for political guidelines on five main problems-the legal basis for the
proposed regulation and the principle of premerger control, the scope of the regulation,
the possibility of derogations from the concept of incompatibility with the common
market, notification of planned mergers and decision-making Powers.
At meetings held on 17 March, lL May, 19 October and 25 November the Committee
noted a growing convergence of views on the power to grant derogations and on the
question of notification. All five items are still on the Committee's agenda.
2. Patent licensing agreements
44, In December 1977 the Commission sent the members of the Advisory Committee
on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions a modified version of its draft Regula-
tion on the application of Article S5(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of patent
licensing agreements.2 The amended version takes account of many suggestions made
when the Advisory Committee was first consulted in December L976, and others made
by business and legal circles. The process of consultation required by Article 6(t) (a) of
Regulation No 19/653 will be continued in 1978, so as to enable the draft to be
published in the Official Journal with an invitation to all interested parties to submit any
comments they may have to the Commission.
1 Point 36 of this Report.
z Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 3.
3 0J 36 0t 6.3.1961.
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In this respect, the assessment of exclusive and territorial licences, and the possibility of
exempting such licences in favour of small and medium-sized firms, continue to be the
main problems.
3. Subcontracting agreements
45. Having worked out the broad lines that it plans to follow in its Notice on certain
subcontracting agreements which are not caught by Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty,l
the Commission has consulted a number of recognized European trade federations on the
draft. In November it put the draft and the views of these trade federations before the
29th Restrictive Practices Conference of Government Experts of the Member States.
46. The aim is to encourage this type of division of labour for i can promote the
interests of small and medium-sized firms. \7ith this in mind a solution is sought which
will reflect the legitimate interest of principal contractors in preserving the secrecy of
their knowhow and ensuring that it is propedy used, while offering subcontractors an
assurance that they will be able to dwelop their business activities unhindered.
4. Proposed regulations applying the rules of competition to sea
and air transport
47. The Commission has continued its work on a Regulation applying Articles 8) and
86 to air transport.2 In the first half of L978 it will be putting a preliminary draft to the
Member States'governmental experts, when it has completed its examination of whether
and to what extent certain forms of cooperation between aidines might be the subject of
a block exemption.
48. Sfhen putting a proposal for a Regulation to the Council for accession to the
United Nations Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, the Commis-
sion stated that it was not against the principle of liner conferences but wished to make
more detailed examination of the way they operated. It stated that it would be transmit-
ting to the Council a proposal for a Regulation applying the Treaty des on competition
to sea transport.
r Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 5.
2 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 16.
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5. Periods of limitation tor ECSC fines
49. After consulting the Advisory Committee and obtaining the unanimous assent of
the Council,l the Commission has adopted an ECSC Decision on periods of limitation
for proceedings and enforcement under the Treaty establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community.'? The Decision closes a gap in Community law. A large number of
provisions in the ECSC Treaty empower the Commission to impose fines and periodic
penalty payments on natural and legal persons that contravene Community law, and to
enforce collection. There has not, however, been any specified period of time within
which these penalties may be imposed or their enforcement may be sought.
The Decision now taken clarifies the legal position of the persons and firms concerned.
In content it corresponds to the limitation regulation for EEC cases.a Details are to be
found in eadier competition reports.a
1 0J c 116 0f tr.r2.r977.
2 Decision of 6.4.1978: not yet reported.
3 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74 of 26 November 1974 concerning limitation periods in
proceedingJand the enforcement of sanctions under +he rules of the European Economic Commu-
nity relating to kansport and competition (OJ L 119 of 29.Lr'1974).
+ Sixih Repoit on Competition Policy, points 19 to 21; Fourth Report on Competition Policy,
points 48 to 50.
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Chapter lll
Cases decided by the Court of Justice
50. In L977 the Court of Justice darified a number of important points concerning the
interpretation and application of the des of competition, making a significant contribu-
tion to the development of Community law in this field.
Two preliminary rulings given under Article L77 of the EEC Treaty dealt with the com-
patibility of national laws and regulations, and of certain business agreements or prac-
tices based on them, with Articles 8),86 and 90 of the Treaty. In interpretinganeadier
judgment, the Court of Justice removed certain doubts as to the way fines are to be paid.
In cases concerning distribution and supply agreements, the Court gave three important
judgments whose significance reaches beyond the individual case.
Van Ameyde v UGI
51. In this casel the Court had been asked by a Milan court to answer several questions
arising in litigation between an Italian loss-adjusting company,2 the subsidiary of. a
Dutch firm, and the Italian National Insurance Bureau. The loss adjuster alleged that
he had been excluded from the market for the settlement of claims arising from accidents
caused by foreign vehicles in Italy.s
52. The Court held that, in the context of the green card system, a national provision
or an agreement between national bureaux that the national bureau bears the sole
responsibility for the settlement of claims for damage caused in the terriitory of a given
Member State by vehicles insured with foreign insurance companies is n.ot incompatible
with Article 90(t) of the Treaty taken in conjunction with Articles 85 and 86. How-
ever, the national bureau or its members must retain the freedom to rely on undertakings
1 CJEC 9.6.1977 (Srl Ufficio Henry Van Ameyde v Srl Ufficio centrale italiano di assistenza
assicurativa automobilisti in circolazione intemazionale (UCI),90/76 [1977] E,CR 109.2 Loss adiusters are firms whose normal function is to act as the agent of an insurer in investigating
accidents and claims arising from them, the final decision as to payment being reserved for the
insurer alone.
3 The loss adjuster also filed a complaint with the Commission under Article 3 of Regulation No 17
for infringement of the rules of competition.
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whose business consists solely in the settlement of accident claims on behalf of insurers,
in the sense of the handling and investigation of claims.
Making a cleat distinction between such measures in the green card system and private
measures, the Court nevertheless held that a decision or a course of conduct of a national
bureau or a concerted practice of its members which has the object or effect of excluding
undertakings whose business consists solely in the settlement of accident claims on behalf
of insurers, in the restricted sense referred to above, may possibly fall under the prohibi-
tion of Article 85 and, if the national bureau is in a dominant position, under the prohi-
bition contained in Article 90 of the Treaty in conjunction with Article 86.
NV GB-lnno-BM v ATAB
53. In this case, between GB-Inno-BM and the Association of Tobacco Retailers
(ATAB) in Belgium,l the Court of Justice was requested to answer questions from the
Belgian Court of Cassation on, among other things,2 the compatibility of Article )8 of
the Belgian Value Added Tax Code with the Community rules of competition. Article 58
provides that the retail sales price set by the manufacturer or importer of a tobacco
product as the basis for assessment to excise duty and VAT must also constitute the
price for sales to consumers. Tobacco retailers cannot sell above or below that price.
54. The Court of Justice recalled that under Article 5(2) ot the EEC Treaty the Mem-
ber States must abstain from any measures which could jeopardize the attainment of the
objectives of the Treaty, and notably the system of undistorted competition sought by
Article 3(f). Accordingly, the Treaty requires the Member States to refrain from taking
or maintaining in force measures that might conflict with the practical effect of Artides
85 and 86. The Member States, who by Article 90 are required to comply with the des
of competition in their relations with public undertakings, have no power to pass meas-
ures enabling private undertakings to evade these rules either.
The Court stated that Article 86 prohibits any abuse of a dominant position by one or
more undertakings, even if such abuse is encouraged by a national legislative provision.
In any event, such a provision would generally be incompatible with Articles 30 and 34
of the Treaty, which prohibit quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having
equivalent effect.
1 CJEC 1,6.1I.L977, Case 11/77: not yet reported.
2 The aspects of this case dealing with the compatibility of Article i8 with other rules of the
Treaty, notably Article 30 et teq, ate dealt with in the Eleventh General Report, point 530.
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SA G6n6rale Sucridre and Soci6t6 B6ghin-Say v Commission and Others
55. In this judgmentl the Court of Justice was asked to interpret the meaning of its
eadier judgment in the sugar cartel case,2 which had fixed the fines imposed for breaches
of the des of competition both in units of account and in the national curency of the
judgment debtor's country of origin, using the official parities set out in the Financial
Regulation. As a result there was a dispute between the firms concerned and the Com-
mission. The German, Belgian, French and Dutch firms alleged that the extent of their
debt was determined by the amount expressed in units of account and that they could
settle their debt in the national currency of. any Member State they chose. They therefore
paid the fines in Italian lire at the official exchange rate (1 u.a. : LIT 62r). The Com-
mission, while agreeing that firms could settle their debt in a currency other than their
national orrrency, considered that the extent of the debt was determined by the amounts
fixed in the latter currency and that conversion should be made at the exchange rate
actually ding on the date of payment. It accordingly regarded the payments made in
Italian lire as only part settlement.
The Court of Justice accepted this inteqpretation. After judgment had been given the
firms concerned paid the remaining amouot of the debts they owed.
Metro v SABA
56, By a judgment given on 25 October L977 in Case 26/763 the Court of Justice
dismissed an application from Metro to set aside the Commission's Decision of L5
December 1975n in the SABA case. The Commission had given exemption under Article
85(3) of the EEC Treaty for the selective distribution system operated in the EEC by
SABA, a manufacturer of radios, television sets and tape recorders.
57. The SABA distribution system is based on alarge number of agreements in stan-
dard form between the manufacturer and dealer. Both parties are prohibited from selling
the relevant goods to unauthorized dealers. To qualify for appointment a SABA dealer
must have a specialized shop or specialized department for consumer electronics, with
trained staff and the means to provide the after-sales, repair and guarantee service
1 CJEC 9.).1977 (SA G6n6rale Sucidre and Soci6t6 Bdghin-Say v Commission and Others), Joined
Cases 41, 4) and 44/13 (interpretation): 119777 ECR 441.
e CJEC 16.12.197, (Codperatieve Vereniging 'Suiker Unie' and Others v Commission), Joined
Cases 40 to 48, t0, 54 to 56,111, 113 Lnd lI4/731 [1975] ECR 1663; Fifth Report on Com-petition Policy, point 19.
3 Firma Metro-SB-GroBm?irkte GmbH & Co. KG and Verband des SB-Gro8handels eV v Commission
of tlre European Communities and SABA, Case 26,/76: [1977] ECR 1375.4 OI L 28 of ,.2.t916; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 54 to 56.
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prescribed by SABA. Approval also depends on whether the applicant dealer accepts
certain additional obligations, notably the obligation to engage in sales promotion activi'
ties, to meet certain sales targets and to enter into long-term supply and cooperation
agreements with the manufacturer.
The complainant alleged that the SABA distribution system was incompatible with
Article 85, chiefly because it excluded price competition for goods of the same brand and
because the criteria for admission to the distribution system prevented large self-service
stores from dealing in the relevant goods.
58, The Court held that the complaint was admissible, particulady as Metro had been
the complainant in the Commission's original administrative proceeding.
It is in the interests of the satisfactory administration of justice and of the proper appli-
cation of Articles 85 and 86 that natural or legal persons entitled, pursuant to Article
3(2)(b) of Regulation No 17, to request the Commission to find an infringement of
Articles 85 and 86, should be able, if their request is dismissed either wholly or in part,
to institute proceedings in order to protect their legitimate interests. In these circumstan-
ces the applicant must be considered to be directly and individually concerned by the
contested decision, even if it was not addressed to him.
59. Nevertheless, the Court dismissed the complaint against the SABA distribution
system on the merits.
The judgment is based on the view that the requirement in Articles 3 and 85 of the
EEC Treaty that competition shall not be distorted implies the existence on the market
of 'workable competition'. It was acceptable in this context that 'the nature and intensive-
ness of competition may vaty to an extent dictated by the products or services in question
and the economic structure of the relevant market sectors'. In view of the peculiat features
of the relevant goods (costly, technically advanced consumer durables) and of a market
structure which does not preclude the existence of a variety of channels of distribution,
the Commission was held to be justified in its view that selective distribution systems
constituted, like other systems, an aspect of competition which accords with Article 85(1).
The Court agreed that in such distribution systems price competition is not generally
emphasized either as an exclusive or indeed as a principal factor. Although price compe-
tition is so important that it can never be eliminated, it is not the only effective form of
competition, or that to which absolute priority rnust in all circumstances be accorded.
'For specialist wholesalers and retailers the desire to maintain a certait price level, which
corresionds to the desire to preserve, in the interests of consumers, the possibility of the
continued existence of this channel of distribution in conjunction with new methods of
distribution based on a different type of competition policy, forms one of the objectives
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which may be pursued without necessarily falling under the prohibition contained in
Article 8t(1), and, if it does fall thereunder, either wholly or in part, coming within
the framework of Article 85(3)'. But the Commission must ensure that this structural
rigidity is not reinforced, as might happen if there were an increase in the number of
selective distribution networks for marketing the same product.
The Court almost entirely upheld the Commission's views on the application of Article
85(3) to the contested obligations imposed on SABA wholesalers and retailers. However,
it disagreed with the Commission's view that the obligation of wholesalers to build up
the distribution network was not a restriction caught by Article 85(1). This did not
take proper cognizance of the scope of that provision, 'since the function of a wholesaler
is not to promote the products of a particular manufacturer but rather to provide for the
retail trade supplies obtained on the basis of competition between manufacturers, so
that obligations entered into by a wholesaler which limit this freedom in this respect
constitute testrictions on competition'.
Even so, this did not vitiate the contested decision, because it appeared that the obligation
to participate in the creation of the SABA distribution network was in fact connected
with the obligations listed in the cooperation agreement, which the Commission consider-
ed to constitute a restriction on competition permissible only under Article 8i(3).
In considering whether long-term supply agreements contributed to improving the pro-
duction or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, the
Court expanded the Commission's statements on an important point. It stated that 'the
establishment of supply forecasts for a reasonable period constitutes a stabilizing factor
with regard to the provision of employment which, since it improves the general condi-
tions of production, especially when market conditions are unfavourable, comes within
the framework of the objectives to which reference may be pursuant to Article 85(3)'.
60. On the whole this judgment upholds the Commission's practice of authorizing
certain forms of selective distribution for specified goods within predetermined limits,
provided the result of the agreements is not to eliminate competition in respect of a
substantial part of the relevant products.
Concordia
61, In the Concordia case,l the Court of Justice againhad to answer questions on the
status of brewery contracts with regard to the des of competition.
1 CJEC 1,.2.1977 (A. de Nore and M. de Clercq v NY Brouwerij Concordia), 47/7G lL977l
ECR 6'.
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These contracts, whereby firms in the hotel and catering business enter into long-term
arrangements to obtain their supplies of beer exclusively from a particular brewery, are
of considerable business significance. They are one of the brewery trade's best means of
promoting sales. The Commission estimates that more than half the beer bought for
-.onro*ptiotr 
on the premises in the Community is bought under such exclusive purchas'
ing agreements.
The problem for competition posed by brewery contracts is that individually they have no
appreciable effect on the n rik.t situation nor on inter-State trade, but the cumulative
e?fect of a large number of similar contracts can substantially distort competition and
the pattern of irade within the Community. The danger is particulady sharp when large
brewery groups with a high turnover cover the whole territory of one or more Member
State with a network of exclusive agreements of this kind. The danger becomes even
greater when several networks of agreements operated by different breweries exist side
by side.
62. Against this economic background the Court of Justice had already decided in
Haecht 11 that agreements whereby an undertaking agrees to obtain its supplies from
one undertaking to the exclusion of all others may be caught by the prohibition of Article
8)(1) where, taken either in isolation or together with others, and in the economic and
legal context in which they are made, they affect trade between Member States and have
either as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.
This judgment poses certain problems with regard to the certainty of the law. On the
one hand, it follows from Haecht I that a brewery contract, which taken in isolation is
entirely unobjectionable for competition purposes, may be caught by the prohibition in
Article 8t(1), and hence void under Article 85(2), by reason of the economic or legal
environment in which it is made. On the other, the assessment of an individual contract
very often depends on factors that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to know,
such as the existence and effect of simiiar contfacts involving other firms.
G3. The Court of Justice first sought to solve this conflict by allowing provisional
validity to 'national' brewery contracts, which represent the great majority. These a na-
tiorml court could strike down only with regard to future effects.2 In Haecht II3 the
Court departed from its eadier judgment by stating that provisional validity applied only
to 'old agreements'.
l CJEC 12.12.1967 (Brasserie de Haecht v \Tilkin and Vilkin), 23/67: 11967] ECR 407,416
zno +L /.
, CJEC 18.3.1970 (Brauerei A. Bilger s6hne GmbH v Jehle and-Jehle'),_43/691 u970) ECR 127.
. CJEC 6.2.197i (Brasserie de Haecht v lTilkin-Janssen),48/72: lr97t) ECR77.
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Against this background the Court of Justice in the Concordia case was asked a series of
questions on the application both of Article 85(1) and (z) of the EEC Treaty and of the
block exemption Regulation No 67/67 EEC.
64. Rejecting the submissions of the Commission and the Advocate-General, the Court
decided that Regulation No 67 /67 was applicable to brewery contracts. Consequently
there was no need for the Court to answer the other questions. In considering the law it
concentrated on the interpretation of Article 1(1) (b) and Article I(2) of the Regulation.
Atticle 1(1)(b) of Regulation No 67/67fiEC exempts agreements to which only two
undertakings arc Pafiy and whereby one of the undertakings enters into obligations to-
wards the other to obtain goods for resale, only from that other. The Commission took
the view that the Regulation extends only to agreements which give the reseller a definite
sales territory. It considered that this followed from the preamble and from systematic
analysis of the text of the Regulation itself. There had been no intention to exempt all
exclusive purchasing agreements. The Court of Justice, on the other hand, had regard to
the actual words of the relevant Article, which, unlike Article 1(1)(a) and (c), made
no specific reference to an allotted territory. An exclusive dealing agreement would not
make sense without reference to a teritory. However, an express delimitation of territory
is superfluous in an exclusive purchasing agreement. It goes without saying that a
publican buying drinks under a brewery contract will sell them on his own premises only,
so that the agreements in issue satisfied Article 1(1) (b).
According to Article t(2) of Regulation No 67/67, Article 1(1) does not apply to
agreements to which undertakings from one Member State only arc party and which
concern the resale of goods in that Member State.
In the Roubaix v Roux judgmentl the Court had held that this provision did not have
the object of excluding purely domestic agreements from the block exemption. Rather
the Regulation extended to these agreements where they were apt to have an appreciable
effect on trade between Member States and otherwise satisfied Article L of the Regula-
tion. In Concordia the Court cleady stated that the same principles applied to exclusive
purchase agreements.
Finally the Court of Justice dismissed the argument that it would be contrary to the spirit
and purposes of Regulation No 67 /67 if it applied to agreements caught by the piohi-
bition in Article 8)(1) only by reason of the cumulative effect of one or more networks
of compatable agreements. The Court found no authority for the argument in the text
of the Regulation and felt that to put such a construction upon the Regu.lation would
t 9JE9 
-3'2'1976 (SA Fonderies Roubaix-Ifattrelos v Socidtd nouvelle des Fonderies A. Rorrr andSoci6t€ des Fonderies JOT), 6/7jt [1976] ECR 111 and 119.
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make it virtually meaningless, for it dealt with agreements which frequently did form
part of such networks.
In this context, the Court noted that the Regulation afforded legal certainty to enter-
prises and simplified the application of the Community's rules of competition. There
-would 
be great value in making the block exemPtion applicable, as far as the EEC
Treaty allowed, to agreements which were caught by Article S5(t) by reason only of
the cumulative effect of. large numbers of agreements. Circumstances beyond the agree-
ment in question would generally be unknown to the parties, and the difficulties of
proving them in the national courts would be nearly insurmountable. The need to
pr.r.ru. effective competition was abeady reflected in the Commission's Power to with-
draw the benefit of the blo& exemption in individual cases under Article 7 of Council
Regulation No L9 / 55 /BEC.
65. The Commission is planning to amend Regulation No 67/67/EEC to bring it into
line with this judgment of the Court of Justice. It will Pay Particular attention to the
general principle of ensuring an adequate degree of certainty as to the law. The draft
amending Regulation has been published.l
66. In connection with its general inquiry into the brewery industry under Article 12
of Regulation No 17 and in accordance with the views it expressed in the Court of Jus-
tice, the Commission is also considering whether and in which cases the block exemption
should be withdrawn. In order to get a precise picture of the current situation on the
market for beer in the Community, it sent several requests for information to national
brewery federations in the course of last year.
De Bloos v Bouyer
67, In a judgment given on 14 December L9772 by way of pteliminary ruling under
Article L77 of. the EEC Trcaty, the Court of Justice once again considered the problem
of the provisional validity of old agreements. This case concerned the effectiveness of
an exclusive dealing agreement between a French manufacturer and a Belgian wholesaler
entered into before Regulation No 17 came into force and notified within the appropriate
time limit.
1 OJ C 3l of 7.2.1978; points 37 to 39 of this Report'
a Etiblissements A. De Bloos Sprl, Leuze (Belgium) v Bouyer, Tomblaine (France), ,9/771OI C20
of 25.1.1979.
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68. The judgment marks a progression over eadier judgments on this matter. In
Haecht II1 the Court decided that a national court could hold an old agreement void
under Article 85(2) only after the Commission had given its decision by the Regulation
No 17 procedure. This was so in particular where the agreement was propedy notified.
The ruling did not fully clarify the powers of the courts in Member States to apply
Article 85 to old agreements. One point that remained open was whether the national
court should stay proceedings to give the parties an opportunity to seek the Commission's
views, particulady where there was reason to doubt whether the agreement was com-
patible with Article 85.
69. The Court has now ruled that during the period between notification and the
Commission decision courts hearing actions concerning duly notified old agreements, or
old agreements that do not have to be notified, must treat the agreements as having the
same legal effects as ate recognized by the law applicable in each case. These effects
may oot be questioned by objections based on the compatibility of the agreement with
Article 8t(1).
A national court must, therefore, treat an old agreement that has been duly notified, and
is otherwise valid in accordance with municipal law, as fully valid, until the Commis-
sion has issued its decision. The Court derives this conclusion from the inseparability of
the prohibition in Article 85(1) and the possibility of exemption provided in Article
8)(3) as regulated in greater detail in Regulation No 17, and also from the general
principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations which are enshrined
in Articles 6 and 7 of Regulation No 17:
(i) Under Article 6(Z) of Regulation No 17 the Commission can exernpt a duly notified
or non-notifiable old agreement from the prohibition in Article 85(1) with retro-
spective effect even beyond the time of notification, provided all the citeria or
Article 85 (3) are satisfied.
(ii) According to Article 7 of Regulation No 17, old agreements that arc incompatible
with Article 85 and do not qualify for exemption can be made lawful with retro-
active effect if, at the Commission's request, they are brought into line with the
des on competition or are terminated. The agreements must have been notified,
even if they are not notifiable, within the time limits set in Regulation No 17.
This system would become unworkable if the national courts could declare the agreement
void for the purpose of Article 85(2) between the date of notification and the date of
1 CJEC 6.2.197, (Brasserie de }laecht v Vilkin-Janssen),48/72: lrpZl] ECn 76 and 86, Third
Report on Competition Policy, point 5.
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the Commission's decision. The parties would be deprived of their hopes of obtaining
exemption or retroactive legitimation.
70. The judgment also confirms that the full legal effect which the Court has thus given
to old agreements duly notified is provisional and temporary. Only the powers of the
national courts have been restricted. The Court explicitly confirmed the Commission's
powers in relation to Articles 6 and 7 of Regulation No 17, including the power to dis-
miss applications for exemption or retroactive legitimation of the agreement in an indivi
dual case. It is unlikely to have practical significance in many cases. The proportion of
old to new agreements is steadily declining. \7here the Commission does issue an
individual decision on an old agreement, it generally gives exemption under Article
8)(3) following changes to the agreement or else retroactive legitimation under Article 7
of Regulation No 17. Only where the agreement does not satisfy the tests for exemPtion
and the firms concerned refuse to alter the offending clauses is the Commission likely
to make a negative decision, entailing nullity under Article 85(2).
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Chapter lv
Restrictive practices in international trade
The Commission has continuedl to take an active part in the work of international
organizations concerned with issues af.fecting competition.
OECD
71. The Commission continued to be represented in the working group which is charg-
ed with the review of the operation of the two recommendations adopted by the OECD
Council on 10 October L967 and I July L973 on cooperation in the field of restrictive
business practices affecting international trade. The main topics for study this year were
methods of overcoming problems flowing from restrictions on information exchanges
imposed by the legislation of various countries and ways of preserving the secrecy of such
information as is exchanged.
New working groups have begun studies on purchasing power, and also concentration
'and competition policy.
\7ork also continued on a report concerning restrictive business practices in relation to
trademarks. The OECD Council adopted the report at the end of December.
UNCTAD
72. The Commission attended two meetings of the group of experts on restrictive
business practices set up to prepare proposals and recommendations for multilaterally
agreed equitable principles and des for the control of restrictive business practices
having adverse effects on international trade.
Little progress was made during the year because of the rather sharp differences of
opinion bebween the indusffialized countries with market economies (Group B) and the
developing countries (Group of ll) as regards the scope of the code and the respective
obligations of Group B countries and the Group of 77.
1 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, points 40 to 44.
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73, On the other hand, Pfogfess was made in the UNCTAD discussions on a code of
conduct with the aim of facilitating the transfer of technology. Proposals were submitted
by three gfoups of countries-Groups B, Group D comprised of Eastern European coun-
tries and the Group of 77.
Each proposal contains a central chapter on restrictive business practices. At the three
meetings that were held in L977 a sustained effort was made to clarify the principles
undedying this part of the code. Fourteen clauses were drafted in the form of composite
texts taking elements from each of the three proposals. The clauses concern:
(a) restrictions after expiration of arrangement;(b) payments after expiration of industrial property rights;(c) grantbackprovisions;
(d) challenges to validity;
(e) sales or representation arrangements relating to competing technologies or products;(f) restrictions on research;
(g) restrictions on use of personnel;
(h) price fixing;(i) restrictions on adaptations;(i) exclusive sales and agency agreements;(k) tying arrangements;(l) export restrictions;
(m) cartels-patent pools or cross-licensing agreements;(n) restrictions on publicity.
All these texts are subject, though in differing degrees, to conditions or reservations.
Nevertheless, the basic principles have been cleady set out in each case. Following new
negotiations it should be possible for certain of the conditions to be withdrawn.
Various questions remain to be settled, such as whether the code should cover restrictions
on the transfer of technology between firms belonging to the same group, and the
whole question of exceptions.
The fundamental question still concerns the legal status of the code. Group B ProPoses
that it should consist of voluntary guidelines, whereas the Group of ZZ still seem to
want a legally binding code. A diplomatic conference scheduled for autumn 1978 has
the mandate to decide this point.
Cooperation between the Commisslon and the competitlon authorlties
of non-member States
74, As stated on a number of occasions, the Commission supports an increase in inter-
national cooperation in the field of restrictive or abusive business practices having an
effect on international trade.
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Apart from its participation in the work of OECD, UNCTAD and the United Nations,
the Community as such implements the recommendations adopted by the Council of
OECD in L967 and 1973. The purpose of these recommendations was described in the
Third Report on Competition Policy.l
In particular, the Competition Directorate and the American Anti-trust Authorities
currently exchange, and have done for several years, non-confidential information on
competition issues of mutual interest.2
r Third Report on Competition Policy, point 40.
2 See in pirticular the Commission's reply to \ffitten Question 65j/77 ol Mr Edwards, OJ C
of 2o.2.r978.
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Chapter V
Main developments in national competition policies
75. The tendency of the Member States to strengthen their means of implementing
competition policy, mentioned in the Sixth Competition Report, was reflected once again
in the new Acts and Bills introduced over the past year.
The most interesting example was the passing of a new French Act, which not only,
strengthens existing provisions for the prevention of unlawful cartels and abuse of a
dominant position, but also introduces rnerger control. A Belgian Government Bill to
the same effect has not yet been laid before Parliament. In the Netherlands, a Bill was
introduced to prohibit price-fixing agreements and resale price maintenance. The Federal
German Government announced changes in the law to improve the facilities for con-
trolling the acquisition and abuse of a dominant position. I-astly, the British Government
announced a general review of the powers and machinery of its competition policy with
the aim of increasing economic efficiency.
Everyone should be pleased at these efforts, which will ensure effective competition
within the Community. They will also lead to a degree of harmonization of the measures
available to the Member States to enforce their competition policy. Although there are
differences in form, the controls actually exercised tend more and more to be comparable.
It is to be hoped that Italy will also introduce legislation making an effective competition
control possible.
The course of various proceedings concerning abuses in the pricing of tranquilizers,l and
the different conclusions reached, show clearly the difficulty of devising uniform, ob-
jective criteria by which to assess prices. They also show that, when the effects of the
restrictive practices of one or more firms are felt in several Member States, there is an
urgent need for close cooperation between the Commission and the Member States if a
uniform approach is to be taken to them.
Belglum
76. In Belgium the basic legislation on competition is still the Act of 27 May 1960 on
protection against the abuse of economic power. A number of investigations have been
r See the items below on competition policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark and the
Netherlands.
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carried out at the request of the Reporting Commissioner (Commissaire-rapporteur), He
proposed that one case be dropped and the Minister agreed. Various other cases ate
currently being investigated.
The Government holding office prior to June 1977 intended to lay before Parliament a
bill on competition, the broad lines of which were mentioned in the last Report.
As a result of the Government's resignation, the bill was not tabled.
The present Government, conscious of the leading role that healthy competition can play
in economic progress and of the gaps in the Act of 27 May L960, has decided to take
up the issue again with a view to formulating a new policy.
Article 58 of the Royal Decree of. ZZ Apil1977 brought the Act of 14 July L976 relat-
ing to public works, supply and services contracts into force on L January 1978. Article 7
of this Act prohibits arly act, agreement or collusive practice which may distort normal
conditions of competition in relation to such contracts.
Denmark
77. The Danish competition legislation and other legal provisions described in the Sixth
Report have not been changed. There are, however, two new laws with some effect on
the rules in force. These are the Electricity Supply Act and the Price Marking and Display
Act.
(a) In February 1976 the Folketing passed the Electricity Supply Act, which is intended
to ensure that electricity has an appropriate role in energy supplies as a whole. The
Act entered into force on 1- January 1977. The administration of the Act's provi-
sions on prices and other conditions for the sale of electricity, including charges
payable on connection or extension, has been taken over by an Electricity Price
Committee set up by the Ministry of Commerce, with secretarial services supplied
by the Directorate of the Monopolies Control Authority. \7here the Committee
finds that prices or other conditions are unreasonable or in violation of more
detailed rules on depreciation, allocations to reinvestment funds and so on laid down
by the Ministry of Commerce, and the matter cannot be brought to an end by nego-
tiation, the Committee can order that the prices or conditions be changed. Where
prices or terms are deemed likely to bring about an uneconomic use of energy
contrary to the public interest, the Committee tnay, after negotiation, order that they
be changed. The prices and terms of trade of electricity companies arc only subject
to the provisions of the Monopolies Act where they are not covered by the Electri-
city Supply Act. Lastly, the Prices and Profits Act of 1974 no longer applies to
electricity companies.
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(b) The Price Marking and Display Act is intended to make it easier for consumers to
compare and evaluate prices and other conditions, and thus to secure greater trans-
parency of the market. The Act makes it obligatory for retailers to display prices. It
also enables the Authority to lay down rules on signs displayed by persons offering
commercial services.
78. Some examples of decisions of the Monopolies Control Authority are given below.
(a) A Copenhagen perfume shop complained to the Authority that the supplier of
Chanel products had ceased deliveries, after the shop had sold them for many years.
The Danish agent for Chanel said that deliveries had been stopped because the
French producer had asked for a reduction in the number of dealers in Denmark so
that distribution costs could be kept down. Before the Authority could intervene a
restriction of competition infringing the provisions of the Act would have to be
established. The Authority's view was that Chanel's market share was not large
enough for the Chanel agent to be covered by the Act, and it therefore found no
grounds for ordering a resumption of deliveries. The Monopolies Appeal Tribunal
upheld this decision. It pointed out that a large number of different ranges of
perfumes and beauty products exist, and that the plaintiff wz$ an authorized dealer
for several of them.
(b) In May L976 the Authority required notification and inclusion on its register of a
nnge of. financial combinations. One of those covered by the demand was a large
fertilizer company with shareholdings in a number of other firms. The company
appealed this decision to the Monopolies Appeal Tribunal. It argued that share-
holdings without cooperation between the firms were not subject to notification,
and that its shareholdings did not give it a decisive influence on the other firms.
The Monopolies Appeal Tribunal upheld the Authority's decision. Among other
things it found that the company's connection in terms of capital with the firms in
question, and the cooperation which this made possible, could exert such a contri-
butory influence on price, production and distribution conditions that they were
caught by Section 6(Z) of the Monopolies Act.
(c) In autumn 1973 the Monopolies Control Authority ordered the three largest sup-
pliers of radio and television equipment to sell supplies to two 'Bilka' discount
houses, part of Dansk Supermarked A/S. The suppliers had refused to supply,
saying that the stores did not fulfil their requirements on the layout, displays,
demonstrations and so on. The Authority found that Bilka was not significantly
different in these respects from many other businesses which were receiving sup-
plies. The suppliers appealed the Authority's decision to the Monopolies Appeal
Tribunal. On 30 May L974 the Tribunal annulled the order to supply, pointing out
among other things that Bilka's particular form of selling was difficult to reconcile
with the need for individual ctrstomer service and gave its opinion that Bilka was not
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significantly restricted in its business by having to do without supplies from the
three suppliers. On 9 lune t977 the ruling of the \Testern High Court upheld the
Appeal Tribunal's annulment of the order to supply, on the grounds Put forward
by the Tribunal. In view of the importance of the principle involved, the Authority
has appealed the case to the Supreme Court.
(d) \fith respect to certain sedatives the Authority found that the prices charged to
wholesalers by manufacturers and importers were unreasonable. Accordingly, the
Authority ordered the prices of certain drugs to be reduced by 2o/e as a temporary
measure. The undertakings concerned, Dumex, Roche and Pharma, appealed to the
Monopolies Appeal Tribunal, which ruled that the price reductions should not
become effective until a decision had been reached on its merits. In its final ding
the Tribunal annulled the Authority's decisions but confirmed that the Authority
was entitled to take action on the prices of the preparations involved provided that
the prices were unreasonable, and also provided, as a general de, that calculations
are based on the price of the individual product rather than on the firm's total
profits. The Tribunal also accepted that overheads could be allocated on the basis
of estimates or in accordance with criteria based on experience.
However, referring particularly to the method of allocating research costs, which play an
important role in this industry, the Tribunal did not find that the fairest method was to
work from the contribution to total turoover, or to the reduced turnover taken by the
Authority, of individual products. In particular, the Tribunal found that export prices
for Dumex's products could not be required to bear a share of research costs correspond-
ing to the share of total turnover accounted for by exports. In the Tribunal's view, there-
fore, a firm must have a considerable degree of freedom in allocating its research costs
as long as its total profits from medical products are not unreasonable. But the Tribunal
did emphasize that the prices of particular drugs should not be based on a completely
arbitrary calculation.
Federal Republic of Germany
79. In a general policy statement the Federal Government announced its intention of
amending the legal basis of German competition policy-the Act against Restraints of
Competition (G\78) I9J7-for the fourth time. The central points of recent thinking
on changes concern extension of the merger control provisions, improved supervisory
powers over dominant firms and public utilities and tighter control of buying power so
as to maintain competivity.
In its comments on the first main advisory opinion of the Monopolies Commission the
Federal Government set out its initial views on stricter merger control arrangements and
changes in the supervision of abuse by dominant firms and public utilities. Current
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merger control law is to be improved to deal particulady with the growing preponderance
of large firms on markets hitherto controlled by small and medium-sized firms, and with
conglomerate and vertical mergers. The chief aim in connection with supervision of
abuse by dominant firms is to close the 'penalty gap' that arises because, under the law
as it stands, penalties apply only when a decision prohibiting some kind of conduct
actually becomes enforceable and not when it is taken, the gap sometimes being of several
years duration. Consideration of buying power is centred on ways of ensuring that the
current prohibition on discriminatory treatment effectively catches discrimination prac-
tised by those who exercise market power oo the demand side and on the establishment
of a presumption that suppliers are dependent on their customers in certain specified
circumstances.
80. In its special advisory opinion on abuse of buying power and possibilities for con-
trol under the G\(/B the Monopolies Commission c,Lme to the conclusion that, if fully
employed, the current statutory provisions are quite adequate to deal with the anti-
competitive effects of buying power. It was particulady firm in its opposition to the
introduction of a general prohibition on discrimination and on any de making the
provisions of competition law generally mandatory.
81. Under its merger control powers, the Federal Cartel Office prohibited one merger
and one planned merger.
Rescue mergers repeatedly arose for scrutiny. Since the Federal Cartel Office's scrutiny of
mergers under cartel law proceeds entirely from considerations of competition, the
strongest firm on any given market is generally disqualified from making a rescue bid
for another firm. The Federal Minister of Economic Affairs can allow mergers previ-
ously prohibited by the Cartel Office for pressing considerations of public interest. He
conditionally authorized the merger between Babcock and Artos, which had been pro-
hibited by the Cartel Office, as a means of preserving jobs, but at the same time stated
that the threatened loss of employment was not to be generally regarded as a legal
justification for rescue mergers.
Dealing with another rescue merger, where the Cartel Office coodemned the takeover by
the Thyssen group of Hiiller Hille, which had already taken place, the Minister of
Economic Affairs authorized Thyssen to acquire a holding of up to 45/o in the smaller
firm. Here again, together with considerations of preserving the outstanding technical
knowhow of the acquired firm, the job preservation argument was material to the
authorization. The two firms have appealed to the Berlin Kammergericht (Court of
Appeal) both against the complete prohibition by the Cartel Office and the part prohibi-
tion by the Minister. Should the appeal fail, the Cartel Office will for the first tirne have
to consider what measures it must order for partial divestiture following a completed
takeover.
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82, Of particular interest as regards the control of abuse of a dominant position were
tlre proceedings for price abuses in the pharmaceuticals market, for which it L974 rhe
Cartel Office had ordered Hoffmann-La Roche to decrease its manufacturer's sales prices
for Valium and Librium by 4O/o and 31/o respectively. The Kammergericht upheld the
order, though it reduced the decrease to 2S/o. Upon a further appeal on a point of law
the Federal Court of Justice, while recognizing that a price reduction order could be
made in an abuse case, revoked the order since there were objections to the way in which
a competitive price was determined; it remitted the case to the Kammergericht for
rehearing.
83. The Federal Government has laid a report before the Bundestag on the experience
to date of the application of the law on non-binding price recommendations. The second
amendment of the Cartel Act in 1973 abolished resale price maintenance for branded
goods and prohibited unrealistically high price recommendations (Mond.preisempfeblun-
gen) and the use of price recommendations to circumvent the ban on resale price main-
tenance. It subjected non-binding price recommendations to more severe control by the
Cartel Office against abuse. In general the report concludes that experience to date of
the provisions on non-binding recommendations offers no firm basis for the making of
proposals for a general prohibition on price recommendations for branded goods.
However, it is proposed that the legal basis for effective controls on non-binding price
recommendations should be improved by requiring that the Cartel Office be notified of
all price recommendations and by giving the Cartel Office greater Powers to seek
information.
84. As to the application of the current ban on discrimination in the distribution of
branded goods, the Cartel Office has published administrative guidelines reflecting cases
decided by the Federal Court of Justice and its own previous practice. The aim of these
guidelines is to preserve market entry at the same time ensuring that, despite the exten-
sion of the supplier's obligation to enter into contracts for branded goods, competition
between the different types of distributor can remain as fak x possible, while respecting
the need for different types of distribution channels.
France
8t. The most important event in 1977 was, without doubt, the adoption by Padiament
of Act No 77-806, promulgated on 19 July 1977, for the control of economic concentra-
tion, and the suppression of unlawful restrictive practices and abuses of a dominant
position. The Act contains three principal measures:
(a) In place of the Technical Commission on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Posi-
tions, the Act sets up the Competition Commission, a new body, with extended
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Powers and improved resources. It consists of a Chairman and ten members assisted
by a Chief Examiner and a team of Examiners and takes over all the responsibilities
of the former Commission, but may also be consulted by the Government on any
question relating to competition. It may also scrutinize proposed mergers and submii
opinions on them.
(b) The Act establishes selective control of any mergers which are seriously prejudicial
to compeiition without making an adequate contribution to economic and social
Progress. Merger control Powers may be exercised where the sales in the home
market on the enterprises involved exceed:(i) either 40/6 of aggregate domestic consumption in the case of goods, products
or services for which substitutes exist;(ii) or 25/o of aggregate domestic consumption for at least two of the firms or for
each of them in the case of goods, products or services for which no substitutes
exist.
Firms may notify mergers to the Minister for Economic Affairs. He, on his own
initiative or at the request of the Minister responsible for the relevant economic
sector, may refer merger cases to the Competition Commission. \Tithin the limits
set by the Commission's opinion, the Ministers are empowered to direct the firms to
take whatever stePs are needed to cancel or adjust their merger, whether it is still at
the planning stage or has already taken place. If these directives are not complied
with the firms may be fined.
(c) As regards the suppression of unlawful restrictive practices and abuse of dominant
positions, the Act does not alter the basic principle of the control machinery but
makes a number of changes, including:(i) a system of administrative fines of up to 5/o of. sales before tax in France if
the infringement is committed by a firm and FF 5 000 000 otherwise; there is
also a mitigated procedure, whereby the Minister can fine each party to a minor
restrictive practice in an amount not exceeding FF 100 000;(ii) an injunction procedure: the Minister may order firms, on pain of fine, to
comply with certain directions or modify certain agreements;(iii) extended right of access to the Commission for local authorities, trade unions,
trade associations and registered consumer organizations;(iv) improved defence rights with the establishment of a full adversary procedure
and the right of appeal to the Council of State against any ministerial decision.
In a different context, an Order of 2 September L977, revoking an Order of
30 May 1970, substantially altered the rules governing the advertising of prices and
price reductions to consumers. Two objectives are sought by this reform. Firstly, the
conditions governing advertisements concerning price reductions are relaxed (there
is no longer an obligation to specify net prices in advertising outside the place of
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sale). Secondly, consumers are now better protected against misleading advertise-
ments concerning prices and price reductionl (the Order requires double marking
of prices, forbids reference to ifull'prices that have not actually been charged before
thJ advertisement is made, prohibiti the advertising of products that are not avail-
able for sale and requires the seller to sell at the advertised price regardless of the
date of delivery).
g6. The authorities have continued. to take action against individual restrictive trade
practices.
They have intervened, for instance, in markets where distributive trades are very strongly
basid ais-A-air manufacturers. In connection with the Particularly aggressive strategies of
certain distributors in relation to prices and margins on selected articles, they have
issued a reminder that the practice known as decoy pricing may be regatded as a form of
bad faith which would warrant refusal to deal by suppliers.
For several years the practice of selling at cost has been acquiring greatet popularity, and
a judgment given by the Tribunal de Grande Instance at Toulouse on 18 APril 1977
confirms the interpretation of the concept used by public authorities, which is that 'cost'
(below which sales would be at a loss) is the price at which the article is bought, less
any rebates or discounts, plus VAT and any costs of catriage.
The number of individual measures taken to enforce the des of competition as applied
to restrictive practices rose substantially (2717 in the first half of L977, compared with
4664 fot the whole of Lg76),leading to the initiation of 696 cases' Detailed analysis of
ttre figures revealed a growing number of breaches of the rules on refusal to deal, loss
leaders and sales at a premium. The number of infringements for failure to respect the
rules on discriminatory practices has remained relatively stable.
On another front, the control of restrictive practices and dominant positions has con-
tinued apace. The Technical Commission on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Posi'
tions, having issued some 130 opinions ii its 23 years of activity, issued 9 opinions in its
last year of existence, of which only 3 had been published at the end of November. The
Commission's other opinions have not been published, either because they were given in
response to requests from courts or because the Minister has not yet taken his decision.
The three opinions approved by the Minister condemn restrictive practices in the whole-
saling of soft drinks and beer, in the natural sweet wines business and between the
owners of presses for straightening lorry chassis. None of these cases was referred to the
criminal courts.
87. The courts have still not given very many judgments on restrictive practices and
abuse of a dominant position. However, more cases are being litigated. Several are cur'
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rently at the preliminary stages and some set down for final hearing. Three judgments
were given this year. One, at first instance, passed aheavy sentence (fines and suspended
prison sentences) on the managers of companies who had abused their dominant position
on the bottle ra& market. The other two, given on appeal, increased the sentence passed
at first instance in the one case and, in the other, set aside the decision of the lower
court on the grounds that the elements of the restrictive practice had not been adequately
proved and that certain of the acts done were obligatory. Both cases related to school
transport. Appeals have been lodged in the Court of Cassation by the accused persons
and the Public Prosecutor respectively.
lreland
88. During the year there have been no changes in the basic legislation regarding
Restrictive Practices-the Restrictive Practices Act, L972----or in the statutory orders
relating to the supply and distribution of particular classes of goods. Proposals f.or f.ar
reaching changes in the legislative approach to the control of Restrictive Practices made
by the Restrictive Practices Commission are being considered but no final decision has
been taken to date. The Mergers, Takeovers and Monopolies (Control) Bill, which was
before Parliament at the dissolution in June, has not yet been reintroduced.
89. During L977 the Examiner of Restrictive Practices investigated the operation of
statutory orders relating to motor spirit, grocery goods, jewellery, watches and clocks and
building materials. These investigations showed that the orders in question were operat-
ing effectively but in one case, namely grocery goods, an apparent breach of the relevant
order came to light and the Examiner has reported the matter to the Minister for
Industry, Commerce and Energy. In the case of motor spirit, oil companies are prohibited
by order from operating new motor spirit retail outlets for a period of six years which
will end in July 1978. The Examiner has requested the Restrictive Practices Commission
to hold a public enquiry into the operation of the prohibition in order to ascertain
whether or not it should be continued after that date.
In areas not involving statutory orders the Examiner carried out investigations into
cinema films, newspapers and magazines, the legal profession, pharmaceuticals, cosme-
tics, fertilizers, the travel industry and motor insurance. In reports to the Restrictive
Practices Commission the Examiner recommended that public enquiries be held into the
supply and distribution of cinema films and of newspapers and magazines.
The Restrictive Practices Commission published an enquiry into fertilizers. They an-
nounced their intention of holding an enquiry into the supply and distribution of cinema
films as well as their intention of holding a special review by means of enquiry into the
operation of Article 3 of the Restrictive Trade Practices (Motor Spirit) Order, L972 as
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amended. Finaily, a number of studies under Section 12 of the Restrictive Practices Act
L972 were advanced.
Italy
gO. No developments worthy of note have taken place in Italy'
Luxembourg
91. Among the main developments this year was an inquiry conducted by the Restric-
tive Trade Practices Commission into banking, following a complaint from a bank which
felt that its interests were being damaged by discriminatory practices on the part of other
banks. The Commission delivered a detailed opinion which led to action being taken by
the Minister of Economic Affairs. The discrimination in question has now ceased.
The Prices Office, a body which can take action against prices on the home market,
particulady when they are a result of unfair competition, has made- a number of orders
iince the end of 1976 concerting, among other things, milk products, meat products,
beer, wine, pharmaceutical products and baker's wares.
Netherlands
92. In the Sixth Report on Competition Policy it was announced that two changes to
the Economic Compeiition Act $ret economische mededinging) were being prepared.
One of them, for the replacement of supervision on the abuse principle by a system of
authorizations for price-fixing and resale price maintenance agreements and conferring
powers on the Minister of Economic Affairs to issue minimum Price regulations, was
introduced in the Second Chamber of the States-Genera! on 13 December. The condi-
tions which pricing agreements must satisfy in order to qualify for authorization were set
out in the Sixth Report. The power to make minimum price regulations is aimed at
curbing excessive forms of price competition where the general interest and the interests
of the relevant industry so require. Such situations arise in cases of:
(i) price wars, where goods or services are temporarily offered at very low prices with
the aim of driving competing suppliers out of the market or of forcing them to
adopt a particular strategy;
(ii) decoy pricing techniques;
(iii) cut-throat competition between two forms of retailing, each having its own cost
structure.
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The Bill provides for the possibility of exemption for firms able to prove that for sound
business reasons (such as cheap imports) they can sell at prices lower than those allowed
by the minimum price regulations.
The other Bill, which would give the
ments, is now in the final stages of
Padiament.
public access to the register of restrictive agree-
preparation and will shortly be introduced in
93' In an opinion addressed to the Government, the Social and Economic Council sup-
ported the introduction of. legal premerger control measures. The Council considers that
the authorities should be empowered to prohibit mergers, or authorize them only con-
ditionally, where there is a conflict with the public interest in terms of competition,
social and regional policies.
For this reason the control powers should be conferred on the Government itself rather
than on any independent agency.
The system envisaged by the Council would be built up on the following broad lines:(i) all mergers between firms above a specified size (where at least one of them is
established in the Nethedands) should be notified to the authorities;(ii) there should be provision for prior scrutiny of all notified mergers exceeding
certain quantitative thresholds (sales and employment);
(iii) notified mergers below these thresholds should be subject to premerger control
only where information available to the authorities indicates that they may be in
conflict with the public interest.
The Council's opinion also suggests giving statutory authority to its own merger code.
This code, which dates f rcm L97O, contains rules that have no legal force but which aim,
by prescribing certain notification procedures, to protect the interests of shareholders and
employees whenever a merger is contemplated.
The Minister of Economic Affairs has expressed agreement with the broad lines of the
Council's opinion.
94. By Order dated 14 July t977 the Minister of Economic Affairs and the Secretary
of State for Public Health and Environmental Hygiene required Hoffmann-La Roche to
reduce the prices charged for Valium and Librium imported on the Dutch market by
25/6 and 3)/o tespectively.
This was the first case where the Government has made a price order against a firm that
had abused its dominant position.
The relevant market here was the tranquillizer market. The structure of this oligopolistic
market and conduct on it were characterized by the absence of arry price competition.
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Because of this fact, its market share, its ownership of patents and trademarks and the
small volume of parallel imports, Roche had a substantial position of power on the
relevant market.
The order referred to the British rnarket by way of cornparison. The prices of valium
and Librium were considerably lower there tiran in the Nethedands' As it was adequately
proved that the British prices did not create an economically unacceptable situation as
i.g"rd, the sale of Valium and Librium, the authorities-having regard to different sales
pr-omotion costs in Britain and the Nethedands and to Bfitish ex-works prices--<on-
.tod"d that the level of the prices charged by Roche on the Dutch market had conse-
quences that conflicted with the public interest'
Roche appealed this decision to the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven (Business
Appeals''iribunal). Roche also took sumrnaryproceedings against the State for breach of
statutory duty.
The appeal to the Tribunal does not suspend the operation of the decision itself.
The judge at first instance in summary proceedings dismissed Roche's action. Roche also
appealed against this decision.
Unlted Kingdom
gi. During Lg77 it was found that, because of the application of the restrictive trade
practices legislation to commercial services, a large number of loan-financing agreements
?ell within the scope of the legislation in that they contained restrictions on the freedom
of action of borrowers, lenders or guarantors which were accepted by at least two parties
to such agreements.
The puqpose of these restrictions was not to restrict competition but to protect tle
secorily of lo.nr and the ability of borowers to repay. Accordingly the Restrictive Trade
Practices Act L977 made provision for the disregard of restrictions in such agreernents,
with the object of removing them from the scope of the legislation. The Act contains a
broader exclusion for agreements under which restrictions are accePted by overseas Parties
and which relate to activities outside the UK. In addition, the order-making powers of
the Secretary of State have been extended so that if any harmful agreements have been
exempted inadvertently they may still be controlled-
It was announced in the Queen's Speech on 3 November t977 that there would be a
review of the legislation and institutions governing competition policy to see that they
make their maximum contribution to improving industrial efficiency. This review has
abeadv started.
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96. Up to t December 1977 the Director-General of Fair Trading made three refer-
ences to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. The Commission was required to
investigate the supply of electricity supply meters, credit card franchise services and
certain domestic gas appliances. In addition, the Secretary of State for Prices and Con-
sumer Protection rnade a general reference to the Commission of discounts to retailers;
the puqpose is to investigate the general effect on the public interest of the practice of
some retailers of obtaininglarger discounts or similar benefits than those available to
other retailers where the differences are not wholly attributable to savings in the sup-
pliers'costs.
During the year the following reports of the Commission were published: the supply of
diazonium sensitized copying materials; cat and dog foods; wheat flour and bread made
from wheat flour; the regulation of charges by scale fees on the part of architects and on
the part of surveyors. In the cases of architects and surveyors, the Director-General was
asked to negotiate with the relevant professional bodies with a view to remedying the
adverse findings in the reports.
97. During the period under review the Director-General has considered 178 mergers
or merger proposals and tendered advice to the Secretary of State for Prices and Con-
sumer Protection on whether or not they should be referred to the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission.
Eight merger references were made to the Commission of which four were abandoned
before the Commission could report. Four reports were received from the Commission in
1977 and in two cases, Pilkington Brothers Ltd/UKO International Ltd and British
Petroleum Ltd/Century Oils Group, the Commission recommended against the mergers.
Suitable undertakings were given by the companies concerned to the Secretary of State
that they would not proceed with their acquisition plans.
Of the remaining cases, the Commission's majority conclusion was that the Babcock and
$Tilcox Ltd/Herbert Morris Ltd merger proposal was contrary to the public interest, but
because this conclusion lacked a two-thirds majority there was no legal power under the
Fair Trading Act to prevent the merger proceeding. In the case of the Fruehauf Corpo-
rution/Crane Fruehauf merger proposal, the Commission decided by a two-thirds majority
that the merger would not be against the public interest.
Each proposed merger was however subject to a counter-bid neither of which was refer-
red to the Commission. Davy International Ltd subsequently succeeded in its counter-
offer for Herbert Morris Ltd, and Babcod< and \Tilcox sold its Herbert Morris shares to
Davy. Fruehauf Coqporation went ahead with its full bid but faced a counter-bid for
Crane Fruehauf from Inchcape and Company Ltd. The Board of Crane Fruehauf later
recomnrended acceptance of the Fruehauf Coqporation offer.
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Discussions on an earlier Commission rcport (1976) concerning the holdings of Euro-
canadian Shipholdings Ltd in Furness NTithy and Company Ltd and Manchester Liners
Ltd concluded with Eurocanadian Shipholdings I-td giving undertakings to restrict its
holdings in both companies and its voting rights in Furness S(ithy and Company Ltd.
The Director-General is now keeping these undertakings under review.
98. Up to t December 1977 some 200 registered agreements in the services sector have
been under examination. They cover a wide range of activity and variety of restriction.
Most involve members of services supply associations. The most common restrictions
concern levels of charges, exclusive dealing arrangements, and standard terms and condi-
tions and codes of practice. In evaluating these agreements priority has been given to the
consideration of those restrictions in each agreement which would obviously not be
allowed to continue without reference to the Restrictive Practices Court. This has led to
the abandonment of major restrictions in many agreements.
Four of the outstanding agreements relating to telephone cablesl were dealt with by the
Restrictive Practices Court during the year: most of the remainder had already expired or
been terminated by the parties. Application was made to the Court under Section 35(3)
of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 seeking Orders to restrain certain parties from
giving effect to 60 agreements concerning ready mixed concrete, and to prevent them
giving effect to any other registrable agreements to which they might be a party, without
first notifying the Office. Sixty ready mixed concrete agreements were also referred to
the Court under section L of the Act. Section 35(3) proceedings were successfully taken
against the major parties to seventy-seven bread agreements registered ln L976.
I Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 107.
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Chapter Vl
Main decisions and measures taken by the Commission
gg. ln t977 the Commission took seventeen decisions applying Articles 85 and 86 of
the EEC Treatyl and twenty-one applying Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty. In
proceedings under the EEC Treaty 261 cases were settled without a decision being taken
because the agreements brought into line with the rules on competition in the Treaty,
were terminated or expired. Most of these were distribution agreements, the cases being
terminated after amendments were made to the block exemption Regulation No 67 /67 /
EEC.
On 31 December there were in all 4Il7 pending cases, of which 3 862 were applications
or notifications, 13) were complaints from firms and 120 were proceedings on the Com-
mission's own initiative. Of the applications and notifications pending before the Com-
mission, )9/6 concerned licensing agreements, 3O/o concetned distribution agreements
and tt/6 concerned horizontal agreements. The size of the figure for licensing agree-
ments illustrates the importance of the block exemption regulation currently being
drafted to deal with many of the more straightforward cases.
100. In November the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant
Positions held its hundredth meeting. This Committee of anti-trust officials from the
Member States has to be consulted under Article 10 of Council Regulation No L7 /62 on
any decision finding that Article 85 or 86 of the Treaty has been infringed, giving nega-
tive clearance or giving exemption under Article 85(3). It met thirteen times in 1977
and gave opinions on twenty or so cases under Articles 85 and 86.
1 Not including the Commission Decision of 20.1.1977, Vacuum Interrupters, which was described
in the Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 175.
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Article 85(1) applied to horizontal agreements
Market-sharing, price-tixing and intormation agreements
Prinfing paper anil stationery manufac{urers
101. The Commission issued a Decisionl formally finding that agreements between
manufacturers responsible for the production of 80 to 9o/o of Belgian and Dutch
printing paper and stationery were infringements of the Treaty's competition des. The
manufacturers in question are members of the Association des fabricants de pites, papiers
et cartons de Belgique (Cobelpa) and the Vereniging van Nededandsche Papierfabri
kanten (VNP).
These agreements, which were terminated following the Commission's intervention,
provided for the firms involved to exchange details of their prices and general sales
terms and to respect set distribution circuits. They also provided for the exchaoge of
output and sales figures between certain firms.
rc2. T{rith this Decision the Commission reaffirmed and clarified its opposition to
'open price systems' which have the object or effect of distorting competition and affect-
ing trade between Member States.z
Yegetable parchment nanufacturers
103. The Commission later issued a Decisions finding that the main European manu-
facturers of vegetable parchment (a kind of wrapping paper) had been engaging in
concerted practices contrary to Article 8)(1) of the EEC Treaty, Two of them are French
(Alamigeon and Dalle & Lecomte), one is Italian (Cartiere Burgo), four are German
(FeldmiiLhle, Nicolaus, Rube and Schleipen & Erkens), one is British (Viggins Teape)
and one is Finnish (Sedachius).
IThen the then second-largest British manufacturer abandoned production in 1971, the
French and German manufacturers engaged in a concerted practice consisting of reserving
supplies on the British market for the remaining maoufacturer there-lUTiggins Teape.
1 Decision of 8.9.1977, Cobelpa/VNP: OJ L 242 of 2L.9.r977.
2 Dutch sporting cartridges agrcemellt (Third Report on Competition Policy, point 55); Non-ferrous
semi-manufactures and ships' cables (Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 39 and 4O)i
and paper-machine wires (Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 134). See also points 5 to 8
of this Report.
3 Decision of 23.12.1917, vegetable parchment: OJ L 70 of 13.3.1978.
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Trorking through the Genuine Vegetable Parchment Association, an international trade
association to which they all belonged, the same manufacturers plus Burgo and Sedachius
exchanged detailed price information and periodically informed each other of the
volumes of vegetable parchment exported by each to their various export markets in
third countries.
Lastly, at meetings held several times each year, the GVPA members discussed and set
rates of increase in selling prices for EEC markets where there was no domestic manu.
facturer (Denmark and the Benelux countries).
104. The Commission has ordered the firms that engaged in concerted price increases
and actually supplied the relevant markets to pay fines ranging from 10 000 to 25 000
u.a.
N ational market protection agreements
Regulation of the Dutch blcyclo market
105. The Commission prohibited the regulation of the market organized by the Dutch
trade association for bicycles and related goods.l By means of an 'Algemeen Reglement'
(General Regulation) the association, the Centraal Bureau voor de Rijwielhandel (CBR)'
set up a private market organization for bicycles, which also covered goods imported from
other Member States.
The Algemeen Reglement regulated access to the Dutch bicycle trade, established mini-
mum requirements and confined the different categories of recognized firm to doing
certain types of business (repair, retailing, wholesaling, supplying wholesalers, joint
purchasing, representing manufacturers). The various categories also had to comply with
Lxclusive purchase and supply obligations, and could not have business relations with
non-member firms. Retailers had to add a minimum profit margin to their purchase
prices. Discounts-which could have encouraged price competition, even if only indi-
iectly through irnproved equipment of bicycles or part-exchange of second-hand bicycles
-were 
prohibited. The association enforced the obligations by measures such as fines
and publication of notices. Any disputes could not be dealt with in the ordinary courts.
The Algemeen Reglement covered the great majority of Dutch firms dealing in bicycles
and bicycle parts-roughly SO/o of bicycles sold on the Dutch market, of which about
35/o were imported. Moreover, a substantial proportion of the parts for bicycles built in
the Nethedands comes from other Member States.
1 Decision of 2.r2.r977t oJ L 20 0f 2t.1.L978.
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106. The CBR amended the Algemeen Reglement in July 1976 itt response to Commis-
sion objections to these serious uncompetitive practices. There are now only two catego-
ries of recognized firrn-retailers and suppliers-and the Reglement applies only to
goods for which a trademark has been registered with the CBR by a supplier.
107, The Commission's Decision concerned only the original arrangement applied until
July 1976.1 The operation of the new Reglement and its effects on competition on a
market where numerous small and medium-sized firms do business is currently under
scrutiny.
Vegetable growers pnd dealers
108. The Commission has continued to take action which throws light on how the rules
on competition apply to the terms for admission to auctionsales for farm produce.,z
In a case concerning the admission of buyers it found that certain arrangements made by
grouPs of vegetable growers and dealers based in Brittany for the marketing of Breton
cauliflowers, artichokes and eady potatoes were in breach of Article 85(1) of the
Treaty.s The actual arrangements banned by the Commission imposed restrictions on
dealers wishing to buy at the two main vegetable auction centres set up in the depart-
ments of Nord-Finistdre and Ille-et-Vilaine by two growers' cooperatives (SICA of
Saint-Pol-de-L6on and SICA-SIPEFEL of Saint-M6loir-des-Ondes).
Admission of dealers to the auction centres was conditional on their making all their
purchases there and having a packing station close to the auction centre.
Further, in respect of Saint-M6loir-des-Ondes only, admission to the auctions was subject
to formal approval by a majority of the dealers already admitted and a buyer was
allowed to purchase and dispatch goods on his own account only.
These obligations, about which complaints had been made, appreciably restricted compe-
tition among Breton dealers and shippers by hampering, if not blocking, access to the
auctions for new buyers and, in the case of Saint-M6loir-des-Ondes, by confining deal-
ings in the vegetables to dealers already admitted.
1 !n January 1976 the Rotterdam Kantonrechter (iudge at the cantonal court), pending a CommissionDecision, stayed the action before him concerning a fine imposed for non-compliance with the
Algemeen Reglement.
2 See Decision of 2r.7.1974 in Frubo: OI L 237 of 28.9.1974 (Fourth Report on Competition
Policy, point 71), upheld by Court of Justice in Case 7l/74 (Fntbo v Commission) by judgmentgiven on i,5.t.7975i U97rl ECB. j63.3 Decision of z.tz.t977: OI L 2t of 26.t.19j8.
COMP. REP. EC 1977
MAIN DECISIONS AND MEASURES TAKEN BY THE COMMISSION It
A very large quantity of Breton vegetables are marketed through these fwo auction
centres (70/a of the cauliflowers and artichokes and 25/o of the early potatoes grown in
France). A third of their production is exported to other Community countries, par-
ticularly Germany.
-109. Since this case concerned farm produce, for which the Commission has made
specific arrangements granting certain powers of. organization to producer groups, and
because this was the first time it had to give a decision concerning the behaviour of such
groups, the Commission did not impose fines.
Agreements Iimiting production and sa/es
Yideo cassettes and video cassette tecordert
110. The Commission issued a Decisionl finding that certain clauses in agreements
between manufacturers of video cassettes and video cassette recorders which took effect
in May 1975, were notified to the Commission in December L975 and were terminated
after Commission representations in September 1977 constituted infringements of the
EEC Treaty's rules on competition.
The parties to the agreements were the Dutch company NV Philips' Gloeilampenfabrie-
ken and seven German firms-Blaupunktwerke GmbH, Bosch-Siemens Hausgerite
GmbH, Grundig AG, Loewe Opta GmbH, Norddeutsche Mende Rundfunk KG, Philips
GmbH and SABA-r$7erke.
The agreements were for the uniform application of technical standards for the VCR
system of video cassettes and vido czrssette recorders based on Philips' Patents.
The firms involved had undertaken to manufacture and sell no video cassettes or
recorders other than those conforming to the system licensed by Philips. Also, any party
which terminated the agreements immediately forfeited its licences under the patents of
the others, while the remaining parties kept their rights under the terminating party's
Patents.
lll. Because Philips is a leading manufacturer in this industry the restrictions of comPe-
tition were held to be appreciable. The tests for exemption under Article 85(3) were not
satisfied since there was in fact no improvement in the material goods. Even if such
improvernents had been achieved, the consumer was not allowed a fair share of thc
1 Commission Decision of 2o.12.1977: OJ L 47 of 1a.2.1978
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resulting benefit and restrictions were imposed that were not indispensable. Hence,
although it is basically in favour of agreements whose purpose is to establish types and
standards and apply them uniformly, the Comrnission could not see its way to giving
exemption in this case.
Export cartels
Necomoul
112. In response to Commission repres€ntations the Dutch maltsters' exporting syndi
cate, 'Necomout' (Codperatieve Vereniging Centrale Organisatie van Nederlandse
Exportmouterijen GA), to which almost all the Dutch malt-producers belong, discon-
tinued its sales activities within the Community.
The syndicate, which had the legal status of a cooperative, had two main roles.
Its primary task was to export to other Community or non-member countries that portion
of Dutch-produced malt which its members could not sell on the home market. The
member companies themselves had undertaken to set aside part of their production
capacity for export sales and to supply the syndicate with specified minimum quantities
each year. They were not allowed to engage in any export business on their own account.
The combination of individual sales on the domestic market and joint exPort sales
through the syndicate also meant that each member could at any one time count on at
least 7)/o utilization of his production capacity. 
'Vhenever a member firm reported that
less than 75/o of its production capacity was being used, the syndicate would immediately
farm out the orders placed with it according to the total available production capacity and
not according to the capacity reserved for export pu{poses, as before.
This arrangement hindered competition between the affiliated malting-houses in deliver-
ies to foreign customers, which accounted for about one-third of their total sales. It also
distorted competition on the Dutch malt market, since profits and losses on export
business were spread over the member firms in equal measure, since geographical loca-
tion, whether favourable or unfavourable, ceased to be relevant and since any member
who had trouble selling his output would be helped out by all the other members.
The Commission, whose investigations began as a result of a complaint from an ex-
member of Necomout, also discovered a sales agreement between the Dutch malt-
producers and their most important customers, the Dutch breweries. The breweries
looked to Necomout members for a substantial proportion of their malt requirements,
and in return the malt-producers purchased almost all the malting badey they needed
through the breweries' syndicate, CBK (Coiiperatieve Vereniging 'Centraal Brouwerij
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Kantoor'). The Commission also discovered that the basic terms for the processing of
malt by contract between individual breweries and malting-houses, including the basic
charge for such processing, had been standardized in a framework agreement.
L13. As a result of the Commission's intervention, the firms concerned terminated the
agreements with the CBK and amended the articles and memorandum of their assocration
in line with the EEC des on competition. Since the agreements were of minor economic
importance the Commission vras able to close the case without issuing a formal decision.
S 2 
- 
Encouragement of permitted forms of cooperation
Sopelem,/Yickers
L14. The Commission authorized' an agreement for cooperation between the French
company Soci6t€ d'optique, pr€cision, 6lectronique et m6canique SA (Sopelem), Paris,
the British company Vickers Ltd, Iondon, and their joint venture Microscopes Nachet
SA, Paris.
This agreement relates to technical cooperation, the exchange of knowhow, research and
development and the joint distribution of microscopes. The particular aim is to help the
firms involved develop more advanced and more sophisticated microscopes.
There is very keen competition on the mictoscopes market in the Cornmunity, which is
dominated by large, powerful German manufacturers (Zeiss, Will and Leitz), accounting
for nearly 5O/o of all microscope sales in the EEC, and by Japanese manufacturers (Ni-
kon, Kyowa and Olympus), with a market share of between 30 and fi/o. Although
Sopelem and Vckers are both technically and economically important firms, neither has
been able to attain a very substantial market share outside its home market: while Sope-
lemAachet has 2O/o of the French market and Viclers accounts for L6/o of the United
Kingdom market and 25/o of the Irish market, their aggregate Community market
shares are orly L.5/o and 2/o respectively.
The agreement is contrary to Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty since the firms concerned
are competitors and their technical cooperation and joint distribution through the joint
venture therefore restricts comPetition on the microscope market.
But the Commission was able to give exemption because of the technical progress and
improvements which are likely to result from the agreement as regards distribution in
countries where the firms involved already do substantial business since they will obtain
1 Decision of 2r.r2.r977i OJ L7o of 11.3.1978.
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access to each other's distribution networks and as regards sales in other countries, where
both will be able to supply a fuller range of microscopes, technically comparable with the
ranges offered by their major competitors. All this will be of benefit to the consumer.
The Commission also took into consideration the keen competition on this market and
the fact that the firms concerned have only very small market shares.
Exemption has been given for a five-year period expiring in 1981. It is subject to an
obligation on the firms concerned to submit detailed reports to the Commission so that
the effects of the agreement and the development of the relevant market can be
monitored.
ll5. This Decision gave the Commission an opportunity to specify certain of the limits
with.in which in exceptional circumstances cooperation between competing firms in
research and development and the formation of a ioint venture to handle distribution
may be allowed.
traz/Peter
116. ln July L969 the Commission authorized,l until January L977, a specialization
agreement entered into in 1957 by two major clock manufacturers-Jaz SA, Paris, and
Peter-Uhren GmbH. Rottweil.
The main point of the agreement is that Jaz abandons production of large mechanical
alarm clocks and specializes in pendulum clocks and electric alarm clocks while Peter
abandons the production of electric alarm clocks and specializes in large mechanical
alarm clocks. Each party also agreed that in the other's territory it would supply only the
other party.
Although all the restrictions in the agreement were within Regulation No 2779f72,2 the
agreement does not qualify for block exemption by reason of the quantitative hurdles-
notably as regards Jaz's market share-that it could not clear.
But as all the tests for exemption under Article 85(3) are again satisfied, the Commis-
sion renewed its authorization for a ten-year period ending in January 1p87.3
It found that in the ten years of the agreement's life the following benefits have resulted:
(a) production has been rationalized and productivity has improved considerably;
(b) quality has been improved and a large number of technical developments have been
possible;
1 Decision of 22.7.1969: OJ L 95 of 7.8.1969; First Report on Competition Policy, poi,nt 26.
2 Points )5 and )6 of this Report.
3 Decision of 23.12.1977: OJ L 6r of 3.i.1979.
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(c) cost savings and productivity gains have been passed on to the consumer in the form
of a substantial improvement in the quality of the clocks and of highly competitive
prices that have risen less fast than the general level of consumer prices.
Regulations goveming lntemational motor sbows
117. By a Decision following on from those already adopted in relation to fairs and
exhibitions,l the Commission confirmed its broad policy of favouring the rationalization
of such events, provided that there are no unnecessary restrictions on the freedom to
exhibit.z
J18. The Decision concerned the regulations adopted by the Bureau Permanent Inter-
national des Constructeurs d'Automobiles (BPICA) governing the showing of motcir
vehicles at international exhibitions held in Europe,
BPICA, which is based in Paris, is an association of. organizations of motor car manufac-
turers, assemblers and importers from twenty countries, including all Community
countries other than Ireland and Luxembourg.
BPICA's des are binding through their national organizations on almost all the wodd's
motor manufacturers and through them on their representatives.
Each year BPICA draws up a schedule of international exhibitions at which motor
vehicles may be shown. The schedule includes Europe's various annual motor shows.
Participation in international exhibitions not on the schedule is prohibited both for motor
manufacturers and for their representatives. Non-international exhibitions are not
covered.
Because of the advantage to both exhibitors (whose costs are kept down) and visitors
(who have a full range before them) of concentrating international motor shows, the
Commission was able to give an exemption, but only after BpICA had abandoned a
dause giving it the right to decide arbitrarily whether an exhibition is international. In
future this matter will be decided objectively by the competent authorities or bodies and
BPICA will no longer be involved in the exhibition of motor vehicles at national or
regional events.
1 Decisions EEMO (OJ \ 92 
"f 20.3.1969' and CEMATEX (OJ L 227 of 8.10.1971); (Fifst!9-n9.1 on Competition Policy, points 42 and, 4l); Decision UNIDI (OJ L 228 of zg.e.iglS;Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 51).2 Decision of 7.tt.1977: OI L 299 of. 23.IL.1977.
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EMI Electronics-Jungheinrich
l1g. Following intervention by the Commission, EMI Electronics Ltd (EMI), a united
Kingdom.o-funy and H. Jungheinrich & Co. (JH), established in the Federal Republic
of d.rmu^y, modifred certain provisions in a joint development agreement notified some
months previously and which amounted to infringements of the comPetition des.
The agreement concerns joint development relating to electronic control devices for use
by JFLin the field of driverless tractor and forklift systems. Both companies are of inter-
natio.rul importance in their respective fields, EMI in electronic controls and JH in bulk
handling ryrt"mr. Under the agreement JH is to make financial contributions to mutually
agreed development projects to be undertaken by EMI with JH assistance.
By one of the original provisions, JH was to be bound to order all its requirements of
electronic elements for drivedess tractor and forklift systems from EMI. This had the
effect of depriving JH of access to products from other sources.
Following representations made by the Commission, the parties agreed to apply the
purchase commitment of JH only to devices of the design developed by EMI under the
agreement. Accordingly, JH is now to be free to purchase from third parties other types
ol electronic control devices for drivedess tractor and forklift systems. If EMI is unwil-
ling or unable on reasonable terms to supply to JH the products developed under the
agreement, then JH is entitled to licences for their manufacture.
Under another provision of the original text of the agreement, EMI, which is exPeri-
enced and wide[ diversified in the business of electronic control devices, had accepted a
general limitation on its freedom to grant licences to third parties under patents which
would be obtained through the cooperative development. This restriction was unlimited
in scope of application and therefore extended also to patent licences in respect of pos-
sible uses outside the field of drivedess tractor and forklift systems. In response to the
Commission's disapproval, the parties agreed to amend the provision in question to
enable EMI, without the consent of JH, to grant licences to third parties for use outside
the field.
120. In this case the cooperative development work is still in its eatly stages and the
restrictive provisions above referred to have not been implemented. Following the
amendments of the agreement which remove these restrictions, the Commission was
accordingly in a position to take no further steps in this matter. This view of the Com-
mission again calls attention to its willingness to give favourable regard to cooperative
development in fields of high technology, also in cases in which substantial firms are
involved.l
1 See also the joint venture cases described above, points 150 to 159 of this Report.
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Specialization, joint buying and ioint selting agreements in the coat
and steel sector
121. Atticle 65 of the ECSC Treaty empowers the Commission to authorize specializa-
tion or joint buying or joint selling agreements in the coal and steel industriei if they
make for a substantial improvement in production or distribution and provided that
certain specified conditions are fulfilled. This possibility is available, for example, for
schemes which promote the more economic use or development of production facilities,
which secure Progress in the supply of new types of raw materials oi which enable small
and medium-size undertakings to maintain their competitive position aisi-ais the larger
undertakings in the sector concerned. Examples of such agreements authorized under
Article 65 ECSC during the year are given below.
(a) Joint buying agreement in the coal hadel
L22. In the solid fuels industry the Commission approved an agreement strictly ana-
logous to a joint buying agreement between five independent German coal wholesalers
designed to enable them to maintain their right of direct access to the collieries. This
right is only available to firms which achieve specified sales volumes which vary from
one colliery to another. Unlike the large wholesalers that often are or were linked with
the collieries, the independent wholesalers, which are usually small, are finding it
increasingly difficult to comply with this requirement as a resuli of the constant declinein demand for solid fuels. Under the agreement each of the wholesalers concerned
surrenders one or more of his direct access rights to the other parties and then obtains
suPplies from them; this raises the annual purchases of the individual firms concerned
from individual collieries and enables them to continue complying with the sales thres-
holds. The system is on a reciprocal basis and enables brrli discoo.rts to be obtained.
The agreement is restrictive to some extent, but it also helps to presefve competition
between independent and integrated wholesalers. This aspect of th. 
^gt..ment, togetherwith the price reductions, which should result from it, are regarded as constituiing a
substantial improvement in distribution.
O) Joint buying of pre-reduced iron ore2
123. The Commission authorized an agreement between several Italian steel-producing
companies concerning the joint buying of pre-reduced iron ore through 'Consorzio Ita-
L OJ L 2r7 ol zt.s.t977 and Bull. EC a-1977, poirlt 2.r.22.2 OJ L 109 of. 2.12.1977.
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liano dei minerali preridotti SpA' (COIMPRE). Pre-reduced iron ore is a high quality
substifute for scrap, especially in electric steel furnaces and the pre-reduction Processes
are relatively n.*. Tn. parties account f.or 38/o of Italian electric steel production and
L7/o of total Italian steel production.
The main aim of COIMPRE will be to negotiate contracts for the joint buying of pre-
reduced iron ore and possibly to set up and operate direct reduction plants in Italy,
together with possible participation in the capital of companies active in this sector.
As regards joint buying, the agreement fulfilled the conditions for authorization because
it will contribute to a substantial improvement in the production of high quality steel
without enabling the parties to impede effective competition in the relevant markets'
As regards the possible construction and operation of direct reduction plants and capital
participations in other companies, the agreement is only an outline agreement and the
details witl have to be filled in before the Commission can Pronounce on its compatibility
with Articles 65 or 66. Meanwhile, in order to be able to monitor future develoPments
in this proposed cooperation, the Commission has attached certain conditions to the
authorization. These include a requirement to notify the Commission of any plan for
setting up or operating a direct reduction plant or for capital participation. Such plans
may not take effect until the Commission is satisfied that they are within the terms of
the existing authorization or until the Commission has separately authorized them.
(c) Joint buying of rolled steel proiluctf
124, The Commission gave a further authorization, valid until 31 March 1982, for agree-
ments between about 40 German steel stockholding companies for the joint buying of
rolled steel products. These agreements were first authorized by the High Authority in
L9672 and this authorizatron was extended by the Commission in 1972,3
The companies concerned are small and medium-sized steel stockholders who, by means
of joint buying through Stahlring GmbH are seeking to achieve economies of scale in
buying, carilage and stocking costs and thereby to improve their competitive position,
particulady as against the larger steel stockholders. The agreement has been successful in
this respect during the first ten years of its existence.
1 oJ L 91 of 2r.4.r977 and Bull. EC4-1977,point2.r.27.
2 0J L 127 0f 27.6.1967.
3 0J L I5 0f r1.4.r972.
COMP. REP. EC I'7
MAIN DECISIONS AND MEASURES TAKEN BY TIIE COMMISSION 101
S 3 
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Artlcle 85 applied to distrlbution
Export bans and similar n?easures
Distillers Company Ltd
125' The Commission took a Decisionl requiring the group companies of the Distillers
Company Ltd to put an end to the price differentiation which hindered its customers in
the United Kingdom from exporting Scotch whisky, gin, vodka and pimm's. DCL's
price terms, which had been the subject of complaints by United Kingdom dealers in
spirits, and the bans on expotts to other EEC countries previously contained in DCL's
Conditions of Sale, amount to infringements of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty.
The DCL group is the most important producer and distributor of spirits in the United
Kingdom and of Scotch whisky in the Community. During the last four years, its share
in the production and sale of Scotch whisky in the United Kingdom has been between
40 and )O/s and its share in sales of gin in the region of 7O/o
The DCL group has thirty-eight main subsidiary companies which deal in spirits (chiefly
scotch whisky, gin, vodka and Pimm's). They oryanize distribution through about a
thousand wholesalers in the UK and through sole distributors, usually handling only one
brand, in the other Community countries.
On behalf of these subsidiaries DCI.: notified the Commission of its Conditions of Sale
to British customers. Bans on exports to other EEC countries which had been contained
in these Conditions of Sale were withdrawn by DCL in June L975 after the Commission
intervened.
But DCL simultaneously put into effect price terms according to which allowances and
rebates usually granted to United Kingdom customers were not to be extended to them
if they exported the spirits to other EEC countries. Accordingly, a United Kingdom
dealer wishing to export Scotch whisky has to pay a price which is approximately double
that which applies to his purchases for resale in the United Kingdom.
These practices of differential pricing amount to an indirect export ban which is as
detrimental to the establishment of a common market as the direct prohibitions previously
contained in the Conditions of Sale and certainly as effective in restricting parallel
exPorts. This was evidenced by complaints which were officially submitted to the
Commission by a number of United Kingdom dealers.
On the other hand, practices of this nature also preclude price levels which are favour-
able to British customers by virtue of brisk competitive conditions in the United King-
1 Decision of zo.t2.t977i OJ L iO of 22.2.1978.
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dom, from affecting market conditions in other EEC countries and thus from benefiting
consumers in those countties also.
The Commission did not accept the reasoning that, because of the higher distribution
costs borne by DCL's sole distributors in other common market countries, the United
Kingdom market had to be isolated in this way to protect such sole distributors from
competition from other dealers.l
BMW Belgium
126. The Commission fined BMW Belgium (BM\r Munich's general importer) and
forty-seven Belgian BM\7 dealers who agreed to operate an exPort ban on new BMW
vehicles.2
In 1975 the selling prices of private cars were lower in Belgium than in other common
market countries, notably because of the Belgian Govetnment's price controls. As a result
new BM$/ vehicles were being re-exported from Belgium to other countries, both in
the Community and elsewhere. But then the Commission's attention was drawn to the
fact that Belgian BMW dealers were no longer prepared to deliver new BM\7 vehicles
for export by complaints from two firms which import new vehicles from France and
Belgium to Germany. The Commission established that BM$7 Belgium had sent a circu-
lar to its Belgian dealers on 2p September L975 calling upon them to enter into an
agreement to stop exporting new BM$7 vehicles. At the same time the eight members of
the BM$Z Dealers' Advisory Committee sent a circular to the Belgian BMW dealers
with BMST's full agreement, urging compliance with the exPort ban.
Forty-seven of the ninety BMST dealers in Belgium complied with the request and
signed the BM\X/ circular. This export ban was terminated on 20 February L976 after the
Commission had intervened and one of the complainants had brought a civil action
against BM\7 Belgium.
The purpose of the general export ban agreed on the basis of the circulars issued on
29 December L975 by BMW and by the Dealers' Advisory Committee was to restrict
competition in the common market within the meaning of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty.
By its very nature such a ban was apt to affect trade between the Member States. Many
consumers and agents acting on their behalf try, when bying motor vehicles, to find out
where in the common market the best terms are offered; they do not buy from their
local dealers but from whoever quotes the lowest price.
r The Commission is of the view that cettain sole distribution agreements concluded by DCL
subsidiary companies with distributors in the common market cannot be exempted as long as
these restrictions on parallel imports remain. It has informed those concerned.
3 Decision of. 23.L2.1977, OJ L 46 of 17.2.1978.
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127. On 13 lanuary 7975 BMW Belgium had notified the Commission of its standard
distribution agreement with approved dealers and applied for exemption under Article
85(3), but that standard agreement contained no export ban. It only prohibited sales of
new BMW vehicles by approved to non-approved dealers. Most of the clauses in the
standard agreement followed those of the selective distribution system operated by
Bayerische Motoren S7erke AG, Munich, in Germany and \7est Berlin and exempted by
Commission Decision of L3 December L9741 from the ptohibition in Article 8i(1),
notably because there was no export ban. The Commission has not yet issued a decision
exempting BM$f Belgium's standard distribution agreement.
128. This Decision reaffirms the Commission's view that export bans introduced under
seParate agreements to supplement selective distribution systems are in serious breach of
the EEC Treaty's rules on competition and are punishable by fine. In deciding what fines
to impose the Commission took into consideration the gravity of the offences, the short
time they lasted and the part played by each of the parties. BM\r Belgium, the instigator
of the agreement and the major offender, was fined 150 000 u.a. (BFR 7 )00 000). The
eight dealers forming the Belgian Dealers' Advisory Committee were each fined 2 000
u.a. or 1 500 u.a. (BFR 100 000 or BFR 7t 000) depending on their size, since they
had supported BMIT Belgium's demand for an export ban. The minimum fine of 1000
u.a. (BFR t0 000) was imposed on each of the remaining thirty-nine dealers who signed
the circular.
Supply agreements
Spices (Liebig)
129. The Commission issued a Decision2 finding that certain clauses in the spice distri-
bution agreements between the main manufacturer in Belgium-Brooke Bond Liebig
Benelux NV, Antwerp, Benelux subsidiary of the British group Brooke Bond Liebig Ltd
-and the three main Belgian food distributors-GB-Inno-BM, Delhaize Frdres et CieLe Lion and Sarma-Penney-4. incompatible with Article 8)(1) of the EEC Trcaty.
The clauses to which the Commission took objection prohibit the distributors from sel-
ling any spices other than those manufactured by Liebig or sold under the shops' own
labels. In return, the distributors are given certain financial favours (fidelity rebates,
other premiums and profits guarantee). Resale prices are fixes by Uebig.
I OJ L 29 of 1.2.1975i Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 86.2 Decision of zt.tz.tgll: OJ L 53 of 24.2.L979.
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This arrangement restricts competition because the distributors are deprived of the free'
dom to decide what makes of spice they will buy and sell, while other manufacturers
cannot supply them. Since many of these manufacturers are established in other Commu-
nity countries, Community inter-State trade is also affected.
The Belgian market for prepad<ed spices for household consumption (ranges generally
cover forty or fifty varieties) is rapidly expanding and is to all intents and purposes
shared out between four main manufacturers-Liebig, the French comPany Ducros and
two Belgian companies, India Specerijen and Topo.
As a full range of spices can only be sold properly, or even introduced to a given
market in self-service supermarkets, Liebig's competitors, who are denied access by the
distribution agreements to the three main self-service supermarket chains that alone
handle 3O/o of the grocery business in Belgium, are having serious difficulty in promot-
ing their sales or even, in some cases, gaining a foothold on the market at all. Liebig's
competitors could do more intensive and more efficient business if they had access to the
major distributors instead of being confined to a large number of smaller retailers. The
difficulties arc all the more serious as Liebig is already very strongly placed t,i*)-ais
other manufacturers on the Belgian market by virtue of its market share and reputation.
Ultimately the effects of these restrictive practices are felt most shaqply by the consumer.
Liebig spices are considerably more expensive than the other brands, but the consumer
cannot buy cheaper spices from the supermarket shelves except the supermarkets' own
brands. Furthermore, since there is resale price maintenance on Liebig spices, the con-
sumer is unable to benefit from price competition between retailers, which might have
induced them to sell more cheaply.
130, The Commission's Decision is interesting not only in that a specific restrictive
practice is to be terminated, but also in that the relevant branch of industry, other
branches in a similar position, and consumers, are given notice that cefiain restrictive
practices in distribution are incompatible with the Community anti-trust rules, especially
where their result is a high degree of market segregation.l
Billiton and Metal & Thermit Chemicals
lJI. Following representations by the Commission, the Dutch firms Billiton, a member
of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, and Metal & Thermit Chemicals (M & T), a member of
the American Can Group, which specializes in packaging, terminated an exclusive Pul-
chase agreement for tin tetrachloride-an intermediate product used in the manufacture
1 See also points p to 16 of this Report.
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of non-ferrous metal allovs-which thev had concluded in october L976 and notified to
the Commission.
Billiton is the Community's largest manufacturer of this material, while M & T is the
largest consumer and takes half of Billiton's output. After preliminary scrutiny, the
Commission indicated to the firms concerned that a number of provisions in their agree-
ment were incompatible with Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. The provisions in question
were an undertaking on the part of M & T to purchase exclusively from Billiton, an
obligation on the part of M g T not to manufacture tin tetrachloride as long as Billiton
could guarantee supplies and a prohibition on the resale of this material supplied by
BillitontoM&T.
After the Commission intervened the firms altered their agreement. In future, Billiton
will supply tin tetrachloride to M & T on the basis of normal commercial relations
involving no restrictive arrangements.
S 4 
- 
Article 85 apptied to Industrial and commercial property rights
Patent and knowhow licence
AGA Steel Rarliators
132, In response to Commission representations two manufacturers of central heating
radiators altered the patent and knowhow licensing agreement that they had notified.
They were the Swedish firm AGA Radiator AB, Helsingborg, which belongs to the
important AGA Group, and the British firm Steel Radiators Ltd, Henley-on-Thames.
Until 30 August 1967 the latter was a subsidiary of AGA-Plitfdr?idling AB. Following
a series of share dealings it is now part of the Stelrad Group Ltd, which is owned by
Metal Box Ltd.
\7hen Steel Radiators was an AGA subsidiary there was no licensing agreement between
them. But to assure the subsequent owners of the British firm that they would be able to
continue manufacturing and selliog the relevant goods in the United Kingdom, a Patent
and knowhow licensing agreement was entered into, whereby AGA gave Steel Radiators
an exclusive licence for the manufacture and sale of its radiators in the United Kingdom.
The agreement contained the following clauses in restraint of competition:
(i) grant of an exclusive patent and knowhow licence for the manufacture, use and
sale of radiators in the United Kingdom; undertaking by AGA to refrain from
manufacturing or selling the relevant products in the United Kingdom and from
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supplying customers who were likely to sell the relevant products in the United
Kingdom;
(ii) prohibition upon Steel Radiators exporting the licensed products to other European
countries in the common market or elsewhere;
(iii) prohibition upon Steel Radiators challenging the validity of the licensed patents;
obligation upon Steel Radiators to continue paying royalties even if one or more of
the licensed patents were annulled on the application of a third party; Prohibition
upon Steel Radiators taking legal proceedings against any third Party holding a
patent competing with one of AGA's patents where AGA had a reciprocal no-
challenge agreement.
Having received the Commission's statement of objections the parties to the agreement
deleted all these restrictive clauses. AGA now gives the Stelrad Group as successor to
Steel Radiators a non-exclusive manufacturing and sales licence valid for the whole
world with the exception of a few countries, some of which are non-Community Euro-
pean countries. It authorizes Stelrad to use the knowhow already given to Steel Radiators
in the same territories and undertakes to continue supplying knowhow. Steel Radiators is
free to export the licensed goods where it wishes, both in the common market and to
non-member countries.
l-r-3. \fith this case the Commission reaffirms its policy on certain clauses that are
frequently found in licensing agreements, such as exclusivity clauses, export bans and
no-challenge clauses.l
For exclusive manufacturing licences, the Commission considers that exemption may be
given where it is found that the licensed territory is not too extensive, that there are
similar products which compete in that territory and that parallel imports are still
possible.
But exclusive sales licences and export bans constitute direct barriers to the free move-
ment of goods in the common market, and the Commission will consider giving exemp-
tions only in special circumstances, as where new products are to be manufactured and
sold or a new market is to be penetrated, entailing heavy investment and hence
considerable risk.
It should be noted that in this case the restraints on competition imposed on the licensor
as vendor of shares in the company could not be 1'ustified by the need to protect the
goodwill assigned to the acquirer, as a considerable period of time had elapsed since the
sale.
t See Decision of 2.12.197r, AOIP"/Beyrard: OJ L 6 of 1r.1,1976 and Fifth Report on Competition
Policy, point 61; andPeugeot/Zimmern, Sixth RePort on Competition Policy, point 159.
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As for bans on exports from the cotnmon market, they may be caught by Article 85(1)
if their effects are felt within the common market.
Trademark licence
Campari
134. The'Commission took a favourable Decision on the agreements whereby Davide
Campari-Milano SpA granted an exclusive licence over its Bitter Campari trademark to
Ognibeni & Co, Hans Prang, Campari-France SA, Sovinac SA and Johs M. Klein & Co in
the Nethedands, Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg and Denmark respective-
ly.1 The licensees are required by these agreements to cornply scrupulously with the
assignor's instructions as to the manufacture of the relevant products, to ensure that the
quality of the raw materials used meets the assignor's requirements and to buy from the
assignor the herbal mixtures whose composition, a business secret, gives Bitter Campari
its characteristic taste.
The Bitter Campad trademark and label were registered for use in most of the Com-
munity countries at the Bureau International de Berne at the beginning of this cenfury.
135. The main point of interest in this decision is that the Commission can extend to
exclusive trademark licences the favourable attitude it has taken on exclusive patent
licences as in Davidson Rubber2 and Kabelmetal Luchahe.s The Commission draws
particular attention to two 6l2u5s5-1hs ban on business in competing products by the
licensees and the ban on active sales policies by all the parties outside their allotted
territories. The Commission noted that these clauses allow the same benefits as can be
obtained from exclusive distribution agreements authorized by the block exemption
Regulation No 57 / 67 /EEC.a
L36. The Decision also imposes obligations enabling the Commission to verify in good
time what effects the agreements are having on exports befween Community countries.
The earlier version of the agreements prohibited exports to EEC countries. In response
to Commiss.ion representations the parties deleted this clause and instead undertook to do
all they could to meet export orders from EEC countries. They also undertake to help
custorners who wish to export the products to other EEC countries to obtain redemption
1 Decision of 2j.12.r977t OJ L 70 of rj.3.r978.
2 OJ L 143 of 2).6.7972; Second Report on Competition Policy, point 46.
3 OI L zzz of 22.8.1975; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 66.
a oJ No 57 0f 25.3.1967.
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from excise duties on alcohol where permitted by tax regulations.l They arc required to
report annually to the Commission on this point.
Use of trademark and business name
137. ln the Sirdarfhildar case the Commission expressed opposition to the use of trade-
marks as a means of market-sharing.z The Commission clarified its policy on this by
giving favourable treatment to two agreements concerning the we of trademarks and
business names which did not hinder the free movement of the relevant products and did
not require the firms concerned to build up new goodwill with a different kademark.
Persll washing powder
138. At the Commission's request Henkel KGaA, Dusseldorf, and Unilever NV, Rotter-
dam, acting for the Unilever Group, stated that they would not prevent the marketing
of Persil washing powder manufactured by either of them even in Member States where
the Persil trademark belonged to the other.
Henkel holds the Persil trademark in Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Nethedands,
Italy and Denmark. The trademark is compounded from the words PER(borate) and
Sll(icate). The Unilever Group holds the trademark in the United Kingdom and
France, either directly, or indirectly through group subsidiaries.
The British trademark belonging to Lever Brothers Ltd, a mernber of the Unilever
Group, has the same origin as Henkel's German trademark. It was registered in 1907 by
the company whose name at the time was Henkel & Co. and was assigned to Joseph
Crossfield & Sons Ltd in 1911. The latter firm was subsequently taken over by the
Unilever Group.
The French Persil trademark registered by Lever SA, Paris, a member of the Unilever
Group, is of dual origin. Henkel & Co. registered tt in 1907, but since 1906 there had
aJready been a registered trademark of a very different appearance; it represented a sprig
of parsley (persil in French) with the word Persil accompanying it, rather than just the
word Persil on its own. Later the two trademarks came into the hands of a single holder
and were assigned to the Unilever Group after the First \Zodd \Var. The first applica-
tion for renewal of the trademark in 1923 was based expressly on the two registrations
of t9o6 and t907; the appearance of the trademark in the application for renewal cor-
responds to the 1907 registration by Henkel & Co. The Commission conduded that the
1 The Commission secured a similar undertaking as regards the tax on spa waters from French
operato$ of spa water soruces. See Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 156.3 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 165.
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French Persil trademark has the same origin as the German mark, but this was contested
by the Unilever Group. However, the question can, in the meantime, remain unanswered,
in view of the statement made by the two firms.
lJ9. According to the judgments given by the Court of Justice in the Cafe Hagl and
Terrapin v Terranova2 cases, the holder of a trademark in a Member State is not entitled
to prevent the importing and marketing of goods from another Member State when they
lawfully bear a trademark having the same origin.
Despite this the two firms used their trademarks in order to prevent imports: Henkel
KGaA tried, sometimes successfully, to prevent imports of cheaper Persil from the UK
into Germany; the courts before whom the resulting dispute was brought referred some-
times to trademark law and sometimes to the law relating to unfair competition. The
Unilever Group for its part tried, again with some success, to prevent imports of
Henkel's Persil from Belgium and Luxembourg into France, working through its French
subsidiary Lever SA. There was correspondence between the two firms in t975, and
Henkel wrote it would 'do all we can to prevent the sale of these goods from both
Belgium and Luxembourg in France'.s Unilever replied that 'we have asked our corn-
panies in UK and France to take equally stringent precautions to try to avoid any flow of
Persil from their country into those areas of Europe where the trademark belongs to the
Henkel company'.
Henkel also obtained written confirmation from a large number of German distributors
that they would no longer distribute Persil originating in the UK.
140. The Commission concluded that geographical market-sharing was being practised
and that Article 85(i) of the EEC Treaty was therefore being infringed. In the course
of the case the two firms agreed to make the statement referred to above.
The two firns have been in contact to discuss the presentation of their respective trade-
marks. They have reached a solution which will not involve any fotmal agreement or
undertaking. Henkel and its group companies now have the word Persil in red letters
with the word Henkel in smaller letters in a red oval. The Unilever Group uses a green
Persil trademark.
Even if these contacts between Henkel and Unilever were to constitute a concerted prac-
tice within the meaning of Artide 85(i), the Commission does not believe that the
Treaty rules on competition are violated. An agreement on the presentation of certain
trademarks aiming to ensure that there can be no confusion in fhs gqns.mer's mind as to
1 CJEC 3.7.1974, C^se r92,/75i lr974l E& 75r.2 CJEC 22.6.1976, Case Lr9/75: [1976] ECR 1039.s '... alles in seiner Macht stehende tun wird, um einen Abfluss der'Ware nach Frankreich sowohl
von Belgien als auch von Luxemburg aus zu unterbinden'.
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the difference between the relevant goods, which can then be circulated freely through-
out the Community with none of the manufacturers being prevented from using his own
trademarks, is cleady inspired by the desire to preserve the existence of the trademark
and is accordingly outside the prohibition in Article 85 (1).
Having received the statement made by the two firms, the Commission terminated the
proceedings that it had initiated. It acknowledges the concern of these firms to reach a
solution that is consistent with the constraints of the common market, even in a difficult
situation involving a well-known brand name.
?enneyst trademark and business nnme
141. In this second case the Commission issued a Decisionl authorizing an agreement
entered into in February L976 by J.C. Penney Inc., New York (Penney America), and
Penneys Ltd, Dublin (Penneys lreland), a subsidiary of Associated British Foods (ABF).
The object of the agreement is to settle a conflict which arose between the two com-
panies in most of the Community Member States concerning their respective rights to
use the name Penneys as a trademark and as a business name.
The two companies operate large clothing and textile retail shops. Penney America,
which is one of the largest distribution firms in the United States, distributes its goods
in the Community under the Penneys trademark, notably through the Sarma chain of
supermarkets in Belgium and its sales subsidiaries in other Member States. Penneys
Ireland is one of the largest textile distributors in Ireland.
Under the agreement all rights to the Penneys trademark in the Community are conferred
on Penney Arnerica. Penneys branded products can thus circulate freely throughout the
common market. The agreement imposes the following obligations:
(i) Penneys Ireland assigns the French Penneys trademark, already registered, and the
Irish Penneys trademark, currently in the process of registration, to penney
America;
(ii) Penneys Ireland will not contest the validity of Penneys' trademarks registered by
Penney America in the Community during the first five years following the date of
the agreement;
(iii) Penneys Ireland undertakes to refrain from using the name Penneys either as a
business name or as a trademark except in lreland, and then only as the name of its
retail shops;
1 Decision of 23.L2.t9771 OJ L 60 of z.j.Lg7g.
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(iv) Penney America may sell its
including Ireland;
(v) Penney America undertakes to
Ireland.
Penneys branded products in all Member States,
pay a determined amount of money to Penneys
As a result, the voluminous litigation between the two companies came to an end. Had
there been no agreement, Penneys Ireland was likely to have won the battle in Ireland
and France whereas Penney America would have been successful in other Member States,
as was already the case in England and \Zales following an injunction issued by the High
Court of England. Each would then have had a reserved territory which the other side's
branded products could not have penetrated.
,142. The Commission considers that firms in this sort of position must seek the least
restrictive solution so that the free movement of goods in the Community is not
hampered.
A contractual obligation upon the parties to assign or renounce their trademark ot
business-name rights, which would entail recreating their goodwill under other names,
can have substantial anti-competitive effects for the purpose of Article 85(1) of the
EEC Treaty and must therefore be exempted under Article 85(3) in otder to be valid.
143. But in the present case the Commission considered that the agreement was not
substantially anti-competitive and therefore qualified for negative clearance. The agree-
ment does not require Penneys Ireland to recreate its goodwill under another name, as it
was already doing substantial and quite successful business with another trademark, even
before the agreement.
S 5 
- 
Article 86 of the EEG Treaty and Article 66(7) of the ECSG Trea$
applied to abuse of dominant positions
ABG
144. By a Decisionl taken after a complaint had been lodged by ABG (Aardolie Be-
langen Gemeenschap BV-central purchasing agency for the Avia associates in the
Nethedands) and Avia Nededand CV (controller of the Avia trademark in the Nether-
Iands), the Commission found that three BP subsidiaries in the Nethedands abused their
dominant position during the critical period of the oil crisis between November 1973
and March 1974.
1 Decision ol 12.4.L977, ABG/Oil companies operating in the Nethedands: OJ L tl7 of 9.5.L977
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Avia is one of the few internationally known independent trademarks for oil products.
It belongs to Avia International, a Zurich-based group with local companies in Switzer-
land, the Federal Republic of Gernany, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium/Luxembourg,
France and ltaly.
BP (British Petroleum Company Ltd) is the parent comPany of the three Dutch subsi-
diaries referred to in the Decision, one being concerned with distribution, one with refin-
ing and the third coordinating the activities of the first two. BP is among the seven
rnajor international integrated oil companies.
The Commission considered that the integrated majors with their own refineries in the
Netherlands held a dominant position air)-ais their respective customers in the Nether-
lands during the most difficult phase of the crisis.
The Commission held that an infringement was committed in that BP abused its dorni
nant position when it cut supplies of petrol to ABG in a way which was discriminatory
compared vrith its behaviour towards other customers in a similar situation, jeopardizing
the very existence of ABG.
145. The Decision does not caffy a fine, since it makes allowance for the uncertainty
which may have existed when the infringement was committed particulady as regards
BP's obligations in the light of the steps taken by the Dutch authoritiesl in attempting
to resolve the supply difficulties caused by the crisis.
Eugnn/Liptons
146. Acting on a complaint in another case2 of refusal to sell, the Commission imposed
a fine of 50 000 u.a. (UKL 20 833) on Hugin Kassaregister AB, Stockholm, one of the
five major manufacturers of cash registers which supply the common market.3
The Decision finds that Hugin AB prohibited its various subsidiaries and distributors
within the common market from selling its spare parts outside the Hugin network and
also, together with its United Kingdom subsidiary, Hugin Cash Registers Ltd, London,
refused without valid objective reasons to supply such spate parts to the complainant
company, Liptons Cash Registers & Business Equipment Ltd, London, a former distributor
of Hugin cash registers in the United Kingdom.
Hugin AB is wholly owned by the Federation of Swedish Consumers, Kdoperativa
Forbundet, a very large organization supplying 20/o of Swedish retail tr4de. Although
1 BP has appealed to the Court of Justice (Case 77/771 against the Decision.2 Points 27 ana 28 of this Report.
r Decision oI 8.12.r977i OJ L 22 of 17.1.1978.
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Hugin AB's share of the EEC market for cash registers is only about 12/6, it enjoys a
monopoly for the supply of spare parts for its own cash registers through its total control
of their manufacture and supply. These spare parts are manufactured to Hugin's designs
with Hugin's tools, and are sold exclusively through Hugin's sales network. They are
essential for the maintenance, repair and reconditioning of Hugin cash registers. Hugin
AB's policy of refusing to supply even qualified independent oPerators not only pre-
cludes all competition in the business of service and repair but also effectively contains
any independent market for leasing Hugin cash registers or for the sale of used machines.
Liptons is a small company specializing in the sale, leasing, servicing, repairing and
reconditioning of all makes of cash register, including those manufactured by Hugin AB,
for which purposes it requires spare parts. Liptons had been supplied until 1977 witb
substantial quantities of spare parts by Hugin AB's United Kingdom importer and sub-
sequently by Hugin UK. Liptons had also acted as disttibutor for Hugin cash registers
from L969 to L972. Thereafter, from October 1972 Liptons was refused the supply of
spare parts by Hugin AB, Hugin UK and every other Hugin subsidiary ar.d distributor
within the EEC to which Liptons applied.
147. The Commission found that there was a separute market for the supply of spare
parts, where Hugin holds a dominant position. Hugin abused its dominaot position by
refusing to supply Liptons without valid objective reason.
National Carbonizing Company
148. This case cenued on the conflicting interests of National Carbonizing Company
(NCC) and the National Coal Board (NCB) with regard to the structure of prices for
coking coal and household coke.
It will be recalledl that NCC complained that the NCB was exploiting its dominance on
the markets for coking coal and coke in the United Kingdom by selling its output at such
prices that NCC, an independent producer buying coal from the NCB for processing into
coke, could no longer make a profit and survive in business.2
After examining the facts and information available to it, the Commission notified NCC
that it regarded as unfounded its complaint that NCB had abused its dominant position.
NCC then applied to the Court of Justice under Article 35 of the ECSC Treaty, alleging
tJrat the Commission had failed in its duty to apply Article 66(7) ECSC8 by not taking
r Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 77.
2 Bull. EC ro-r975, points 2105, 24t5 ana 2449.
3 Article 66(7) requires the Commission to take action whenever a dominant firm abuses its
dominance for purposes incompatible with the obiectives of the Treaty.
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action to end NCB's infringement of the Treaty. At the same time, NCC called on the
Court to take interim measures that would enable it to produce domestic coke on an
econornic basis.
149. Altho'tgh this case did not come to judgment in the Court of Justice, NCC having
withdrawn, it nevertheless gave the Commission an opportunity to clarify its policy on
the obligations of dominant firms with regard to the ECSC Trcaty.
In 1975,7 working from the Order given by the President of the Court of Justice, the
Commission issued a decision adopting interim measures in favour of NCC.
In its decision the Commission stated that 'an undertaking which is in a dominant posi-
tion as regards the production of a raw material (in this case coking coal) and therefore
able to control its price to independent manufacturers of derivatives (in this case coke)
and which itself produces the same derivatives in competition with these manufacrurers,
may abuse its dominant position if it acts in such a way as to eliminate cornpetition from
these manufacturers in the market for the derivatives'.
This was based on the judgment given by the Court of Justice ot 6 March 1974.2
The Commission deduced that a dominant firm 'rnay have an obligation to arrange its
prices so as to allow a reasonably efficient manufacturer of the derivatives a margin suf-
ficient to enable it to survive in the long term'.
However, the Commission considered that the fundamental questioo was whether NCB's
conduct in relation to household coke, this being the subject of NCC's complaint, might
eliminate a coke producer who produced primarily industrial coke or, io other words,
whether this conduct itself was such as to affect competition. The Commission felt that
account had to be taken of all the facts in assessing the effects on independent coke
producers of NCB's prices for household coke. Thus it would have been unjust to ignore
the fact that not one coke producer produced household coke only.
The Commission considered that NCB's conduct was not in itself of such a nafure as to
eliminate a coke producer as the producer was not prevented by NCB from selling
industrial coke at a profitable price.
The Commission therefore took no action on NCC's complaint, with the exception of the
interim measures already mentioned and of certain other measures not directly relevant
to the rnain question.
1 Decision ol 29.t0.t97s: OJ L 35 oI 10.2.1976; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, loc. cit.
r Joined Cases 6 tnd 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico italiano and Commercial Solvents Corporation
v Commission: IL974) ECF. 223.
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SG 
- 
Jointventures
150. The Commission has continuedl to study the problems surrounding joint ventures
with a view to developing its policy on the matter. In the course of the year it issued
decisions in three important cases,z defining the scope of Article 85(1) and setting
limits within which large firms may be authorized under Article 85(3) to cooperate with
each other through a joint venture. The Commission has taken a favourable stance on the
joint formation of new business units that will enable the participants either to penetrate
new geographic matkets or to overcome the technical difficulties and face the major
financial risks linked with the development of advanced-technology products, or to place
the manufacture of intermediate products used by the parent companies on a profitable
footing,
De Laval/Stork
15L. ln the first case the Commission took a favourable Decisions in respect of an
agreement between the American company De Laval and the Dutch company Stork. They
formed a joint venture at Hengelo, Nethedands, with the object of combining their
production and marketing activities for Europe and the Middle East. Their cooperation
covers turbines and compressors used in large-scale plants such as oil refineries.
Under the agreement Stork made part of its Hengelo manufacturing plant available to
the joint venture and De Laval provided technical knowhow. Both De Laval and Stork
remain in business as independent manufacturers.
Cooperation befween Stork and De Laval restricts competition in the Community turbine
and compressor industry, since the production and marketing activities of two competitors
have been merged into a single joint undertaking, thus reducing European customers'
choice. The venture is therefore caught by the prohibition in Article 8t(1).
It does, however, bring with it appreciable economic advantages such as increased know-
how and a wider product range for Stork and easier penetration of the European market
for De Laval which justify exemption under Article 85(3). The various agreements
between the two companies do not lead to market dominance; there are a number of
important suppliers in the market larger than De Laval and Stork, whose own combined
market share is between L0 and t)Vo.
r Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 53.
2 The Vacuum Inteffupters Decision ol Zo.t.t977 is described in the Sixth Report on Competition
Policy, point 175.
3 Decision ol 25.7.t977: OJ L 215 of 23.8.1977.
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The joint venture was initially formed in1.97I for a period of five years, fenewable with
the consent of both parties. fhe period of exemption has been set at nine years in order
to ensure that the cooperation does not last longer than is economically justified'
Ii2. The Decision imposes conditions and obligations which will ensure that the ability
of De Iaval and Stork to compete with the joint venture is not unnecessarily limited,
that the parent companies are 
^bl. to make unrestricted 
use of jointly acquired knowhow
after the joint venture comes to an end and that the cooperation does not lead to any
further restriction of competition in the turbine and comPressor industry.
The General Electric Company Ltd/Tll.e Vt/eir Group Lttl
153, In the seconcl case, the Commission, by decision,l exemPted a joint yenture entered
into by agfeement between The General Electric Company Ltd and The \7eir Group Ltd
which was notified in April 1977. Prior to the grant of exemption and on the initiative
of the Commission, the parties had abandoned a nurnber of restrictive provisions which
could not have been exempted. The purposes of the joint venture are to develoP, manu-
,facture and sell sodium cir.ulators fot or. in nuclear fast reactors. The parties are of
considerable industrial significance in the United Kingdom and are established also in
other Community countriis and elsewhere. The exemption was made subject to a number
of reporting obligations upon the parties.
The joint venture arrangements vrere made wholly by agreement and do not depend for
their validity or enforceability on the control of a sePafate comPany' However, the
arrangements provide for the unified, joint and equal control by the parties of all their
activities relating to sodium circulators, including planning, financing, research, develop-
ment, constfuction and sale.
The agreement and the joint venture fall within the scope of Article S)(1) of the EEC
Treaty, primarily because, prior to the agreement, both parties were competitors and,
followiog expiry of the agreement, both parties will again become competitors in respect
of sodium circulators. Moreover, for the continuance of the agreement, both parties
independently retain, not only horizontally competitive but also vertically ovedapping
activities in related markets, specifically in the power engineering field.
lj4. The Commission found that in these circumstances the very creation of the joint
venture in which the parties took joint control amounted to a restriction of competition,
regardless even of the specific restrictive provisions of their agreement. These were
viewed by the Commission as reinforcing the implicit restrictive effects of the joint
venture.
1 Decision of 23.tr.r977t OI L t27 of 20.12.1977.
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In addition, the existence of the joint venture was seen by the Commission as providing
opportunities and inducements to the parties to enlarge their common activities so as to
impair free competition between themselves also in areas outside sodium circulators
where they retain independent interests.
155. The Commission was able to grant an exemption in this case for a number of
reasons and notably because of the high risks involved in this particular development
work, the complementary expertise of the parties and the utgency to achieve safe
and satisfactory technical performance of nuclear reactors in this field. As seen by the
Commission, the twelve-year duration of the agreement and of the joint venture is
relatively short-term, if considered against the projected long-term future of fast reactor
programmes. On completion of the development and on termination of the agreement
and the joint venture, both parties will be competitors at arm's length in the manufacture
and sale of sodium circulators with enhanced technical versatility and competence.
The Commission also took the view that the conditions for exemption would probably
not have been satisfied if the parties had been in a position to manufachrre and sell
sodium circulators jointly for the entire time or for a significantly loog time during the
term of the agreement. But in this case the current development work is likely to take
some eight years before questions of manufacture and sale can in practice arise. This
undedines that while the Commission is willing in appropriate cases to view favourably
cooperative development projects in fields of high technology, it will closely assess the
possible restrictive effects of joint manufacture and, even more particulady, joint sales
affangements.
This decision of the Commission marks an important step in the development of its
policy towards joint ventures and also calls to mind its recent Communication to the
Council' which encouraged research and development projects in the field of fast
reactors.
Imperial Chemical Industries/Montedison
156. The last case concerned an agreement between ICI of the United Kingdom and
Montedison of Italy relating to the establishment and operation of a joint subsidiary
(Anilina SpA) for the production of nitrobenzene and aniline. No formal Decision was
taken because the venture was not in fact carried into operation.
Both companies are major manufacturers of intermediate products for polyurethanes and
elastomers, which have many applications in the manufacture of a wide range of products
in everyday use such as automobiles, building materials, footwear, furniture, paints and
refrigerators.
1 COM(77) 16r,2s.7.1977, Bull. EC 7/B-r9j7, point 1.3.4.
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These intermediates, the manufacture of which involves complicated Processes requiring
considerable resources available only to a few large undertakings, include two major
groups of chemicals that are only partly interchangeable. One of them, diphenyl methane
diisocyanate (MDI), is a widely used product manufactured from aniline, a b€nzene
derivative. ICI is one of the wodd's largest producers of MDI, but Montedison has only
recently decided to enter this market as a producer.
Both companies needed substantial quantities of aniline, ICI wished to increase its pro-
duction capacity of aniline and Montedison required aniline for the manufacfure of MDI.
According to the parties, the quantities required by each was more then was available on
the open market but less than the amount which would economically justify the con-
struction of a new plant. They estimated, however, that their combined requirernents
would justify such investment.
The parties claimed that most of the production would be required for their own use but
a significant proportion of. capacity would be surplus and available for production of
aniline which could be sold on the open market.
They therefore agreed to set up Anilina to supply each of them with the necessary ani-
line. ICI was to provide the knowhow and Montedison the necessary benzene and the
infrastructure for the plant.
157. The Commission considered that the agreement as notified was caught by Article
85(1) of the EEC Trea\. Each party holds an important position in the petrochemical
industry. In the field of polyurethanes the parties are competitors in both the upstream
and downstream markets and could become competitots in the market for aniline.
The Commission concluded that the joint venture would therefore have the effect of
substantially reducing competition between two very large undertakings within the EEC
and of appreciably affecting trade befween Member States.
It carefully examined whether the benefits of the joint venture were such that they
outweighed the disadvantages produced by the restrictions on competition. The Commis-
sion considered that the joint venfure did enable Montedison to enter a new market as a
producer of aniline at the same time permitting ICI to expand its existing capacity. The
cooperation by means of a joint venture therefore offered the parties the opportunity of
overcoming urgent problems in the short term and could in the long term increase
competition in the common market, improve production and technology, and consumers
would be able to enjoy a fair share of the resulting benefit. The total potential market
share of the two companies would not have the effect of eliminating competition in
resPect of a substantial part of the products in question in view of the strong position of
Bayer and other suppliers both within the Community and elsewhere.
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The Commission accordingly took the provisional view that an exemption under Article
85(3) could in principle be granted. It therefore expressed a favourable opinion in
resPect of an application made to the European Investment Bank for a loan to cover part
of the capital expenditure envisaged by the agreement provided the agreement was made
to conform to EEC rules on competition.
lJ8. However, in order to ensure that the amendments to the agreement as notified were
adhered to and that the restrictions on competition still resultjng from the agreement
were kept to what was indispensable for the attainment of its objectives and also, in
particular, to ensure that as befween the parties themselves the effects of their coopera-
tion did not lead to unnecessary limitations of their freedom to seitle their production
and marketing policies independently, the Commission considered that exemption could
be granted only on certain conditions and subject to certain obligations to be fulfilled by
the parties.
To this end the Commission's proposals included as a matter of precaution a condition
agreed to by the parties before notification that Anilina should not sell any of its sur-
plus production to third parties. In the view of the Commission this might lead to the
parties concerting their sales policies, since the parties envisaged that a significant part of
their overall production of aniline would be available for sale on the open market. This
condition therefore also required that the two parties should cooperate in no other way
in the sale of such production to third parties.
Similarly, exemption would be granted only on the clear understanding that Anilina
would adhere to the intention of the parties expressed in the agreement that neither was
in any way to be impeded from seeking to take more aniline than the other, either from
surplus ptoduction (or unused capacity) or even, if it so wished, from capacity increased
at its own expense,
The Commission also considered that it was extremely important that the cooperation
between two such large and competing companies should not last longer than was
absolutely essential for them to overcome their problems and therefore concluded that
continued exemption would not be justified if independent production by ICI and
Montedison became reasonably practicable. In addition, the Commission considered that
on the termination of the agreement Montedison should be in a position to continue as
an independent producer of aniline if it wished, thereby increasing competition in an
oligopolistic market.
159. At this stage the joint venture was abandoned-for reasons not related to the Com-
mission's action-before all the specific conditions and obligations to be imposed had
been settled. The Commission consequently closed its proceedings.
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g 7 
- 
Merger control (Article 66 of the ECSG Treaty)
Belgian and French steel fims
150. Acting under Article 66 of. the ECSC Treaty the Commission authorizedl Com-
pagnie Bruxelles-Lambert Pour I'Industrie d l2 F'inance (CBL), Brussels, Compagnie
Financidre de Paris et des Pays-Bas (Paribas), Paris, and Etablissements Frdre-Bourgeois
(Frdre), Charleroi, to merge the French firms Chdtillon-Commentry-Biache (Chitillon),
controlled by Paribas, Neuves-Maisons, controlled by Paribas and Frdre, and Chiers,
controlled by Paribas and CBI-, into a single comPany to be known as Compagnie Indus-
trielle Chiers-Chdtillon under the control of Paribas and of Financidre du Ruau. The aim
is to form a diversified steel group producing the long products of Chiers and Neuves-
Maisons and the flat products of ChAtillon.
l6L The same Decision authorizes CBL to acquire shares in Financidre du Ruau, a
Belgian holding company that has extensive interests in Belgian and French steel firms.
The holding company was hitherto controlled by Paribas and Frdre. CBL's buying into
Financidre du Ruau will enable it to share in the control of a large number of steel firms
in France, Belgium and Luxembourg on the same terms as Paribas and Frdre.
L62. ln assessing the effects of these mergers on the steel market, the Commission took
into consideration the group effect resulting from the fact that CBL, Paribas and Frdre
are among the firms that together control Cockerill, and of the possibility that the
business of Cockerill and firms under its control might be coordinated with that of the
firms linked with CBL, Paribas and Frdre.
In certain product categories the position of the group-effect firms will be particularly
strong. But in the common market there are other manufacturers with similar or greater
market shares, and more and more products are being imported at highly competitive
prices from non-member countries. The fact that major financial groups have holdingsjn these firms will help to improve the extremely serious financial situation in which
some of them find themselves.
.163. This Decision is entirely without prejudice to any other decision the Commission
may take under Article 61 or 66 of the ECSC Treaty concerning other structural
orgariz,ation plans still under scrutiny.
1 Decision ol L4.12.1977t Bull. EC l2-L977, point 2.1.58.
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IIoescVHetzog
164. The Commission also authorized Hoesch I7erke AG. steel manufacturers of Dort-
rnund, to acquire a 71/o holding in ITalter Herzog, Eisen- und R6hrenhandelsgesell-
schaft KG, Stuttgart, as the proposed transaction satisfied the tests of Article 66(z) of
the ECSC Treaty.l
Valtet Herzog, a steel stockholder with a turnover of approximately DM 320 million in
1975, markets some 310 000 tonnes of steel products annually, practically all of it in
Germany. The companies' joint share of the steel stockholding market in Germany totals
approximately 7.7%.
r Decision of 19.7.19771Bull. EC 7/8-1977,poltr;Itz.t.tL.
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Competition policy and
government assistance to enterprises
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Chapter I
State aids
S 1 
- 
General
165. The technical work which will enable the Commission to submit to the Council a
communication redefining the principles of coordination for regional aids is nearing
completion. These principles will then apply to all types of regional assistance. In addi-
tion, the Commission has stated its views on a number of national tegional aid schemes.
As regards aid to specific industries, the Commission transmitted to the Council a propo-
sal for a fourth Ditective on aids to shipbuilding. It also took major decisions on assist-
ance for new investments in the synthetic fibres industry and State aids for the iron and
steel industry.
The Commission once again confirmed its general position that export aids may not be
applied in trade between Member States. It also dealt with certain employment aids which
could have adverse consequences not only on the balance of certain industrial sectors but
also on the employment situation itself when considered from a Community rather than
a purely national angle.
S 2 
- 
General regional aid schemes
Principles of coordination of national regional aid schemes
166. Technical work on the measurability of opaque aids was continued with the as-
sistance of experts from the Member States.l
Following initial proposals two working documents which took account in partialar of
the comments and additional information provided by the Member States were prepared
by the Commision and discussed at multilateral meetings on 21 APril and 22 Ju,ne.
These documents have improved certain aspects of the initial proposals and introduced
a number of innovations. In the main, they define amounts for new aid ceilings per job
r Sirth Report on Competition Policy, point 192.
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created (in European units of account) for the four different categories of regions defin'
ed in the Cornmission Communication to the Council of 26 February 1975.r They may
henceforth be used as a basis in calculations concerning new investment asistance. They
also consider the pros and cons of fixing a limit expressed as a percentage of investrnent
to be used with the new ceilings. The proposals include fixing a common aid ceiling for
Ireland, Northern lreland, the Mezzogiorno, \(/est Bedin, and the French ovefseas
departments of Guadeloupe, Guiana, Martinique, Reunion and St-Pierre and Miquelon
expressed as a percentage of initial investment and covering all assistance granted; as in
other assisted Lreas, a ceiling per job created would also be used.
Member States may continue to grant aids towards operating costs until decisions are
taken on their compatibility with the common market under the review of existing aid
schemes carried out by the Commission as required by Article 93(t) of the EEC Treaty.
In the light of these decisions the Commission would specify, if necessary, the conditions
in which, despite its general reservations on this type of assistance, it could be considered
compatible with the cornmon market in certain situations. In the meantime, the intensity,
duration and geographical coverage of aoy such assistance being granted may be neither
increased nor extended and no new assistance of this type may be introduced without
the Commission's authorization.
On the basis of this work and in view of the need to redefine the principles of coordina-
tion adopted in I971,a a draf.t Commission Communication to the Council has been
prepared for submission at a multilateral meeting in January 1')78.
Specific statements on certain national regional aid schemes
167. At the same time, pursuant to Article 92 et Jeq of the EEC Tteaty, the Commis'
sion continued scrutinizing the compatibility with the conrmon market of certain national
regional aid schemes.
S7hen the Commission analyses the socio-economic situations in various regions in order
to assess the assistance granted them it comes up against the problem that adequate
regional statistics are not always available at the appropriate levels and arc rarely comPa-
rable from one Member State to another; various aspects of this problem have been
studied. A first proposal for measures to improve the situation was submitted to the
representatives of the appropriate national statistical offices at a multilateral meeting
held in Luxembourg on l-0 and 11 November. It concerned in particular the handling and
distribution of basic data currently available and the further processing of fuller employ-
ment statistics. This work will continue.
I Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 8, to 87.
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Federal Republic of Gemany
168. Discussions continuedr on the German general regional aid scheme.a On 8 March
L977 the Commission forwarded to the German authorities the first results of its scrutiny
of the scheme, to be used as a basis for the Commission's decision. By verbal note on
LL October the Federal Government submitted its comments. These are being examined
at present by the services of the Commission.
Meantime, on 8 August L977, the Federal Government informed the Commission of its
sixth general plan to improve regional economic structures,B a slightly amended version
of the fifth general plan. On 7 October t977 the Commission informed the Federal
Government that it raised no objection to retroactive introduction from L January Lg77,
although it would be re-examining the changes in its future overall decision on the
German regional aid scheme.
The Commission also commenced its review of assistance granted by the L?inder. In addi-
tion to the regional assistance administered jointly by the Bund and the Linder as tasks
of common interest,a translated into practice each year as an outline plan, each Land
grants its own regional assistance. In cases where the Iand authorities' assisted areas
coincide with the assisted areas designated under the outline plans, the overall intensity
of regional assistance (Federal and/or Land) is restricted to the maximum rates of
assistance laid down by the outline plan. The Commission only proceeds to a specific
scrutiny of assistance granted by the Land authorities when the assisted areas in question
are not covered by the outline plan. Thus on 8 June L977 the Commission informed the
German authorities of its observations on the assisted areas in one Land and requested
additional information on the schemes and assisted areas in other Linder.
Belgium
169. Article 2 of. the Commission Decisjon of Z6 Apill L972s on the Law on Economic
Expansion of 30 December 1970 required the Belgian Government to send the Com-
mission a new plan designating development areas. I7ork undertaken since then by the
Belgian authorities and the bilateral contacts with the Commission were again broken off
in early 1977 on account of the government crisis and the subsequent elections. At the
Commission's initiative contacts were recentlv resumed.
1 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 200.2 Bundesdrucksache 7/4742 of. I3.2.t976.
3 Bundesdrucksache 8/759 oI L5.7.L977.
a Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 89.
u OJ L 1o5 ot 4.5.1972.
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Moreover, the complementary regional aidl provided for in the Law on Economic Ex-
pansion of 30 De;ember lg7._which the Belgian Government had granted for six
months in 197) on account of the economic recession in Belgium'?-was extended for the
fifth time in June L977. On account of the persistence of social and economic difficulties
in the areas concerned, the Commission raised no objection to this further extension'
Denmark
170, By letter dated 3 May the Commission informed the Danish Government of its
decision on the current regional aid scheme.3 This decision-generally favoutable-fol-
lowed overall review, as iequired by Article 93(t) of the EEC Trcaty, of the socio-
economic situation in the Danish regions and the related fneasures of assistance.
Denmark generally enjoys a higher standard of living than most Community countries'
However, there are regional disparities, notably caused by the exceptional concentration
of population in Copenhagen and the surrounding region (Zealand). 3t/o of the Danish
population lives in the capital, and the density there is almost seventy times higher than
the national average.a Until quite recently the trend towards concentration was coqtinu-
ing. The rural areas in the west were losing part of their inhabitants through emigration,
while people settled near the big towns, attracted by job ProsPects. Although this trend
now seems to have come to a halt, it is still too early to decide whether the causes are
linked with the economic crisis or whether a real struchrral change has taken place.
The problems created by this geographical distribution of the population are aggravated
by the structure of economic activities. Although there has been a considerable drop in
the numbers employed in farming over the last twenty-five years, it still accounted for
Ll.L/o of jobs in r97o and 9.6/o in L973 (as against 5.6/o in the Nethedands, 3.6/o
in Belgium and 2.7/e in the United Kingdom). This structure is also extremely unbal-
anced in regional terms. In the assisted areas alone, employment in farming varies from
14 to 47/o, while the averz,ge is roag}ly 2O/o.
In addition to these structural difficulties, those regions where farming is the main activity
suffer from an inherent drawback: the most fertile soil is in eastern Denmark where
urban concentration is greatest; the land to the west is poor. In the counties where rnost
of the population is employed in farrning, the yield from the soil is lowest.
1 Moniteur belge of 1.1.1971.
z Sixth Report on Competition Poliry, point 201.
3 System iitroduced by Law No 219 of 7.6'1972, Loatidende A otr 7'6.1972.
n fiy way of compariion, Z0/o of the French population lives in the Paris area, while population
density in The Hague is twenty times higher than the average for the Netherlands.
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As regards unemployment, the latest comparable statistics ayallable (L975) reveal that
it affected 6.8/o of the Danish working population as against an average Community rate
of ).7/o. Although the regional disparities in this connection are tending to subside, at
times of economic crisis, higher structural unemployment persists in certain areas of
Jutland.
17 1. As previously mentioned,r the Danish scheme provides for three categories of
assistance: grants, loans at concessionary interest rates and State guarantees. Assisted
areas fall into two categories-ordinary and special development areas-which are
roughly equal in size and together cover about 50/o of. the country and 3A/o of the
population.
,The special areas are those with the greatest problems; investment grants may only be
granted in these ateas, where the maximum aid intensity is therefore higher than that
applicable to the ordinary areas. The special areas are located in north and south-west Jut-
land and in certain islands where farming is the main activity (Bornholm, Samss, Laoge-
land and Aero, Lolland and Falster).
The ordinary areas are located in western and south-eastern Jutland.
As regards funds earmarked, among Community countries Denmark grants the least
regional aid, whether as a proportion of gross domestic product or of the number of
inhabitants in assisted areas. Most financial support in Denmark takes the form of loans
and investment grants.
172, In view of the regional disparities revealed by the socio-economic analysis and the
fact that the intensity of aid granted seemed well adapted to the specific structural prob-
lems of each region, the Commission felt that, all in all, the Danish regional aid scheme
could be considered compatible with the common market and qualified for the deroga-
tion provided for in Article 9z(3)(c) of the EEC Treaty as'aid to facilitate the develop-
ment of ... certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading condi-
tions to an exteot contrary to the common interest',
However, the Commission felt that its decision should be qualified by certain restric-
tions and proposals, mainly concerning the duration of the scheme.
The previous regional difficulties of certain areas seem to be easing, and recent socio-
economic developments gives reason to hope for tapid disappearance of persisting dispa-
rities. This is true not only of central and south-eastern Jutland, where structural changes
,from a predominantly agricultural society to an industrial society can be observed, but
also of the island of Lolland and Falster.
r Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 203.
COMP. REP, EC I97
130 COMPETITION POLICY AND GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE
The Commission has therefore restricted the grant of regional aid in these areas and also
the Grent area to two years; before the end of this period, these areas'economic develop-
ment will be reviewed again.
The Commission also requested confirmation that the Danish scheme's administrative
arrangements would ensure observance of the Community ceilings fixed by the 1975
principles of coordination in the few areas where, by combining all types of regional aids,
if,. ..lfingr would be exceeded. The Commission also requested prior notification of
significant cases of application of the assistance (investment over 3 million EUC or
projects for which combined intensity of all regional aid reaches or exceeds l5/o of
investment in net grant equivalent) in areas bordering on the existing assisted areas. It
also asked for an annual report on the application of the scheme, detailing the total cost
of aided investment and the different categories of assistance. It reminded the Danish
authorities that assistance relating to products listed in Annex II to the EEC Treaty-
which may concern the food industries-are subject to the des of competition as applied
in agriculture.
'Finally, as regards the categories of assistance under the Danish scheme considered as
opaque within the meaning of the common method of evaluating aid (State guarantees,
compensatory grants and transfer grants), the Commission reserves the right to take a
decision when the technical work now in progress on possible methods of measuring all
opaque aids in the Community is completed.l
173. By letter dated 18 October L977,the Danish authorities notified the Commission of
proposals to amend the existing delimitation of assisted aneas.
The measures reduce the coverage of assisted areas, both as regards population and
surface area.
On 20 December L977, the Commission decided in favour of these amendments but
imposed certain conditions on the Danish Government concerning attribution of assisted
area status to some new municipalities; these conditions concern the duration of the
measures, observance of Community ceilings and notification of significant individual
cases of application.
France
174. By letter dated 22 December 1976 the Commission informed the French Govern-
rnent of its views on the reform of the French regional aid scheme which came into
1 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, points 194 and 195.
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force in April.l The changes introduced conforn to the new guidelines of French
regional policy and the Commission took a generally positive view.z However, it could
not take a f.inal decision on the premium for the location of certain service industries
(PLAT) and the special rural aid, for the intensity measured in terms of jobs created was
not comparable with that of other aids. The Commission will state its definitive view on
this assistance in the light of the new principles of coordination for general regional aid
schemes.
,Turning to other asPects, although the Commission raised no objections to the general
measures of assistance granted by the French Government, the coverage of certain mea-
sures gives cause for concefn,
175. This applies first of all to the reasons for granting the regional development
premium (PDR) in the areas of Charleville-Mdzidre and Sedan in Champagne-Ardennes
and the duration of the assistance. These areas, where PDR has been granted since L974
at its lov/est level of intensity, have been classed as assisted areas for the entire duration
of the eighth plan, until 1980. The Commission feels that the problems of these areas
are not sufficiently extensive to warrant classing them as assisted areas for such a long
time. As regards population, although outward migration of 0.7/o per year was register-
ed befween 1968 and L975 in the Ardennes Department, population in the areas con-
cerned increased by roughly 2/6 between the last two censuses. As regards the job situa-
tion, the increase in unemployment, mainly among women and young people, has gone
hand in hand with the drop in job vacancies; this development cannot be aclnowledged
as structural for it is too recent and coincides too closely with the recession. Taking ac-
count of the region's high degree of industrialization, demonstrated both by the position
of industry with respect to total employment (4s/6 for the Ardennes Department in
1968) and by the variety of branches represented, and reconsidering these areas' difficul-
ties in the light of the general situation of the champagne-Ardennes region (they only
account for roughly 7.4/6 of surface area and L5/o of the region's total population), it
becomes clear that the gravity of the situation must not be overestimated and that the
status of these areas should be reviewed in two years' time.
176. The amounts to be granted by way of the new regional development premiums
(PDR) and the premium for the location of research activities (PLAR) in cases involving
investment below FF 10 million are to vary according to the seriousness of the regional
situation; the Commission attaches great importance to this principle.
1 Decrees Nos 76-326 
^nd 76-127 
of 14.4.1976, colcerning the PDR, PLAT and PLAR respectively(Journal officiel de la R6publique franEaise of 15.4.1976); Decree No 76-795 of Zq.S.tgl6(Journal officiel de la R6pr.rblique frangaise of 25.8.L976).
2 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 206.
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Different provisions apply to investment over FF 10 million. In this case, the Decree
of f4 April 1976 specifies that the amount of the premium is fixed without any such
variation. In practice, however, the French authorities do have regard to it and only depart
from the principle in certain specific circumstances which have been notified to the Com-
mission. The Commission consequently decided to raise no objection to the procedure
for granting the PDR and PLAR, but to monitor its implementation. For this reason,
it requested the French Government to submit an annual report on the application of
these two aids. The report's contents are to be set out in such a way as to enable the level
of assistance by region to be checked.
The data in the report also disclose two other types of information: the breakdown by
category of expenditure (land, buiidings, machinery and plant) on aided investments and
the total amount of investments and related assistance for cases in which, by way of ex-
ception, the premium is not granted on a standard basis for investment below FF 1o mil-
lion. On the basis of this information the Commission intends to check on the feasibility
of the standard basis used to rneasure French regional aid and to make sure that the
assistance granted exceptionally without reference to the standard basis is indeed of an
exceptional natute.
177, A new feature of the PDR system provides for the granting of the premium in
exceptional circumstances outside regions with assisted status. This facility applies to
projects located in the proximity of an assisted area which help to overcome its economic
and social problems. It is extended to firms introducing schemes apt to solve the serious
problems arising in a non-assisted area from the closure of one or more firms or by
serious disturbances in the employment situation. These measures are hard to assess on
account of their very nature. They could well divert regional assistance from its objective,
for they could be used to soive local, economic or sectoral problems to the consequent
detriment of regions classed as priority assisted areas on account of their structural
weaknesses.
For this reason the Commission requested advance notification of significant individual
cases of application. This request concerns all cases in which aided investments exceed
3 million EUC and cases in which the intensity of regional aid exceeds L)/6 of the in-
vestment in net grant equivalent.
178. Finally, evaluation of the combined amount of French regional aids in the various
assisted areas has revealed that, in the part of the country subject to an aid ceiling of
2O/o ir net grant equivalent under the 1975 principles of coordination,l the combined
r Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 85 to 87.
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amount of regional aids could exceed this percentage if PDR is granted at the nominal
limit of 25/o, i.e. L7/o of investment. The same applies to the research centres where
PLAR is granted at the nominal limit of. zO/o of investment. The Commission reguested
the French Government to inform it of steps taken to exclude the grant of aid in excess
of the ceiling.
On 23 November the French Government informed the Commission that it was ready
to comply.
Ireland
I79. Now that the technical work carried out with the cooperation of the Member States
on the opaquenessl of regional aids has been completed the results will be used in
establishing the new principles of coordination. Progress has thus been made on the
transparency of certain regional aids granted in Ireland. I7ork may now be undertaken on
analysing the compatibility with the common market of the Irish general regional aid
system.2
Italy
I80. To put into effect the Italian La.w No 183 of. 2 May 19763 introducing new rules
on Italian regional aids, notably for the Mezzogiorno, for the f.we-year period from 1976
to 1980, the Italian Government had to introduce implernenting measures4 following
authorization by Parliarnent. In the meantime assistence was granted on the basis of
earlier legislation.s The Commission waited for details of these measures before taking a
decision on the new system.
The Italian Government ioformed the Commission of some of the new scheme's imple-
menting measures. These include a decree setting up a single fund for granting industrial
credit (low-interest loans).6 A series of principles have also been introduced: degressive
granting of assistance according to the seriousness of the regional situations concerned,
r Sixth Report on Competition Policn points 194 and 195.i Principal statutes: Industrial Development Act L959, Finance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1,956,
Finance Act 1969.
:r Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica italiana No 121 of 9.5,L976.
a Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 208.
5 Principal statutes: Law No 8y ol 6.t0.197t (Gazzata Ufficiale No 271 of 26.10.1971), Iaw
No 623 of 1o.7.t959 (Gazzetta Ufficiale No 198 of 19.s.1919), Law No 674 of 22.7.1,966
(Gazzetta Ufficiale No 200 of 12.8.1966).6 Decree No 902 of 9.1I.1976 (Gazzetta Ufficiale No 8 of Lt.t.t977).
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setting an overall limit on intensity in cases where national and local aids are combined,
discontinuing a number of previous types of national aid, limiting suPPort for Central
and Northern Italy to one single type of assistance: low-interest loans. Although the
Commission appreciated that these rationalization measures were in accordance with
Community guidelines on assistance it deferred its definitive assessment of the decree
for two reasons: it could not evaluate the assistance granted by means of low-interest
loans since the reference rate, corresponding to the commercial interest rate, required to
calculate the amount of aid had not been fixed and since the eligible areas in Central and
Northern Italy had not been designated.
Two further decreesl on procedures for granting financial assistance to the Mezzogiorno
were also notified to the Commission. Since they concerned procedures to be followed
when applying for assistance, the Commission considered that scrutiny of the decrees
pursuant to Article 92 of. the EEC Treaty was not required.
The Commission has organized a multilateral meeting of experts to complete the Member
States' information on the definitive coverage of the new system; the only information
they have formally received is that given on the preliminary draft in 1974.2
.f8f . The Commission also took decisions on two regional Bills notified in January and
May. The first applies to the autonomous province of Trento; pending implementation
of the country's new rules on State aids, the Bill provides for assistance to industry and
small businesses for one year only.
Since the grants concern previously approved assisted areas and are to apply for a limited
period of time, the Commission did not raise objections to their introduction.
The other Bill concerns the autonomous Valle d'Aosta region and amends the Regional
Law No 33 of g October L)7),3 previously approved by the Commission,a subject to
certain conditions. It concerns the granting of low-interest loans to encourage industrial
investment in the region. The previous law restricted eligibility to firms ernploying up to
500 persons with invested capital of up to LIT 5 000 million. As a result of inflation
this amount is now too low and the Bill is designed to raise it. The Commission consider-
ed that this adjustment did not warrant amending its previous favourable decision on
the scheme, all the more so since intensity in the mearrtime had dropped considerably.
1 Decrees of 22 and 24 Jantary 1977 (Gazzetta Ufficiale No 6l of 7.5.1977).
s Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 95; Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 208.
3 GazzettaUfficiale No 320 of 13.12.197i.
4 Bull. EC Ll-r973, point 2112.
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Netherlands
182. As previously mentionedl the Dutch Government substantially modified its regional
aid system (Investeringspremieregeling-IPn;z notably by extending the geographical
coverage to one further region and eighteen new growth points.
On 18 May the Commission initiated the procedure of Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty
in respect of these amendments3 expressing reservations on the warranting of assistance
in six of these new growth points: Goes, Vlissingen-Oost and Terneuzen (located in
Zeeland), and Cuyk, Oss and Bergen-op-Zoom (located in North Brabant).
The socio-economic situation of the Goes, Vlissingen-Oost and Terneuzen growth points
is satisfactory. The unemployment rate is below that of areas usually classified as assisted
and is no more than 8O/o of the national average. Per capita incomes are also distinctly
higher than those of assisted areas-roughly the same as the national average and an
index of L10 compared with the Community level. Farming, which in 1973 provided
employment for tL5/o of the working population of the province of Zeeland, is not
experiencing any particular difficulties. At Goes, the only growth point where farm
workers (14.5%) are above the national averz;ge (7.5%), agriculture is prosperous.
The increase in unemployment at Cuyk and Oss has been too recent and coincided too
closely with the general economic crisis to be definitely acknowledged as structural. Al-
though per capita income is relatively low, manufacturing and service industries have
made progress; the increase in employment in these two sectors between 1973 
^nd 197,equalled or even exceeded the national a.verage. The building industry is experiencing
some difficulty, but then there is a nationwide recession. Finally, although farms are
small, there are no particular problems in agriculture.
The socio-economic difficulties of Bergen-op-Zoom are mainly caused by the Rijnmond
region.a It draws workers from the north-west of the province of North Brabant and
from Bergen-op-Zoom and it is now suffering the consequences of the general recessioo.
The unemployment rate there is higher and the per capita income lower than the national
a\tetage, but the arca is less badly off than the traditional assisted arezrs. Moreover,
'between 1973 and 197) jobs in manufacturing and the services went up by 5.1/6 and
2.2/o respectively. Progress has therefore been made despite the decline in activities in
certain industries-furniture, clothing and building (the latter for the same reasons as
at Cuyk and Oss). Farming has also registered a drop in employment, but it accounts
for few jobs in the area.
I Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 212.
2 Ministerial Notice No 1271/lll/1260 PI PORAEP of. l.r.t9lr; Staatscourant No 90 of 14.5.t975;
Staatscourant No 175 of 11.9,197J,
3 OJ C 129 ot 2.6.1977.
a Area situated at the mouth of the Rhine and the Meusq ertending from Dordrecht to the coast.
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The Commission therefore felt that the granting of regional assistance should be dis-
continued in the growth point of Goes, Vlissingen-Oost and Terneuzen and restricted
to a fwo-year period in the growth points of Cuyk, Oss and Bergen-op-Zoom, where
structural difficulties carnot be acknowledged with certainty.
l8J. Follovring the Commission's decision, the Dutch Government informed it that
from 8 June Goes, Vlissingen-Oost and Terneuzen would no longer be considered as
growth points with regard to the IPR system.
By letter dated 11 July it also notified the Commission of further amendments to the
IPR system. The two major innovations are the extension of the system to cover the
growih points of Oldenzaal, Deventer and Venlo; however, maximum theoretical intens-
ity of aid for Deventer and Venlo would be LOJ% in net grant equivalent instead of
the 2O/o rate generally applied. In addition, fot investment in manufacturing in the
growth points of Kampen, Zwolle, Uden, Venray, Cuyk, Oss and Bergen-op-Zoom, and
for key investment in the services industry in the Roermond, Melick and Herkenbosch
growth points, maximum theoretical aid intensity would be brought down from 20/o
in net grant equivalent to L0.L%.
The Dutch Government also slightly amended maximum theoretical intensities of the
various premiums provided by the scheme but they remain below the ceilings fixed by the
1971 principles of coordination. It also introduced two new possible applications of the
IPR scheme: one for investments which, within the meaning of the basic scheme, do not
constitute investments establishing or extending firms but which are of exceptional
social importance and the other for new industrial plant established at Terneuzen and
Vlissingen-Oost and of vital importance for the area; the Commission would receive
prior notification of individual cases.
The Commission ii now scrutinizing all these amendments.
184. In March L977 the Dutch Government also informed the Commission of its In-
vestment Account Bill (\7et Investeringsrekening) providing for the introduction of
six new investment premiums, notably:
(i) a general regional premium of. 1"2% of the cost of investment in building ad 6/o
of that in outside plant; ihis premium would be payable in a certain part of the
Netherlands, the designat.ion to be fixed by administrative procedure (probably
the whole country outside the Randstad);
(ii) a special regional premium of 2o/o of the cost of investment in buildings and
LI/o of that in outside plants; this premium would be payable in certain munici-
palities selected according to socio-economic criteria, notably severe employment
difficulties;
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(iii) a premium to be payable in accordance with town and country planning considera-
tions of 2o/o of the cost of investment in buildings and to/o of that in outside
plant; this premium would be payable in certain municipalities only to improve the
balance of local population and economic development.
Having examined the Bill, on 24 May the Commission initiated the procedure of Article
93(Z) of the EEC Trcaty with respect to these three premiums. It could not assess
whether the assistance qualified for derogation under Article 9z(3) of the EEC Treaty,
since vital information was la&ing. It therefore requested the Dutch Government to
provide further information and inform it of the areas eligible for the first two pre-
miums with details of their socio-economic difficulties and the growth points where the
third premium could be granted.
The Commission also expressed doubts on the compatibility of the premiums with the
conrmon market, since they could all be granted for replacement .investment. They would
thus permanently reduce firms' running costs and therefore their manufacturing costs.
This assistance could not be considered to encourage recipient firms to adjust to the true
conditions of competition in which they must operate and therefore did not qualify for
derogation under Article 9z(3)(c) of the EEC Treaty as aid to'facilitate the develop-
ment of certain economic activities or certain economic areas'.
Uniteil Kingdorn
185. The completion of technical work carried out with the cooperation of the Member
States on the opaqueness of some of their regional aids enabled work to continue on the
examination of compatibility with the common market of the British regional aid
scheme.ll
Assistance under the scheme includes the regional development grant, an automatic
investment subsidy granted for all investment (including replacement investment) over
an unlimited period. Many in-depth discussions were held on this aid-both bilateral,
at different levels between the Commission and the British authorities, and multilateral.
:186, Meantime in April ar'd May fwo amendments to the aid scheme were notified to
the Commission. The first concerns changes in the stafus of certain assisted areas: the
maximum assistance granted is in some cases reduced and in other cases increased. The
areas where aid has been reduced are Aberdeen, Inverurie, Stonehaven, Malton, Northal-
r Principle statutes: Great Britain - Industry Ac.. 1972, Local Employment Act 1972, Scottish
Development Agency Act 1975, Ifelsh Development Agency Act 1975; Northern Ireland - In-
dustrial Investment (General Assistance) Acts (Northern lreiand) L956-71, Industrial Development
Acts 1966-7L, Selective Employment Payment Act 1966.
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lerton, Pickering, Richmond and Thirsk. The areas where the level has been increased
are Shotton'travel to work' area, Hull 'travel to work' area, Grimsby Employment Office
Area, Arbroath, Cumnoch, Dundee, Kilbirnie and Lanark Employment Office Areas. The
second concerns an increase in assistance for Special Development Areas: an extension
from two to five years for the government factories' rent-free periods and an increase in
the intensity of aid granted in the form of low-interest loans. The Commission raised no
objections to the introduction of these amendments but postponed final assessment
pending an overall decision on the British scheme.
However, since the second amendment could cause assistance to be granted beyond the
aid ceilings laid down by the 197) principles of coordination,l the Commission drew the
attention of the British Government to its obligation in this respect. By letter dated 7
September the British authorities assured the Commission that assistance granted would
not exceed the ceilings.
187. Finally, on 3 October L977 the Commission took a decision on the amendments to
the regional aid scheme for Northern Ireland which had been notified in August 1977
by the British Government. This system, set up by the Industrial Investment (General
Assistance) Acts (Northern Ireland) L966-71 provides for a series of grants, interest-
free or low-interest loans and interest relief grants.
In the main these amendments involve an increase in the capital grants for investments
and increase the ceiling on job creation grants. Since the Commission has not yet stated
its views on the compatibility of the Northern Ireland aid scheme with the common
market, it decided to raise no objection to the introduction of these amendments, but
reserved its definitive position pending an overall assessment. It therefore authorized
derogation from the regional aid ceiling fixed for Northern Ireland by the L975 prin-
ciples of coordination.'? It felt that an increase in assistance was warranted in current
circumstances on account of Northern Ireland's worsening unemployment and low per
capita gtoss domestic product.
S 3 
- 
Ald systems for specific industries
Shipbuilding
;I88. Although wodd shipbuilding production was at a record level in 1976, this was a
result of orders placed in previous years; it was already evident that the dearth of new
I Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 85 to 87.
2 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 87 
^nd 99.
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orders heralded a serious woddwide crisis characterized by a structural surplus of produc-
tion capacity. In L977 the progressive reduction in orders on hand obliged many ship-
yards to start reducing production and consequently to lay of.f. workers on a significant
scale.
The experience of the Community's shipyards has been comparable to that of world
shipyards as a whole, with orders on hand falling by about 4o/o during L976 ar.d by a
further 2o/o in the first half of 1977. Orders on hand in Community shipyards for
delivery in 1978 amount to only about half of t9l5 production.
The medium term outlook is also extremely adverse. Even in 1980 world orders are
unlikely to be greatly in excess of 60% of L976 production, and the Community's
yards, being at a considerable competitive disadvantage in relation to shipyards in third
countries and more particularly in the Far East, may be obliged to accept an even greater
reduction in activity. The consequences for employment in the Community industry
could well be a loss of over 5O OOO jobs, or about one third of its employment; there
would, in addition, be significant indirect effects on employment in other industries.
I89. These unfavourable prospects have led the Community, both internally and exter-
nally in contacts at an international level, particulady within the OECD, to seek the
development of policies to deal with the crisis.
\Tithin the OECD the Community participated in the preparation of the general guide-
lines, approved on 4 May L976, which provide that, in order to remedy the serious struc-
tural disequilibrium existing in this industry, efforts are needed in all shipbuilding coun-
tries in order that the inevitable reduction in wodd shipbuilding capacity may be achieved
in the least damaging and most equitable way possible.
The principle of equity led the Community to request the Japanese Government to make
special efforts, since shipbuilding capacity has grown particularly rapidly in that country.
The Japanese Government responded to this request by advising its shipbuilders to in-
crease prices by 5% so as partially to reduce the gap between EEC and Japanese prices,
which was estimated to be around 4O/o on avetage, and by taking measures to reduce
hours worked in Japanese shipyards by )O/o by 1978.
I[Zhile these measures may contribute to a more equitable distribution of new orders
between Japan and the Community, they cannot be considered as more than a temporary
palliative. The fundamental problem is the continuing reduction in the volume of new
orders to be shared out. This trend, which aPPears unlikely to be halted before 1980 at
the eadiest, is rnade more acute for members of the OECD by the increasing share of
wodd production accounted for by non-rnember nations.
190. The Community is now faced with the need to achieve the necessary adjustments
of its shipbuilding industry to the prospective world market situation. These adjustments
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must evidently take account of the problems which may result for workers in the industry,
which are particulady serious because of the current high levels of unemployment and
because the shipyards are generally to be found at coastal locations where there are few
alternative job opportunities.
Moreover, such adjustment is bound to require major structural changes since it will
involve both reduction of capacity and conversion towards the production of those types
of ships, such as product carriers, Ro-Ro vessels and container ships, for which there is
still some demand. Those Community yards which invested in facilities to produce large
and relatively simple vessels, such as bulk cariers and oil tankers, will have to make this
latter adjustment.
Most Member States have considered that transformations on the scale necessary could
not be achieved in an ordedy manner without State intervention. Their interventions
have been varied, as will be seen in the descriptions of national aid schemes set out below,
and the Commission has been particulady concerned to ensure that they are linked to the
rcalization of the required structural changes and that they do not distort competition
within the Community to an exteot contrary to the common interest. In addition to its
examinations of national schemes the Commission has transmitted to the Council a
proposal for a fourth Directive on aid to shipbuilding.
191. The first Directive on aid to shipbuilding v/as principally designed to harmonize
aids to shipbuilding and to reduce the intensity of those aids, such as production aid,
which create the greatest distortions of competition befween Member States.l Successive
Directives, moreover, had extended the coverage to include virtually all forms of aid to
the industry.
Since the third Directive was due to lapse on 31 December 1977, the Commission prepar-
ed and transmitted to the Council on B November 1977 a proposal for a fourth Directive,
which follows the same general lines as the earlier Directives but is adapted to the pre-
sent particulady difficult circumstances of the industry.,
The following are the main provisions of this proposal, whose principal objectives are
to ensure that aids are of limited intensity and that they make a real contribution to
restoring the industry's viability :
(i) following the progressive reduction in the ceilings for production aids in previous
Directives, these are no longer asthorized except as anti-crisis measures and subject
to the Commission's approval. The proposal provides in particular that aids of this
r First Report on Competition Policy, point 168; Second Report on Competition Policy, point 95;
Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 104.
, OJ C 294 of. 7.r2.r977.
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kind must be progressively reduced and linked to the restructuring of the industry
and for the advance notification of individual cases involving direct competition
between Member States so as to enable the Commission to verify that the aids do
not in such cases affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common
interest;
(ii) whereas the third Directive provided for an examination of aids for investment
after the event, the Commission's proposal provides in addition for prior notifica-
tion in the case of aids for investment which would lead to an increase in a ship-
yard's capacity;
(iii) aids to rescue an undertaking can be considered compatible with the coflrmon market
under this proposal provided that they are necessary in order to avoid serious
employment problems and are a step towards an acceptable longer term soluuon;
(iv) aids in the form of credit facilities for the sale of ships must, as in previous Direc-
tives, respect the relevant conditions of the Resolution of the OECD Council of
18 JuIy 1974;
(v) the proposal breaks new ground on aid for the purchase of ships which must not be
granted to shipowners in one Member State in a way which discriminates against
shipyards in other Member States; the proposal provides for Member States to give
regular reports on aids to shipowners.
This Directive would remain in force until the end of L980, at which time it would,
almost certainly, be necessary to modify it so as to take account of developments on the
wodd market. The proposal, moreover, specifically provides that such modifications may
be made before the expiry date of the Directive if they are warranted.
In its examinations of the national aid plans described below the Commission sought in
particular to ensure that the proposed provisions on antr-crisis measures were respected.
United Kingalom
192. The United Kingdom shipbuilding industry, which is principally located in areas
with particulady serious unemployment problems, where it is an important employer,
had, in common with other shipbuilding industries, experienced a rapid rundown in its
order books, which was likely to lead to a number of closures and redundancies in the
short term.
19i, The United Kingdom Government therefore informed the Commission that in
order to enable the industry to obtain some oew orders in the present depressed wodd
market, it intended to introduce an Intervention Fund, with a budget of UKL 65 mil-
lion, which would be used to give grants to shipbuilders so as to enable them to align
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their quoted prices with those ruling on the wodd market. The Intervention Fund would
provide grants up to a maximum of 30% of contract prices for orders obtained up to
March 1978 and on which work commenced by December 1978. The available funds
would, however, be used as f.ar as possible for those cases where United Kingdom tenders
were most competitive with those made by yards in third countries and for those yards
which could be expected to become most competitive in the future.
The United Kingdom Governrnent estimated that the sum available to the Intervention
Fund would enable the shipbuilding industry to secure orders equivalent to about half
the industry's annual production.
194. Thls proposal raised two main problems: the lack of any link with a plan to restruc-
ture the industry and the danger that the aids could distort competition within the Com-
munity and thereby aggravate the difficulties of shipyards in other Member States.
The Commission recognized that it had not been possible to prePare a plan to restructure
the United Kingdom shipbuilding industry because it had only just been nationalized,
but it considered the criteria for selecting the yards to be aided were not sufficiently
restrictive to guarantee that aids would be limited to yards with a real chance of becoming
competitive in the future. In order to ensure that aids were granted on a sufficiently
selective basis and that competition between shipyards in the Community was not distort-
ed, the Commission decided to authorize the use of the Intervention Fund provided that
each case was notified to it for prior approval. It indicated, rnoreover, that it would
review this authorization after six months in the light of experience with the scheme
and of the progress made in preparing the restructuring plan for the industry.
195. Up to November 1977 the Commission received 14 notifications involving proposed
use of the Intervention Fund. In its appraisal of each case it took account of any compe-
tition for the order from other Member States and of the prospects for the viability of
tlre yard concerned as well as of its workload, of its location and of any recent tttiotaliza-
tion. The Commission was satisfied that these criteria were met in practice. In particular,
competition from shipyards in other Member States was exceptional and in all cases the
orders would otherwise probably have gone to third countries.
The Commission did not therefore raise any objections in these cases.
For the cases where the use of the Intervention Fund was successful in obtaining the
order, the effects of the use of the Fund have been to win orders amounting to some
403 000 gross registered tonnes, equivalent to 37/o of United Kingdom annual produc-
tion capacity at a cost of UKL; )1 million. Assuming the UKL 14 million remaining
available achieves proportionally similar results, the total effect of the scheme will have
been to secure orders amounting to about 53/s of. annual production capacity.
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Netherlands
196. The shipbuilding industry in the Netherlands has been among those in the Commu-
nity that have been most severely affected by the present crisis, and eady in L977 the level
of orders on hand indicated that about one third of the industry's direct and indirect
employees would be redundant within 12 months.
197. The Nethedands Government informed the Commission of its intention to inter-
vene to promote the restructuring of its shipbuilding industry. It had drawn up a general
restructuring policy providing for a reduction in capacity of 30% between L976 and
1980 and had laid down more detailed employment and capacity reduction targets for
various groups of shipyards, which were to prepare more detailed prograsrmes to achieve
these targets. On a preliminary assessment some HFL 1 000 million of investment for
rationalizalton and rnodernization would be required in order to restore the industry's
competitiveness and viability.
Aid would be provided in the context of this restructuring plan over the period 1977-80.
The following are the main measures involved:
(i) an improvement in the sales credit facilities for small ships and dredgers within
limi* compatible with the provisions of the OECD Understanding on Export
Credits for ships and hence with the third Directive on aids to shipbuilding; these
favourable credit facilities rilere also to be extendedto offshore drilling equipment;
(ii) State guarantees for performance bonds and insrtalments paid before delivery;
(iii) State guarantees for the financing of investment needed to restructure and rational-
ize production;
(iv) a State contribution to the industry's redundancy fund; and
(v) the compensation of losses incurred on individual orders.
198. As far as shipbuilding was concerned, the first four measures raised relatively few
problems from a Community viewpoint. The sales credit arrangements would be compa-
tible with the third Directive; the State guarantees for performance bonds and for instal-
ments paid before delivery would have a minor effect on competition and were principal-
ly designed for orders obtained from third countries and the aids for investment and for
the redundancy fund would facilitate the industry's restructuring while being of relatively
rninor intensity.
On the other hand the extension of sales credit facilities to offshore drilling equipment
was not covered by the third Directive and, if applied within the Community, would be
incompatible, not only with the Commission's principle that there should be no aid to
exports to other Member States but also with its analysis of the competitive situation in
the offshore supplies industry and of the risks of distortions of competition. The Com-
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mission had already initiated the procedure of Article 93(2) in respect of the aids
granted by the United Kingdom to finance purchases of fixed offshore installations.l
The Nethedands Government accordingly agreed that this scheme would not be applied
in the case of sales to the other Member States.
The Commission examined the arrangements for the compensation of losses in some
detail as t"hese were the most important of the proposed measures and the aids most likely
to distort competition within the Community. The proposal provided that the shipyard
would bear 25/o of the expected loss at the time the order was taken, the State covering
the remaining 75/o.Half of the State's share would be in the form of a graftt and half
in the form of an unsecured interest-free loan repayable after 1980. The ceiling for aid
would be 30/o of the contract price, and the total volume of aid would be limited in
each yeat to a certain percentage of the industry's turnover, this percentage being fixed
at 20% initially and falling to Ll/o in 1980. The estimated budgetary cost of this com-
pensation would be HFL 300 million (equal to 108 million u.a.) in the first year and
diminish thereafter.
The Commission considered that these arrangements would make an effective contribu-
tion to restructuring the industry and reducing its capacity in an ordedy way, since the
aids would be granted in the framework of the general plan for restructuring the industry
and would be progressively reduced so as to provide an incentive to the preparation and
implementation of the more detailed plans by groups of shipyards.
The Commission wished also to be satisfied that this aid woutrd not distort competition
within the Community. Although the Netherlands Government had undertaken not to
grant aid where ihis would enable a yard in the Netherlands to secure an order which
would otherwise have gone to a yard in another Member State, the Commission consider-
ed it necessary for it to check this point. It therefore required the Netherlands Govern-
ment to agree to notify to it in advance every proposal to aid a yard to secure an order
where there was a competing tender from a shipyard in another Member State.
Following the agreement of the Netherlands Government to this procedure the Commis-
sion informed it that it had no objections to the implementation of the proposals, but it
requested that it be regularly informed of the progress in restructuring the industry and
of the aids granted to it.
France
199. Ifith the prospect of significant redundancies in the short-term, the French
Government decided to intervene to enable its shipbuilding industry to secure new orders.
I Sixth Report on Competition Policy, points 2L9 lo 22L,
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The proposal was for aids to be given in the form of grants for orders up to a total of
around 300 000 gross registered tonnes taken up to July L978 f.or delivery by the end
of r9go. The rate of grant would vary with the size of. yards and was set at a maximum of
l5/o of the contract price for small yards and for other yards at from L3/6 to 20/p,
according to the type of ship, of the contract price plus direct aid less certain costs. The
budget for the scheme would be FF 360 million.
This aid would be accompanied, on the one hand, by a number of modifications to the
price guarantee scheme designed to make its terms more restrictive as required by the
provisions of the third Directive on aids to shipbuildingl and, on the other hand, by
efforts to restructure the industry and to amalgamate the seven major yards into fwo
diversified grouPs, each with a broad financial base and benefiting from backward inte-
gration into areas such as marine engines and electrical engineering. The grant of the aid
would to some extent be dependent on progress made in this restructuring.
200. This proposal raised two problems. First, as in the case of the Nethedands and
United Kingdom aid schemes, it would be necessary for the Commission to verify that
comPetition between Member States was not distorted. For this purpose a procedure of
advance notification of individual proposals to grant aid would be required in cases where
a tender frcm a French shipyard was in competition with one from another Member
State. Second, under the proposal for a fourth Directive, the price guarantee scheme
would be authorized subject to the same conditions as other anti-crisis aids, and in par-
ticular to there being a clear link with the industry's restructuring. As the French propo-
sals did not provide for such a link the Commission considered that, as in the case of the
United Kingdom's Intervention Fund, it could only authorize the implementation of the
scheme for a short period, in this case up to February Ig78, after which it would review
the scheme in the light of a report supplied by the French Government on the use made
of the aids, of the progress achieved in restructuring the industry and of the solution
adopted for this type of measure in the fourth Directive. Subject to these conditions the
Commission decided to raise no ob;'ections to the French Government's proposal.
Denmark
201. The Danish shipbuilding industry is faced with the same problems as other Member
States which threaten to have particularly serious consequences in Denmark in view of
the industry's importance in the economy. Employment in shipyards had in fact akeady
been significantly reduced by the beginningof 1977.
1 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 104.
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The Danish Government therefore decided to intervene to assist its yards to obtain new
orders by offering shipowners in Denmark favourable credit facilities for ships purchas-
ed from Danish shipyards. \7hile these credit facilities, being in the form of buyer's
credit, were not in conflict with the provisions of the third Directive on aids to shipbuil-
ding, which only refer to seller's credit, the Commission considered that the discrimina-
tion in favour of Danish shipyards would amount to a means of bipassing the discipline
imposed by this Directive on seller's credit, and would, in any case, be contrary to the
non-discrimination provision in the third Directive.l In view of these objections, the
Danish Government decided to modify its original proposal and to grant the aid for ships
purchased from Community yards. The Commission, therefore, having satisfied itself
that the aid was not such as to have appreciable adverse effects on competition between
Member States in the shipping industry, was able to inform the Danish Government that
it had no objections to the proposed aid scheme,
Textiles
202. The problems of the textiles industry have been discussed in previous reports,2 as
have the general principles, first elaborated in 19713 and recently adapted and refined,n
whose puqpose is to provide a framework for Member States in the preparation of aid
plans for the industry and the Commission in its appraisals of such plans.
These principles require Member States to abstain from grainting aids which would lead
to an increase in productive capacity in sectors where there is structural overcapacity or
where demand is stagnating. Moreover, in the case of sectors where overcapacity and
low demand have caused a collapse in prices throughout the Community, aids should
only be granted to companies converting to other activities. On the other hand, in order
to increase the industry's competitiveness, aids may be given to improve production tech-
niques and for applied research, provided, in the latter case, that the results are made
available on commercial terms and without discrimination throughout the Community.
The Commission has applied these principles not only in its examination of the national
aid proposals notified to it but also in the preparation of proposals that it made to the
Member States on aids to the synthetic fibre industry.
r Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 104'
2 Most recently in the Sixth Report on Competition Pobcy, point 222.
c First Report on Competition Policy, point 171.I Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point22).
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Synthetic fibres
203. The Community's synthetic fibre industry experienced very rapid growth in com-
munity demand in the 1960s and in the eady years of the current decade. This growth
was largely a result of substitution of natural by synthetic fibres in the textile industry
to the point where the latter provide nearly half the industry's fibre input. In the last
few years, however, demand has failed to increase and although the 1973 peak in com-
munity demand was regained ]n1976, the industry now faces serious problems, both in
its home and in its export markets.
On the home market the increasing penetration within the Community of textile imports
of all fibres from third countries has led to a significant deterioration in the Commu-
nity's balance of trade in textiles in the 1970s and hence, because of the slow growth
of demand for textiles, to a stagnation of demand for Community producers of synthetic
fibres. Outlets have also been lost in export markets as new capacity has been installed in
third countries, so that pxPort business has been reduced and much of what remains has
to be done at unremunefative prices.
Although these changds are to some extent a conjuncfural phenomenon, they cleady
involve a number of strucfural changes which make it impossible for the industry to grow
at the rate at which it did in the past. Despite this change in the industry's prospects
the long gestation period for new investment projects has meant that signifiiant new
capacity has continued to come on stream in the Community in recent years as a result of
investment decisions taken on the basis of the more favourable conditions and prospects
prevailing up to the end of t973.
As a result the rate of capacity utilization is only about 70/o and, despite increases in
raw material, labour and other production costs, prices have fallen to levels at which
significant losses are being experienced. On current demand forecasts it would appear
unlikely that capacity utilization will return to a satisfactory level other than in the iong
term.
204. In these circumstances the Commission was particulaily concerned about the po-
tential effects on competition within the Community of any national aids granted to the
industry. Hitherto such aids have frequently been granted under regional systems of aid
to which the Commission has given its agreement and over whose use in individual casesit does not usually have any control. In the case of general aid systems, which are also
sometimes applied to this industry, such control exists with certain exceptions (for in-
stance in the case of aids to maintain or create employment).
The Commission therefore requested the Member States to abstain, for a period of two
years from granting any regional or other aids to investment projects which would result
in an increase in production capacity, even where the plan to grant such aid would not
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nofmally have to be notified. Since, however, such abstention would only serve to avoid
a further exacerbation of the existing situation but would not eliminate the existing and
prospective problems of overcapacity, the Commission decided that it would be essential
?or it to exeicise control orn.. ail aids granted to the industry and therefore informed the
Member States that it expected them to notify it in advance of all proposals to grant aid.
The Commission intendJto examine each such proposal with a view to ensuring that aids
are used to encourage a reduction in capaciry to a level where actual and prospective
demand and potential supply are more neady in balance.
Nelherlanils: Cotton anil allied textiles
205. Is L976 the Commission decided to initiate the procedure provided for in Article
93(2) of the EEC Treaty in respect of a proposal by the Nethedands Gqvernment to
introduce an aid scheme for the cotton and allied textiles sector.l The objectives of this
aid scheme was to increase productivity and to improve product quality, without any
increase in the production capacity of the sector in the Netherlands. The aids proposed
were to take two forms:
(i) interest-free loans related to companies' L974 fiscal depreciation and to employ'
ment at January 1976. These loans were to be repayable in equal instalments in
1980 and 1981, unless the companies presented resfucturing Programmes, in which
case the loans would be converted into grants.
(ii) investment grants to meet up to 2O/o of the costs of restructuring Programmes Pro-
posed in the period 1976-78.
$fhile the objectives of the Nethedands' proposal were in line with the Commission's
principles on aids to the textile industry, the scheme itself raised two problems. First the
interest-free loans would amount to stop-gap production aid in the case of undertakings
which did not subsequently engage in restructuring and this was in contradiction with
the principles on aids. Second, the Netherlands Government had abeady introduced an
aid to restructure this and other sectors of the textile industry to which the Commission
had not objected and under which restructuring programmes were to have been prepared
without delay.'z
The Commission had at that time requested that these programmes be submitted to it
,for approval but had not yet received them.
,,Following the initiation of the procedure provided for in Article %(2) the Nethedands
Government clarified its intentions and made certain modifications to its original ProPo-
r Sixth Report on Competition Policy, points 227 and 228.
z Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 110 and 111.
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sals. First, the loans would no longer be free of interest but would bear a tate of interest
equal to that charged by the National Investeringsbankr for loans guaranteed by the State,
and for companies presenting a restructuring programme their conversion into grants
would correspondingly reduce eligibility for the investment grants. Second, the sum of
grants available under this aid scheme and under other aid schemes would in no case
exceed 35/o of the cost of aided projects. Third, despite the additional aids to the sector
as a result of this scheme, its production capacity and employrnent were expected to be
significantly reduced in the medium term. The Nethedands Government argued that
the aids were in fact essential in order to avoid such a drastic reduction in capacity that
restructuring would become virtually impossible. Fourth, the aid scheme would be con-
centrated on undertakings in the Twente area where serious employment problems are
being experienced and where the textile industry is a major employer. Finally, the Nether-
lands Government also undertook to transmit the restructuring plans to the Commission
for its approval in advance of any decision on the grant of aids for restructuring.
Jhe Commission re-examined the Netherlands proposal in the light of these clarifica-
tions and amendments.
Since the loans under the proposed scheme would now benefit only from a State guaran-
tee, the intensity of this aid would be much lower and not such as to affect trade between
Member States to an extent contrary to the common interest. This aid was justified by the
need to maintain sufficient production units in existence for valid restructuring of the
sector to be possible. Moreover, the obligation to pay interest on the loans would induce
undertakings rapidly to prepare their restructuring programmes. The limitation on the
sum of grants available under all aid schemes would further limit the effect on compe-
tition and trade within the Community.
These modifications, taken together with the prospective decline in the sector's capacity,
brought the proposed aid scheme into line with the Commission principles on aids to the
industry. Moteover, since the restructuring programmes would be transmitted for prior
approval, the Commission would be able to verify that they were well adapted to the
sector's problems and would make a real contribution to restoring the sector's viability.
For these reasons the Commission decided that there were no longer any grounds for it
to oppose the implementation of the aid scheme and it accordingly closed the Artide
93(2) procedure.
Netherlanils: Clothing industry
206. The Nethedands Government informed the Commission of a proposal to introduce
an aid scheme for the clothing industry. This proposal raised similar problems to those
r Third Report on Competition Policy, points 118 and 119.
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which had led the Commission to initiate the Article 93(2) procedure in the case of the
same Government's proposals for cotton and allied textiles.
The scheme would be the Netherlands' third aid scheme for the clothing industry since
1975, when it had introduced a scheme to facilitate the industry's restnrcturing.l This
original scheme provided for aids to be given to undertakings which agreed to participate
in the restructuring of the industry when the restructuring prograrnmes had been drawn
up. Aids were available under the scheme in the form of grants for up to 20% of in-
vestment for projects started in 197) and L975 and for up to 7.5/o of investment for
projects started at a later date. Aids were also available for employment in the form of
a gtart of HFL 1 000 for each worker kept on the payroll throughout the year.
The latter measure was extended in 1976, when a further grant of HFL 600 Per worker
was instituted.
Since the grant of these various aids was conditional on an exPress undertaking by firms
to participate in subsequent restructuring and since they were necessary in order to permit
firms to survive until the restructuring programmes had been drawn up, the Commission
took the view that they could be considered as being in line with its principles on aids to
the textile industry and did not therefore raise any objection to their implementation.
However, it requested the Netherlands Government to transmit the restrucfuring pro-
grarnmes to it for approval.
207. The third measure proposed by the Nethedands Government had the same objec-
tives as these eadier schemes: to maintain employment and to restructure the industry.
The new aid scheme was essentially a continuation of the eadiet measures and provided
,for further grants at a rate of 20/6 f.or replacement investment. In addition, there was
provision for aids to meet the losses of undertakings engaging in restructuring and for
loans towards the cost of restructuring. The precise content of the proposal was, how-
ever, very unclear. It emerged, moreover, that work on the restructuring Progrzunmes
which were to have been prepared without delay in L975, had hardly begun and the
Netherlands authorities were still awaiting the submission of specific plans by under-
takings which they would then have to examine and approve.
I'Ihe Commission considered that the proposed scheme amounted to a stop-gap measure.
It recognized that such measures were justifiable in exceptional circumstances in order to
give time for the preparation of restructuring programmes and could therefore accePt
them provided that there was a clear link between the receipt of the aids and the teoJiza-
tion of a restructuring prograrnme. Since this v/as, however, the third successive scheme
of this kind to assist this industry, the Commission considered that this justification
could no longer be invoked.
1 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 110.
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In the Commission's view, a continuation of aid of this kind for a further three-yeat
period would be equivalent to the introduction of a protective measure for the Nether.
lands clothing industry and would have serious adverse effects on intra-Community
trade. The Commission therefore decided to initiate the procedure provided for in Article
93(z) ot the EEC Treaty.
Electron i cs : lJ n ited Ki n gd om
Insfuumentation anil automation industry
208. The United Kingdom Government informed the Commission that it planned to
introduce a scheme of aid for the instrumentation and automation industry. This industry
comprises a variety of sectors which produce industrial and electronic instruments for
analysis, measurement of process control scientific instrurnents for research or industrial
use, electromedical equipment, automatic gauging and testing instruments and automation
sysrems,
The United Kingdom Government argued that, although the industry's past performance
in terms of production and exports appeared to be satisfactory, its future prospects were
uncertain because of the fragmentation of the industry and its relatively low levels of
profitability and research and development expenditure. It therefore proposed to inter-
vene to assist the restructuring and rationalization of companies in the industry, invest-
ment in new capital equipment, plant, machinery and buildings and the design, develop-
ment and launching of new products and systems. The scheme would have a budget of
UKL 25 million.
209. The Commission examined the arguments advanced by the United Kingdom
Government to justify its intervention in this industry. First, the industry's fragmented
structure appeared to be the result both of the creation of small business by innovative
entrepreneurs, reflecting the industry's dynamism rather than a failure to perform ade-
quately, and of the diversity of its output. Second, the level of profitability, although
below the United Kingdom avenge, was nevertheless positive and did not appear to
indicate a need for State aid. Third, it was thought necessary to verify by means of
thorough international comparircns the United Kingdom contention that the level of
research and development expenditure was low.
Finally, even if it were demonstrated that real weaknesses exist in these areas, they would
be difficult to explain othet than in terms of more fundamental factors, for instance
,managerial deficiencies, which would not be affected by the proposed aid schenre.
The Commission also examined the prospective effects of these aids on trade befween
Member States. It noted that there is very substantial trade in the products of certain
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sectors of the industry. Although some specialization probably existed within the Com-
munity so that trade levels might overstate the extent of competition between Member
States, there was a clear risk that the aid scheme would affect trade to an extent contrary
to the common interest.
On the basis of this preliminary examination the Commission therefore concluded that
an adequate case had not been made for the proposed aid scheme and that it might
adversely affect intra-Community trade. It therefore decided to initiate the procedure
provided for in Article 93(2) for the EEC Treaty in order to enable it thoroughly to
examine the justification for the aids to the industry and their likely effects on intra'
Community trade.
2/0. Following the initiation of this procedure the Commission examined with the
United Kingdom authorities both the justification for the proposed aid scheme and its
potential effects on the basis of a more detailed analysis of the industry's structure and of
intra-Community trade.
The fragrnented strucfure of the United Kingdorn industry is mirrored in other Member
States, where small companies predorninate and the number of large companies is limited.
The United Kingdom, in fact, has rather more large companies although this difference
is largely accounted for by the presence in the Uoited Kingdom of subsidiaries of multi-
national companies principally ovrned and controlled outside the Community. Such com-
panies are estimated to be responsible for about half the United Kingdom industry's
output. Since the Commission's original conclusion was confirmed by this analysis it
concluded that there was no adequate justification for the aids to restructuring.
The evidence on research and development expenditure by the United Kingdom industry
puggested that this was rather lower in other Member States. However, such evidence
may merely reflect the importance of multinational companies in the United Kingdom
and the consequent import of technology from parent companies. This evidence is there-
fore inconclusive. Moreover, aids to encourage research and development, particularly if
concentrated, as the United Kingdom intended, on developrnent and related activities,
would be expected to have a particularly direct effect on comPetition in this industry,
where the technical characteristics and performance of products are an irnportant facet
of competition. j i
A low level of profitability is common in this industry and may reflect the intensity of
competition and management deficiencies in small companies. Nevertheless, inadequate
profitability poses obvious problems for financing investment whether from internal
sources or from the capital market, particulady for United Kingdom comPanies of Euro-
pean origin, whose profitability is in general lower than that of the United Kingdom
iudustrv as a whole.
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An increasing proportion of the United Kingdom's trade in the products of this industry
is with the other Member States. More detailed analyses tended to confirm the Commis-
sion's provisional conclusion that the proposed aids could adversely affect trade between
Mernber States.
211. In the light of this analysis the United Kingdom Government decided to revise its
original proposals and informed the Commission of the following modifications:
(i) aids would not be available for product dwelopment or for restructuring; the
scheme would be limited to investment aids;
(ii) the budget for the scheme would therefore be reduced to UKL t0 million; and
(iii) priority under the scheme would be given to companies of European origin and
there would be encouragement for collaboration between United Kingdom and
other Community companies.
212. The Commission considered that these modifications met the objections it had had
to the original proposal. In particular, there was a justification for aids to encourage
investment by the industry and the new proposal would involve aids being focused on
that part of the industry, cornpanies of European origin, where this justification was
strongest. Moreover, in view of the more limited form and extent of the proposed aids
and of the encouragement to be given to collaboration befween United Kingdom and
other Community companies, any effects on trade would be much smaller than the Com-
mission had originally feared and would not be such as to be contrary to the common
interest.
The Commission therefore decided to close the procedure of Article 93(2).
DlecEonic conponent
2L3. Demand for electronic components has grown rapidly as their use has become
increasingly widespread in the fields of. data processing, telecommunications, consumer
goods and industrial equipment, public health and transport. Technical progress in the
industry is rapid, especially in the case of active components, and manufacturers there-
fore need to recoup their substantial research and development exPenditures by selling on
alarge scale before their products become obsolete.
In certain third countries the industry has been supported by Government research and
development contracts, by large Government orders for military or other PurPoses as
well as by more direct aids. Some of these countries' firms have reaped the benefits of
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large scale production and have used this advantage to establish a degree of technical
superiority in the manufacture of the most advanced components.
Community firms are therefore at a certain competitive, disadvantage in this industry, in
particular in the case of active components, and there is a danger that this may constitute
a handicap for user industries as the component manufacturers of third countries expand
into the manufacture of equipment using their components and thus enter into competi-
tion with their customers. In these circumstances, security of supply is also an important
consideration particulady in periods of peak demand for certain tlpes of component.
A number of Member States therefore grant aids to the industry especially for research
and developrnent. The Commission's position on the (]erman Government's aid scheme
f,or this sector was described in a previous report.l In the Commission's view the Com-
tnunity indusrtry will only be able to overcome its cornpetitive handicap with State sup-
port, but such support should be coordinated at the Community level so as to avoid a
duplication of the efforts to individual Member States.
214. As in other Member States the industry faces two principal and interrelated prob-
lems in the lJnited Kingdom: the difficulty of financing research and developmeot and
an excessivel;r fragmented stftlcture. The United Kingdom Government therefore decided
to intervene to aid the industry to overcome these difliculties with a vievr to making it
viable in competition with producers in third countries.
The aid scheme proposed by the United Kingdom Government would have a total budget
of UKL 25 rnillion, of which UKL 15 million would be avaiiable to support the design,
development and production launching of new products and key process materials or
production technologies and would be in the form of either a 2)/6 grant or of a shared-
cost contract with a levy on subsequent sales. The remaining UKL 10 million would be
used to aid ntionalization and restructuring projects by, means of concessionary loans or
interest relief grants. \7here fixed investment was associated with expendirure on pro-
jects eligible for either category of aid, grants would be available at a tate of 2O/6 for
new equipment, plant and machinery and L1/o for nerv buildings and for extensions or
modifications to buildings.
The Commission considered that the United Kingdorn's proposal was in line with the
needs of the Communify industry on the basis of its own diagnosis of the industry's
problems, and could therefore be regarded as compatible with the common interest. It
requested the, United Kingdom Government to focus its intervention under the scheme
on European based firms since the financing problerns of these firms are particulady
serious.
t Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points l2O and l2l.
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Ferrous and non-terrous lounding
Nefterlands and Uniterl Kingdom
2t-5. Founding is a metal-casting process which produces a wide variety of finished and
semi-finished castings in either ferrous or non-ferrous metals, the principal non-ferrous
metals used being copper, zinc and aluminium and their alloys. These castings are com-
ponents sold in widely different markets principally in the engineering and allied indus-
tries. The foundry industry thus occupies an important place in the economy,
Since most castings have to be produced to meet the particular requirements of individual
customers, foundries and their customers have to work closely together. This factor has
led some customers to establish their own integrated foundry op€rations and, together
with the normally high weight: value ratio and consequently relatively high transport
costs of castings, has meant that foundries, and especially the independent foundries,
tend to be small and to serve predominantly local markets. They have therefore enjoyed
some nafural protection from competition, but their dependence on the forfunes of a
small number of customers makes them particulady susceptible to the effects of cyclical
fluctuations in the level of economic activity. The latter factor has affected the profita-
biliiy of foundries and has in consequence reduced investment to very low levels, parti-
cularly for independent foundries; the integrated foundries haye been able to draw on
the larger financial resources of the groups to which they belong. Integrated foundries
have the further advantage that the managerial resources available to them are also more
extensive.
The obsolescence of many buildings and of much plant and equipment used by foundries
affects not only their productivity but also their ability to meet cus,tomer requirements for
more sophisticated castings. Moreover, founding is a process which involves generally
unpleasant working conditions so that foundries have difficulties in attracting and retain-
ing manpower; i also pollutes the environment and foundries are therefore being
increasingly required to meet the costs of stricter anti-pollution regulations.
216, Bor these reasons the Commission considers that there is some justification for aids
to the foundry industry. Moreover, for the reasons outlined above (the need for custom-
ers to be in close contact with foundries and the relatively high transport costs of cast-
ings) international trade in castings is relatively limited: typical export figrres are of the
order of 5/o of production and irnports generally account for a similar percentage of
apparent consumption. The effect of any aids, provided that they are kept within reason-
able limits, on competition between the industries in the different Member States and on
intra-Community trade is therefore much srnaller than would be the case for other sec-
tors. These arguments, however, have greater force in the case of independent foundries
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than in the cas,e of integrated foundries. For the latter, the justification for aid is limited
by the larger rnanagerial and financial resources available to them and there is some risk
that any aids would have a greater effect on competition and trade between Member
States in the products in which the castings are incorporated.
The commissjion's position on three aid schemes, those for ferrous foundries in the
tNethedands and for ferrous and non-ferrous foundries in the United Kingdom, was
based on these considerations.
217. The Nethedands Government informed the Commission of its intention to intro-
duce an aid scheme for the ferrous foundry industry in order to eocourage the restructur-
ing of the industry, to improve its financial position and to protect the environment. The
scheme provided for aids to be given to promote the implementatton of. the restructuring
plan for the industry, which had been approved by the Netherlands Government. Grants
at a rate of 2CtVo would be available for investment expenditure and associated prepara-
tory work anil at a rate of. 25/o f.or investment to reduce pollution. Grants of 2OVo
would also be provided towards the costs of employing consultants to improve comPany
organization. Iiinally, there was also provision for State guarantees to be given on loans
where funds available would otherwise be inadequate. 'The budgetary allocation to the
scheme was to be HFL 31 million.
The Commissj:on considered that these proposals were generally in line with its own
analysis of the, industry's situation and problerns, but that the scheme should be concen-
trated on independent rather than integrated foundries so as to bring it more into line
v/ith this analysis and that the consultancy grants should only be available for small and
rnedium-sized undertakings. The Netherlands Government having a.greed to the latter
request and to a limit on the total aids available under the scheme for any integrated
foundry, the Commission was able to indicate that it had no objections to the proposed
aid scheme.
218. Fot the s,ame reasons the Commission had raised no objections tc ihe United King-
dom's aid scherne for the ferrous foundry industry when it was introduced in 1975.
The scheme, .whose objectives were to encourage modr:rnization, restructuritrg and an
improvement in working conditions, provided for gtants at a rate of 25/o for investment
in new plant arnd equipment and at a rate of L5/o for investment in buildings. In addi-
tion loans on advantageous terms or equivalent interest relief grants were available
towards the cost of restructuring or rationalization. The scheme was allocate(l UKL 2t
million.
By the time lhe scheme closed at the end of t9l6 applications for aid had greatly
exceeded the number that had been anticipated. The United Kingdom Government
therefore infc,rmed the Commission in two stages of its intention to increase the
budgetary alloation to the scheme, first to UKL 40 million and then to UKL 95 million.
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The Commission examined these two successive increases in some depth since it was con-
cerned that aids granted on this scale might lead to an increase it capacity greater than
that warranted by market prospects. Such a development would call into question the
effectiveness of the aid scheme since it would oblige foundries to accept unremunerative
prices for their castings and thus tend to perpetuate the industry's financial problems and
threaten its viability. Moreover, such overcapacity could have evident effects on intra-
'Community trade. The fact that the vast bulk of the aids granted under the scheme had
been for investment in new plant and equipment and that very few restructuring projects
had been submitted served to increase the Commission's concern on this score.
Since all applications for aid had already been submitted it was possible to examine the
effects of the projects concerned on the industry's capacity in the light of an analysis of
the applications outstanding. On the basis of this analysis it was concluded that prospec-
tive capacity and demand would not be out of balance, since capacity increases in aided
foundries would be largely offset by the closure of other foundries.
The Commission therefore informed the United Kingdom Government that it had no
objections to the two increases in the budgetary provision for the scheme.
219. The United Kingdom Government also informed the Commission of an aid scheme
it planned to introduce for the non-ferrous foundry industry. This scheme had the same
objectives as that for ferrous foundries and the aids were to be provided in the same
forms for the same purposes. In addition provision was made in the case of small and
medium-sized firms for consultancy grants to meet 5O/o of the costs of investigating
f,irms' problems and formulating proposals for improving productivity and efficiency.
The budget for the scheme was UKL 20 million.
As in the case of the Nethedands Government's scheme for the ferrous foundry indus-
try, the Commission's principal concern was that this scheme should be focused on the
independent foundries. The United Kingdom Government having modified its original
proposal so as to set a limit on aids available under the scheme f.or any integrated foun-
dries, the Commission indicated that it had no objection to the proposed aid scheme
being put into effect.
Aids tinanced by quasi-tiscal charges
France: Clock and watch intlusfy
220. ln the Commission's v,iew an aid scheme which in itself gives rise to no objections
is nevertheless incompatible with the common market if the aids are financed by quasi-
fiscal charges levied not only on the domestic products of the industry concerned but also
COMP. REP. EC 1977
1t8 COMPBTTI'ION POIJCY AND GoVERn*MENT ASSISTANCE
on competing imports from the other Member States. T.his view, the reasons for which
are set out in prrevious reports,l was confirmed by the Court of Justice in its Judgment of
25 June L970 in Case 47 /69.
The Commission has therefore acted on a number of occasions to ensure that in cases
where aid schemes, to which it has no objections as such, are financed by quasi-fiscal
charges, these charges are not levied on products imported from other Member States.
Thus, in L973, it had required the French Government to modify in this way the basis
on which it levied the quasi-fiscal charge used to finance industrial research establish-
ments in the cl,ock and watch and leather and hide industris5.z
22L. Following a complaint the Commission was led to examine a Decree of 28 March
1977s promulgated by the French Government by which the latter had instituted a new
aid scheme for the clock and watch industry financed by a quasi-fiscal charge whose
proceeds are allocated to the industry's research establishrnent and to its trade association.
The French (iovernment had not, as required by ihe Trcaty, given the Commission
advance notification of its intention to introduce this aid scheme.
The quasi-fiscal charge is levied on all commercial transactioos in products of the clock
and watch industry, including products imported from other Member States.
The Commission therefore decided to initiate the proceclure of Article 93(z) in respect
of this aid scheme in order to oblige the French Government to exempt products
imported fromL the other Member States from the charge. At the same time it reminded
the French Gc,vernment that it should suspend all levies on products imported from the
other Member States irrespective of the stage at which they were collected and reserved
its right to require reimbursement of any amounts alrcady collected on these products.
S 4 
- 
Genelal ald schemes
222. Ptevious reports on competition policya have descrilrcd the characteristics of general
aid schemes, the main features of national systems falling under this heading and the
Commission's reasons for considering that it is necessary for it to monitor them in
advance (prior notification of both industry and regional programmes or, failing this,
1 First Report on Competition Policy, points 181 to 183; Second Report on Competition Policy,
points 108 to 111; Third Report on Competition Policy, points 102 to 104.
2 Fourth Report oo Competition Policy, point 162.
3 No 77-348; Joumal officiel de la R6publique franEaise of !.4.t977, p. 1832.
a Second Report on Competition Policy, point Ll6 et seq; Third Report on Competition Policy,
point 112 e, req; Fovrth Report on Competition Policy, poirrt 166 et seq; Fifth Report on Com-
petition Policy, point L31 et rcq.
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significant individual cases of application). This monitoring procedure now applies to all
general aid schemes in the nine Member States. In L977 the Commission also stated its
views on new measures introduced bv fwo Member States.
Signiticant cases of application ol general aid schemes
223. In addition to certain industry schemes introduced in the Member States under their
general schemes and described in this report in the section on aid schemes for specific
industries, the Commission examined some forty significant individual cases in 1977.
The following table shows the Member States and industries concerned.
Number of caset examined General aid scltemes
Belgium 10 Acts of 17 Jaly L959
and 30 December 19701
Denmark 2
Federal Republic of Germany 0
France 2 Economic and Social
Development Fund
(FDES),
Ireland 0
Italy B Act No 464 of
B August 19723
Luxembourg 1 Act for the promotion
of economic expansiona
Netherlands 0
United Kingdom 12 Industry Act 1972
Industries
Chemicals and plastics
Mechanical engineering
Building materials
Foodstuffs
Shipbuilding and ship-repair
Textiles and clothing
Others (including one service
entelprise)
r Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points Lj5 
^nd 
tj6.
2 Third Report on Competition Policy, points 113 and 114.3 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 168.
+ Third Report on Competition Policy, points I20 to 125.
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224. The Commission raised no objection to the planned measures in most of these
cases. However, four cases concefning Belgium, Italy Irnd the United Kingdom caused
certain difficulties.
The Commission could agree to aid for the telecommunications industry only after
intensity had been reduced. Given the considerable overcapacity in the domestic appli-
ances industry, a proposal concerning the extension of a firm caused certain problems;
following the Commission's objections the Member State concerned abandoned the
proposed ass:istance.
In the last hvo cases, the Commission initiated the procedure of Article 91(2) of rhe
EEC Treaty. 'fhese concerned:
(i) aid to rescue a shipbuilding and repair yard; it was a stop-gaP measure not accom-
panied try measures to ensure the yard's viability or its conversion to other activities;
(ii) assistance for a major manufacturer of domestic appliances and textile machinery;
this assistance would have increased the Community capacity in the industry, where
there was already an excess. The initial scheme was amended to avoid increase in
capacity and the procedure was finally closed.
Italy
225. In October 1976 the Italian Government informed the Commission of a Bill
reorganizing assistance for the restructuring and conversion of industrial firms. This Bill
has since pasised into law as Act No 675 of L2 August L977,1 and forms part of the
Italian Govetnment's programme to re-establish overall economic equilibrium (fight
qgainst inflation, measures to improve the balance of payments) by renewing industrial
structures anrl thereby reinforcing industry's competitiveness and reducing the country's
dependence on imports, The Act mainly provides for setting up a new Interministerial
Committee on Industrial Policy (CIPI) to give greatc:r consistency to industrial policy
and an Industrial Restructuring and Conversion Fund.
The Ministry' for Industry would be responsible for the Fund; it was to be granted LIT
2 630 thousand million for four years and would replace the various previous acts on
,assistance for the stune purpose which were to be repealed: Act No 1470 concerning
firms in difficulties,'? Act No ll0L concerning the reorganization and conversion of the
a Gazzetta Ufficiale No 253 of 7.9.t977.
2 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 148i Gazzetta Ufficiale of 24.1..1962,p.339.
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textile industryl and Acts Nos 464 and 184 (Title I) on the restructuring atd reorganiza-
tion of firms,2 on which the Commission had previously stated its position.
The Fund would provide assistance for the restructuring and conversion of existing firms
and the creation of new industrial plant in the Mezzogiorno in consideration for the
closure of plants inadequately developed areas in central and northern Italy. At least
4O/o of the sum allocated to the Fund would be earmarked for the Mezzogiorno.
226. Assistance from the Fund would be granted in the form of:
(i) low-interest loans covering no more than 3O/o of the cost of projects, granted for
up to fifteen years with a five-year period of grace for projects in the Mezzogiorno
and ten years with a three-year period of grace for projects elsewhere;
(ii) interest relief grants covering no more than 7o/o of the cost of projects in the
Mezzogiorno and 40 to 60/6 of projects elsewhere. The maximum period of grant
was to be the same as for the loans. If combined with low-interest loans. the maxi-
mum ceilings still applied.
Combination with other types of assistance for industry would be possible only in the
case of grants under Act No 183 of 2 May L976 f.or the development of the Mezzo-
giorno.
Eligibility for the proposed assistance was to be defined later under the intemention
progftlmme for certain sectors and industries to be drawn up by the new Interministerial
Committee (CIPI).
227. The Commission welcomed the new Act's rationalization of Italian Eeasures of
assistance for industrial restructuring and conversion. However, it constituted a general
aid scheme and terms of eligibility were not cleady defined. In accordance with previous
decisions on general aid schemes in all Member States, in December 1975 the Commis-
sion initiated the procedure of Article 93(Z) of the EEC Trcaty, requesting the Italian
Government for prior notification, as in the case of previous general aid schemes with
similar objectives, of :
(i) programmes for specific industries to be defined by the new Interministerial
Committee (CIPI) or, failing this;
1 Second Report on Competition Poliry, point 98i Gazzetta TJffjciale of 23.72.1-97I, p. 8170.2 Second Report on Competition Policy, points l]9 to 724;Gazzett^ Ufficiale of 23.5.1972,p.59j4;
Gazzetta Ufficiale ol 28.4.197t, p. 2466; Fourth Reporl on Competition Policy, point 163; Fifth
Report on Competition Policy, point 148.
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(ii) significant cases of application concerning individual firms, i.e. cases involving aided
investrnent up to 3 000 000 EUC or aid intens:ity of up to L5/o in net Srant
equivale:nt of the amount of aided investment, without any reference to the amount
of th. Ittt.t.
The Act also provided financing for the Fund for App,lied Research (LIT 600 million)
to promote r<'search and development projects in industrial firms, on which the Commis-
sion had taken a favourable decision in L972. The Commission felt that it should stand
by its favourable attitude to assistance to promote firms' research and development.r
228. ln Nov,ember 1977 the Italian Government forma.lly undertook to comply with the
Commission'ti request and provide prior notification of :
(i) decisions whereby the Interministerial Committee (CIPI) determines the branches
of industry which it considers qualify for assistance;
(ii) progrannmes for specific industries which the CIPI approves in this connection
laying clown criteria and procedures for granting assistance from the Fund;
(iii) the annual prograrnme for the distribution of finance from the fund and the guide-
lines on. the specific industries and geographical arr:as eligible for assistance.
(iv) As rega.rds applications for assistance from the Fund for individual proiects falling
outside the industry programmes, the Italian Government emphasized that this type
of aid u'as not covered by Act No 675.
In view of the Italian Government's undertakings, the Commission decided to close the
procedure of Article 93(z) of the EEC Treaty.
United Kingrlom: National Ente4rrise Boaril
229. The Commission examined the clauses of the Industry Act L975 dealing with the
establishmenrt and operation of the National Enterprise Board (NEB) in the light of
Article 92 et seq of the EEC Trcaty. This Act extends certain provisions of the Industry
Act L972 which sets out the conditions in which the British Government may provide
financial assistance to develop and modernize British industry, improve its efficiency or
provide supp,ort for production capacity in a particular sector or firm. The various types
of financial assistance provided are outlined in two Sections of the Act: Section 7 con-
cerning the ,:levelopment of certain regions and Sectio:n 8 concerning government inter-
vention outside these regions. The Commission considers Section 8 as a general aid
1 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points L7l to t74.
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scheme and the British Government has undertaken to observe the Commission's moni-
toring procedures on general aid schemesl of this type where both Section 7 and Section 8
are used for rescue measures for certain firms.
230. The National Enterprise Board (NEB) was set up to provide the British Govern-
ment with greater scope for intervention with the aim of. regenerating British industry.
The NEB's Purposes are 'the development or assistance of the economy of the United
Kingdom or any part thereof','the promotion... of industrial efficiency and interna-
tional competitiveness'and'the provision, maintenance or safeguarding of ... employ-
ment'. In attaining these aims, the NEB's functions are to establish, maintain, develop,
Promote or assist industrial firms; to promote or assist the reorganization or development
of certain sectors; to extend public ownership into profitable areas of manufacturing
industry; to take over and manage publicly owned firms and those that are taken over.
Upon the authorization and instruction of the British Government the NEB m y grant
the assistance provided under Sections 7 and 8 of the Industry Act L972. To carry out its
tasks the NEB may acquire shareholdings in firms, form bodies corporate or partnerships,
grant loans to firms or provide guarantees for loans contracted with others.
The NEB's funds were initially fixed at UKL 700 million which could be brought up to
UKL 1 000 million, constituted by Treasury loans taken from the National Loans Fund,
the body responsible for all State loans and public dividend capital taken from funds
provided by Padiament. The NEB can also borrow funds, guaranteed by the Treasury.
As regards the rate of return obtained by the NEB, from the funds made available to it,
the Secretary of State determines 'the financial duties of the Board and different determi-
nations may be made in relation to different assets and activities of the Board'.
The NEB is a statutory body; members are appointed and dismissed by the Secretary of
State for Industry, who lays down general guidelines (published after consultation with
Padiament) and also 'directions of a general or specific character'.
231. The Commission's scrutiny of the NEB's functions, powers and funds revealed
that its objectives were consistent with the definition of a general aid scheme outlined in
its Second Report on Competition Policy.2 It covered the same ground as Section 8 of
the Industry Act L972 considered as constitutin g a general aid scheme.
In practice the NEB is subject to the authority of the Secretary of State for Industry since
he appoints and dismisses members of the Board, issues general and specific guidelines
and directives, determines general or specific financial duties and provides funds.
r Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 146.
2 Point 116 of this Report.
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The Board obtains funds at concessionary interest rates--whether public borrowings
through the .National Loans Fund, borrowings guararLteed by the Treasury or public
dividJnd capital without fixed costs or interest rates. Intervention in firms could there-
fore include a.ssistance. Firms qualifying for intervention cor.rld receive such assistance if
they had not been able to obtain sufficient equivalent funds at that time from normal
commercial clmnnels or could have obtained them only by agreeing to a higher rate of
interest.
However, countering this argument is the British Gover:nment's affirrnation ituring talks
on the NEB .with the Commission that it would be an independent body, managed on a
commercial basis under an obligation to look for an adequate rate of return on its oPera'
tions. These intentions have been put into effect in some of the general guidelines
already given to the Board by the British Government.
232. In view of the foregoing the Commission considered that a distinction should be
made betweenL the various principal types of NEB intervention.
As regards the NEB's routioe operations, i.e. those undertaken at its own initjative under
the general guidelines: shareholdings in the capital of industrial firms and/or loans or
guarantees, t}e Commission asked the British Governnrent for an annual rePort giving
full details of its operations. The Commission took two factors into consideration when
rnaking its request:
In the past Commission decisions, for example in the cases of GEPI (Italy) and IDI
(France)t involving the acquisition of capital of certain firms, the Commission con-
sidered that jn principle this type of intervention could not a priori be classed as State
aid, since Arrticle 222 of the EEC Treaty allows for puLblic ownership. Generally speak-
ing, a shareholding can only be classed as a State aid or considered equivalent 4 porte'
riiri: if. for e:<ample sustained losses are writteo off by the State or if systematic provision
of assistance follows on from the original acquisition. The Commission can therefore
decide whether shareholdings by bodies like the NEB have the effect of assistance only
by scrutinizing its actual activities. It can then decide whether conditions and restrictions
shouid be imposed in the future.
Similady, the loans and guarantees granted to certain firms;, with or without sharehold-
ings, could, depending on the procedure used, also constitute aids. The funds to which
the NnS will have access could constitute aid, for it could use funds costing less than
those used by similar bodies with no State support. \Thether or not this advantage is
passed on to certain firms will depend on the public authorities' handling of the NEB's
1 Second Report oo Competition llolicy, point 122 et seq'
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financial duties. Only after actual NEB operations have been terminated will it be pos-
sible to determine whether these loans and guarantees involve an element of assistance.
i'Ihe second principal type of NEB intervention will take place under the specific direc-
tions given by the Secretary of State for Industry under Section 7 of the Industry Act
1975; these cannot be considered without reference to the Secretary of State's power to
adjust the NEB's f.inancial duties according to its funds and activities. His instructions
could compel the NEB to undertake unprofitable measures including State aid.
For this reason the Commission requested that all NEB operations undertaken following
specific directions should be notified in advance.
Finally, the Commission stressed that as regards cases of assistance under Sections 7 and
8 of the Industry Act 1972 of which the British Government had undertaken to notify
the Commission in advance, the undertaking should also be respected in all cases where
assistance was to be granted whether through the NEB or by the Secretary of State for
Industry himself. The Commission also requested the British authorities to inform it of
all general or specific directions or guidelines on financial duties given to the NEB.
S 5 
- 
Aids to employment
233. In order to combat unemployment and restore economic growth, after first trying to
improve guaranteed benefits for the jobless and sometimes making firms avoid redun-
dancies, the Member States made use of assistance for job creation, and occasionally on
job preservation.l
National assistance for job creation covers either all job seekers or certain categories only
(the young, the handicapped, those over a certain age). It may take the form of pre-
miums or of relief from certain social or tax liabilities; the State takes over part of the
wage costs incurred for newly-recruited workers which employers would normally have
to bear.
The system is introduces for a limited period of time and as a percentage of wage costs;
it is sometimes paid as a lump sum on recruitment, but the payments or relief may also
continue for a certain period after recruitment.
234. Cefiain doubts persist as to the real economic and social consequences of these
premiums.
r Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points ti7 to t47.
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They may cauLse employers to bring forward recruitment in times of uncertain demand
when they miight otherwise postpone it. They are also aPt to restore a certain balance
befween relative costs of labour and investment, for certain aspects of labour costs often
upset this balance on account of tax and social legislation or assistance to Promote invest-
ment. rVhen they only cover certain categories of workers they offset some of their
handicaps. But they are likely, especially when granted f,cr a lengthy period, to encourage
firms to adopt labour-intensive methods which, in the light of the wodd labour market,
are unlikely to ensure Community prosperity. They can also artificially maintain uncom-
petitive production by delaying necessary modernization:, this is the main problem caused
by aids to preserve employment. Finally, they can-in certain conditions of demand-
have a displacement effect; it is therefore difficult to assess their positive contribution
to the employment situation for it is hard to evaluate the extent to which job creation or
preservation jn certain Member States, certain industries (notably those in difficulty),
certain firms or cefiain categories of workers is similarly offset by the disappearance or
failure to crr:ate corresponding jobs in other Member States, other firms or other
categories of rvorkers.
In view of the problems and the features peculiar to each system the Commission has
taken decisions, as in past years, on various new measures taken by the Member States
and expressed its concern on the effects of an existing system.
lreland: Aids to employment in larming and industry
235. ln June L975 the Irish Government introduced an aid scheme to improve the
employment situation; the Commission initially raised no objection to the scheme.l In
June the Irish Government informed the Commission that it had decided to extend the
scheme and slightly amend its terms from 28 February Lt77 Io 28 February t978.
Under the ne'w terms employers increasing their staff oler a reference period will receive
for each person out of work recruited, a premium of :
(i) IRL 10 per week for a young person under twenty having left school at least four
months previously;
(ii) IRt 20 per week for a young person of twenty or over out of work for over four
weeks anLd having received unemployment benefit.
The premium is to be paid for twenty-four weeks for eaclh worker.
IRL 4 100 000 was set aside for the scheme, affecting 10 000 to 15 000 workers.
1 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 147.
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The assistance was only to be granted for a limited period (six months) for each v/orker.
Moreover, of all Member States Ireland has the worst unemployment problem, 9.4/o of
the working population without jobs as against 5,1./o f.or the Community as a whole.
The Commission accordingly raised no objection to the extension of this scheme.
United Kingdom: Employment subsidies tor young workers
236. To attenuate the difficulties of many young workers seeking jobs, towards the end
of L975 the British Government introduced a system of premiums to encourage
employers to take on young workers under the Employment and Training Act L973.
The Commission raised no objection to these measures when first introduced.l
The scheme was to expire on 31 August and the British Government decided to extend
it until 31 March 1978. The subsidy is paid at the rate of UKL 10 per week for twenty-
six weeks and covers all young unemployed people under twenty. Extending the scheme
required UKL 4., million additional funds and affected 20 000 young people.
These employment subsidies for young people are apt to offset sorne of the drawbacks
in their recruitment i.e. lack of experience and inadequate training for jobs offered them.
They are likely to counterbalance employers'preferences for other categories of workers
and their usefulness cannot be questioned.
The Commission therefore raised no objection to this extension, particularly since it was
in line with the fourth medium-term economic policy programme2 advocating the grant-
ing of allowances for on-the-job training or measures to help unskilled young people.
United Kingdom: Temporary employment subsidy - fES
237. ln the Fifth Report on Competition Policy,a the Commission stated that it had no
objection to the introduction of a temporary employment subsidy (TES) by the United
Kingdom. The system was to apply for twelve months to firms who would otherwise
have to make workers redundant and the subsidy was to be paid at the rate of UKL 10
per week for twenty-six weeks to keep in employment groups of fifty workers or more.
Roughly UKL 7 million was allocated for the scheme.
on account of the very rapid increase in United Kingdom unemployment, the commis-
sion felt that the system could be considered compatible with the common market as
aid 'to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of the Member State'.
r Buil. EC r2-r975, point 2l)2; Pifth Report on Competition Policy, point 145.
2 OJ L rol of 25.4.7977.
o Point 145 of this Report.
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The scheme has been extended on a number of occasions. Payments under the scheme
have been doubled to UKL 20 per worker per week fc,r twelve months with a possible
further extension 
"tar^te of IJKL 10 
(eighteen monthrs in all). It may be applied until
31 March 19,78 and paymeats under allocation for decisions taken before that date
could extend it until March L979. Funds allocated for the flES were raised to UKL 43L
million.
238. ln accordance with Article 93(1) of the EEC T'reaty, which requires it to keep
all existing aid systems under constant review, the Commission monitored application of
the scheme.
Statistics supplied by the British authorities from June 197'/ revealed that the payments
were being increasingly concentrated on certain sectors, already covered by other British
aid schemes,' and hard hit in all the Member States, mainly textiles, clothing and foot-
wear. Althou,gh they only account f.or 4.2/o of UK jobs, these three sectors have alone
received half the payments (over UKL 200 million). This amount far exceeds funds
earmarked under all other industry schemes applied in the Communify. Out of the
18t 000 wodrers now covered by the scheme, 92ooo are working in these three sectors:
(i) in textiles 8.5/o of the workforce is affected (I7.3% in cotton weaving); the
assistance accounts for roughly 3O/o of wage costs l:or the workers covered and
6/6 of. turnover for plants employing them;
(ii) in clottLing, L2.8% of the workforce is concerned (22/o in women's and girls'
outerwear); the assistance accounts for 40/o of. wage costs and LO/6 of hlmover;
(iii) in foot,vear, 6.3/o of the workforce is concerned.; the assistance amounts to 33Vo
of wage costs and 6/o of turnover.
This concentr:ation has given cause for concern in a number of Member States. It gave
rise to a recent question in the European Padiament.2 Oomplaints were seot to the Com-
mission by trade associations in many other Member States which considere<I they were
seriously harnned.
239. The nallure of the scheme has been changed since it was introduced. It was set up
as a short-term counter-cyclical instrument and intended. to encourage firms to keep their
workers off the unemployment register, but now has the effect of maintaining in pro-
duction a la:rge proportion of fitms in industries that are declining throughout the
Communitv.
Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 153 to 155; Fifth Report on Competition Policy,
points 107 to 109; Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 223.
Written Question No 721/77.
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Although the recipient employer does not benefit from the assistance----owing to the
fact that he has to keeo on the workers for whom he receives it-he can still maintain
all or part of his produciion thanks to the artificial reduction in labour costs.
In contrast to existing job creation assistance in the United Kingdom and certain other
Member States, TES is a purely stop-gap aid. Since it is granted on the basis of the
number of existing jobs maintained, it enables certain industries with excess capacity to
carry on with uncompetitive production. Its negative consequences are twofold:
(i) it does not really help to solve the problems of the recipient firms and plants, but
simply postpones their solution. It makes no mention of encouraging recipient firms
to restructure ot reorganize to adapt to market conditions;
(ii) it exerts a depressive influence on the markets, production and employment situa-
tion of uncompetitive firms not receiving assistance both in the United Kingdom
and other Member States.
As regards employment, the British authorities acknowledge that the assistance has a
displacement effect, i.e. the fact that jobs maintained in recipient firms are artificial-
ly offset by the disappeararce of failure to create jobs in other firms; this may be
quantified at 33/o on the United Kingdom scale alone without taking account of
job displacement in other Member States. If the Community as a whole is consider-
ed, and if attention is confined solely to industries in difficulty, the main recipients
of the system, the positive contribution maCe by this aid to the employment situa-
tion at Community level must be virtually or even non-existent, for the TES merely
transfers unemployment from the United Kingdom to the other Member States.
From an industrial standpoint, assisiance thus granted to production in these sec-
tors under pressure is in manifest conflict with the Commission's previous rulings
imposed on other Member States, notably in cases concerning textiles. Its principlesl
exclude the grant of purely stop-gap aids since, in view of the sector's difficult
situation throughout the Community, all they achieve is to transfer difficult business
situations from one Member State to another.
240. The Commission therefore took action in respect of this scheme, both in view of the
above considerations and, more particulady, because there was information to suggest
that the British authorities intended to maintain the system in some form or other after
its planned expiry date (31 March 1978).
As required by Article 93(t) of the EEC Treaty it requested the British Government to
take without &lay certain 'appropriate measures' concerning application of the scheme
1 Third Report on Competition Policy, point 101; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 156
and 1.57; Fifth Report on Competition Poliry, points 10J and 106; Sixth Report on Competition
Policy, poiot 222.
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required by the functioning of the common market since, in the case of a proposed ex'
tension of the, scheme beyond the above date not taking account of these 'appropriate
measures', it rvould be obliged to initiate the procedure of Article 93(2) of the EEC
Treaty in respect of the proposal.
These appropriate measures concern the following main changes: finding a way of avoid-
ing undue concentration on any one sector; amending procedures to remove the purely
stop-gap aspects; prior notification to the Commission of significant cases of application.
241. It must be stressed that the Commission's action takes account of the scheme's
social repercussions. It does not object to the scheme as a rvhole, but feels that certain
restrictions sh,ould be introduced on its application in :industries which throughout the
Community are experiencing the same social and industrial problems. It is true that un-
employment rirtes have increased sharply in the United Kingdom, but trends have been
similar in other Member States; the job situation in the Utnited Kingdom is no worse than
elsewhere in the Community.
The Commission's aim is therefore to eliminate the scheme's negative sectoral conse-
quences which cause undue displacement of industrial and employment difficulties from
the United Kingdom to other Member States without any improvement in the overall
Community situation. The proposed restrictions should allow the scheme's really positive
social advantal;es to be maintained.
S 6 
- 
Aids tro exports
242. The Commission restated its views on the granting rcf export aids in its Sixth Report
on Competition Policy.l It considers that this type of asr;istance is incompatible with the
general principles of a common market in which a customs union has existed since
1968, and particulady with free movement, in that a Member State can in this way
artificially boost its sales in other Community countries. These aids cannot qualify for
derogation whatever their intensity, form, grounds or purpose. This view was confirmed
by the Court of Justicez in its Judgme^t of L969 on Frerech preferential rediscount rates.
The Commissiion confirmed this general position when on t4 March L977 a decision
was adopted at the 439th Council meeting on the guidelines to be applied to credits for
exports to non-member countries. The Commission made a statement to the effect that
it had always considered export aids granted by Member States in intra-Community trade
as incompatible with the common market within the meraning of Article 92 of the EEC
r Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 241.
2 Joined Cases (i and Lr/69: U969) ECR 523.
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Trcaty. The decis,ion, based on Article tll and concerning credits for exPorts to non-
member countries, did not affect this position. In particular it did not legitimate as-
sistance granted by Member States using the credit terms provided for by the decision
in their trade with other Member States. The Commission reserved the right to take the
measures required, pursuant to its powers under Article 92 o{ the Tteaty, to put an end
to such aids if they still existed or prohibit them if the Member States intended to intro-
duce any further aids.
243. ln L976 utofficial information both from national authorities and trade circles
indicated that certain Member States were disregarding the Commission's des and might
be applying in intra-Community trade aid schemes really designed to promote their ex-
ports to non-member countries.
In the difficult economic circumstances we are now facing (slack industrial activity,
considerable unemployment, surplus production capacity in many industries, and, in
many countries, imbalance in trade figures) to tolerate such Practices would amount to
allowing each Member State to seek to export part of its difficulties, notably its un-
employment, to other Member States and allowing the outbidding in export credit terms
which occurs on non-Community markets to spread to the Community market, which has
so far remained free of it, at least as regards the Member States.
Accordingly in September 1976 the Commission asked the Member States to confirm
within two months that they did not'either directly or indirectly make available funds
to reduce the cost of export credits for sales to other Member States or for products used
on the continental shelf'.
The explicit reference to the continental shelf (which is to be regarded as forming part
'of the territory of the Member States and is therefore subject to all the des of the
Treaty, notably those relating to State aid) was necessary sin6s-25 one of the appropriate
measures provided for in Article 93(L) of the EEC Treaty-the Commission had asked
the British Government to entitle installations manufactured in other Member States to
the assistance it granted to finance off-shore installations manufactured in the UK for
the exploitation of oil reserves in the UK continental shelf. \fhen refusing to exterid
the assistance, the British Government pleaded that, under cover of their export aid
schemes, certain Member States were granting similar assistance for supplies of such
installations to the UK continental shelf.
244, The sifuation after receiving replies from the Member States to the Commission's
letter was as follows:
Seven Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands) stated that they applied no measures to reduce the cost of credit on their sales to
the other l,[ember States (including their continental shelves).
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It appeared thrlt the situation in France did not comply $iith the Commission's principles.
The Banque liranEaise du Commerce Ext6rieur (BFCE) is a government agency, all the
shares being held directly or indirectly by the State; it has the function of promoting
export dealings between France and other countries notablly by:
(i) refinancing or financing long-term credits granted by suppliers to purchasers, the
requisite resources being raised partly by the Treasury in the form of loans and
partly by bank loans and bond issues; the rates of interest charged to the supplier or
purchaser depend on the scales set by the Minister for Economic and Financial
Affairs; lfie debit balance between the cost to the BFCE of the financial resources
it uses for this purpose and the proceeds of the interest it charges is macle good by
the Treasrury;
(ii) refinancing of bank loans (with the Treasury's agreemert and at Treasurl,determin-
ed interest rates) to suppliers or purchasers for the purposes of bridging loans
during the production of certain machinery fot export, (production and engineering
costs), this refinancing being granted by the BFCE: at rates corresponding to those
charged lby the banks from funds obtained by rediscounting at the Banque de
France, any shortfall being made up by the Treasury.
According to r:ertain budgetary papers these operations cost the Treasury FF 358 million
(64 million EUC) in L97t,FF 549 million (98 million EUC) in 1976 and FF 400 mil-
lion (71 million EUC) in L977.
After prolonged discussion the Ftench Government inf,rrmed the Commission by letter
dated 10 June that it had decided to settle the question by putting an end to these cuts in
rates granted bry the BFCE in the case of loans for sales in other Member States.
In the United Kingdom, the ECGD (Export Credits Guarantee Department) uses State
funds placed at its disposal to refinance or pay interest relief grants on medium and
long-term cre,Jit opened by banks to British exportersi at an interest rate set by the
Government. 'Ihe rate is calculated in such a way as to ensure that British products will
be competitiv€ on export markets; in September L976 it was 4.5 points below a reference
rate which the ECGD and the banks agreed to regard as the rate which would be available
on an unregulated financial market.
The Commission drew the British Government's attention to the contradiction befween its
theoretical position and application of the system in trad,e between Member States; it also
asked what measures were proposed to remedy this situa,tion. Proposals were accordingly
put before the Commission concerning terrnination ol' assistance for British sales to
other Member States. Certain problems have still to be, ironed out and discussions are
still in progress befween the British authorities and the Commission. A successful out-
come will probably be achieved early in 1!78.
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Aids to energy
245. The Commission stated its views on a number of cases concerning assistance for
the energy industry, notably assistance to oil refining, measures to promote more rational
use of energy and measures to diversify sources of energy used in the Community.
Belgium: Oil retining
246. The Commission Decision of 17 June 1975' specified that the Belgian Government
should inform the Commission in advance of cases implementing the Act of L7 J'iy 1959
'introducing and coordinating measures to encourage economic expansion and the creation
of new industry'. As required by this decision the Belgian Government informed the
Commission in June I976 of its intention to grant assistance for anti-pollution investment
by a major international oil company extending production capacity at one of its refineries
in Antwerp.
The extension work mainly consisted in modernizing the existing refinery and raising
distillation capacity from 4.5 to L3.5 million tonnes per year, investment amounting to
BFR 12 000 million. The Belgian Government had originally stated that of this amount
BFR 1 900 million covered the cost of environmental protection facilities. S7ork on mo-
dernization and extension was started in 1973 and, taking account of certain delays, the
new refinery vyas to commence operations in the summer of L976.
The proposed aid for this project was a 4/o interest relief grant for four years on
BFR 1 270 million, designed to reduce the cost of the environmental protection equip-
ment.
247. Io1973 the Commission had already raised objections to the Belgian Government's
intention to grant similar assistance for the same project and the establishment of a new
refinery at Kallo.2
The Belgian Government originally pianned to give assistance to the whole of the in-
vestment made by the Esso group to extend its Antwerp refinery. N7hen the Commis-
sion reacted by initiating the procedure of Article 93(Z) of the EEC Treaty, the Belgian
Government offered to confine the assistance to anti-pollution investment.
The Commission then concluded3 that even in these circumstances the assistance could
not be justified: neither as a regional aid, in view of the social and economic prosperity
of the Antwerp arcai nor as an industry aid in view of the sutplus refining capacity al-
r Decisicrn 75/397/EEC, OJ L r77 of 8.7.1975; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 135.
e Decision 73/295/EEC: OJ L 27O of 27.9.1973.
3 Third Report on Competition Policy, point 105.
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ready becoming evident in Belgium as elsewhere in the Community; nor as an envlfon-
menial aid, foifirms should normally be responsible for bearing the costs of eliminating
their own nuisances, unless they have difficulties in doing so and this may lead to serious
economic or social problems. By means of the abovementioned Decision therefore, the
Commission had ordered the Belgian Government not to grant the proposed assistance
for the project in question.
248. When in L976 the Commission initiated the procedure of Article 93(2) of the
EEC Treaty inL respect of the new project-which in many respects was exactly the same
as the previous pioject-it felt that there was no reason for changing its views. The
situation in the Antwerp region, which is still relatively ProsPerous, did not warrant the
assistance in its new form any more than in 1973; moreover, the oil refining industry in
tselgium and i:he Community was giving increasing cause for concern. In a Communica-
tion to the Council in March L977 concetning a Community aPProach to oil refining
problems in the Community, the Commission stressed that surplus distillation capacity
in the Community could be estimated at t4O million tonnes, or 75/e of tot.al existing
ctpacity, so thirt its L973 forecast was substantially outdatr:d.
On 6 November. L974a the Comrnission sent a memorandum to the Member States on
aCommunityapproachtoStateaidsinenvironmental.matters,statingthatassistance
should generally not be granted to investment for the establishment of new production
installations, i:he 'polluter pays' principle should be fully applied in such cases and if
such assistancr3 were granted to firms in operation on 1 January 1971 in cases involving
an increase in existing production capacity only that part of the investment that related
specifically to anti-pollution facilities could qualify.
In initiating the procedure the Commission felt that it was extremely important that these
principles be observed in an industry under Pressure, where the proportion of anti-
pollution investment tends to be quite large (16/o in th.is case). If the public authorities
were to subsiclize this investment in would be tantamount to contributing to the develop-
ment of production capacities in an industry where such development is contrary to the
cornmon interest.
249. The procedure continued and the Belgian Government submitted its comments,
stressing that from 1972, on account of new obligations imposed in respect of environ-
mental protection, either activities in Antwerp had to be discontinued, or processing
capacity greatly extended, since the cost of the requirecl anti-pollution investment could
not be arnortized by a production capacity of 4.5 million tonnes Per yeaf; the whole
operation could accordingly be compared to the adaptation of an existing firm without
reference to former and new capacity. Although the sum of BFR 1 900 million had
1 Fourth Report on Competition Policy' point 180'
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originally been put forward as representing the cost of anti-pollution equipment for the
new refinery, the true cost had had to be revised to BFR 4 i00 million.
The Commission however considered that:
(i) an oil company would not triple the capacity of art. aheady large refinery and invest
BFR 12 OOO million merely to comply with local environmental protection require-
ments;
(ii) in estimating the cost of the anti-pollution equipment at BFR 4 500 million, the
Belgian Government had included equipment worth more than BFR 3 000 million
to improve product quality (desulphurization, lead content); all refineries need such
equipment to meet standards required by public authorities and consumers both in
Belgium and elsewhere.
Bearing in mind the tripling of the refinery's capacity the Commission considered that
only one-third of the cost of the anti-pollution installations strictly speaking (i.e. BFR
1 300 million) could qualify for assistance to protect the environment and decided on
22 March 19771 that the proposed interest relief grant should be applied to no more
than BFR 460 million (instead of the BFR 1 270 million originally envisaged by the
Belgian Government).
In taking this decision the Commission considered that the rest of the assistance would
have borne part of the cost of investment required to extend refining capacity and, in
view of the refining industry's current situation, that such assistance-although not to
be allocated for all investments required for the extension but only certain equipment-
would adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Energy-saving aids
250. The energy crisis highlighted the need and the opporiunity for more efficient use
of energy in the Community, as regards both domestic and industrial consumption.
Despite the programme for the rational use of energy and various measures introduced
in the Community since L974, much greater efforts could be made to save energy.
Action in this respect can not only make a considerable contribution to the basic objec-
tive of reducing Community dependence on imported energy but also, as a secondary
effect, shmulate the economy by encouraging investment and thus job creation.
In certain cases, notably among small and medium-sized firms, it would appear that in
current economic circumstances the increase in energy prices has not in itself been suf-
1 Decision 77/26j/EEC: OJ L 80 of. 29.j.1977.
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ficient to stimulate adequate energy-saving efforts and that the State must offer financial
incentives to encourage firms to take the necessary steps without too much delay.
Beariog these considerations in mind and also the guidelines drawn up undet the Com-
munity energy policy,l the Commission took favourable decisions on a number of bills
providing for assistance for firms' investments in enertry-saving schemes. It considered
that such schemes qualified for exemption under Article 92 (3) (b) of the EEC Treaty as
'aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest', an
improvement in the Community's energy situation being; considered as constituting such
a project.
Denmark
2jL The Darrish Government notified the Commission of a series of Billsz concerning
the granting c,f assistance for properfy investments designed to save energy. These Bills
extended an aid scheme previously set up as part of a set of temPorafy measures taken by
the Danish Government in September L975 to reduce unemployment; the Commission
did not object to these measures when they were first introduced.s
The last of these Bills, which became Act No 477 of 14 September L977,4 raised the
total funds earmarked for financing this assistance to DKR 1 1J0 million (172 million
EUC), as agarinst an initial allocation of DKR 100 million. Half the amount was to be
used for invesrtments to improve residential property an,C half for investments in indus-
trial, commercial and farm buildings in operation before L974. The assistance would be
granted in the form of non-reimbursable cash grants for up to 30% of the cost of
investments, tlhe maximum amount in each individual cirse not exceeding DKR 100 000
(1r ooo EUC).
\7ork on heat insulation, improvement or rePlacement of heating systems and other
energy-saving measures qualify for the assistance and the scheme applies until 1980.
In its assessrnLent the Commission took account both of the provisional nature of the
scheme (the funds set aside for financing would have to be exhausted by 19s1) and the
relatively low maximum amount in each individual case, making the scheme above all
suitable for snrall and medium-sized firms.
1 Council Resol.utions of 17 September 1974 concerning a new r:nergy policy strategy for the Commu-
nity and of t7 December 1974 on a Community action programme on the rational utilization of
energy (OJ C lfi of 9.7.1975); Commission Communicatjion to the Council of 2, May-.L97,7
contiining a Community action programme for the rational use of energy (COM(77) 185 final).
2 Lovtidende A 1916, p. 1310 (Act No 44 0f 25.8.1976); Bull. EC rt-r976, point:.2122; Lov-
tidende A 1977, p. )22 (Act No 112 of 3o.3.r977).
a Fifth Report ,on Competition Policy, point 143.
a Lovtidende A, 1977, p. 1361.
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2J2. Neither did the Commission raise objection to a second BiIl, which becarne Act
No 261 of 8 June L977 providing investment grants to promote more rational use of
energy by replacing or modernizing manufacturing processes in manufacturing and craft
firms consuming large amounts of energy.
DKR 80 million (12.2 million EUC) has so far been earmarked for this assistance,
which may not exceed DKR 800 000 (120 000 EUC) in each individual case.
Netherlands
253, The Dutch Government notified the Commission of a similar Bill providing for
assistance in the form of premiums at the rate of 25/o of the cost of investment and a
rnaximum in any individual case of HFL 1 million (360 000 EUC). HFL 20 million
(7.2 million EUC) has been set aside for the scheme.
Firms' investment schemes saving considerable quantities of energy (plant for the ration-
al use of residual heat, thermo-electrical plant, plant exploiting solar energy and wind
power and any other system reducing energy consumption or required to distribute it)
qualify for assistance.
Applications for the premiums must be made by 15 December L977 and the plant rnust
come into operation in the year following the decision to grant it.
2i4. Another Dutch Bill provides for assistance for energy-saving demonstration pro-
jects. A sum of HFL 1 million (360 000 EUC) was earmarked to finance them in 1977.
These schemes qualify both for a gta t covering 25/o of. investment and engineering
costs and a special loan of up to 25% of these costs at an interest rate of 5/o, rcimburs-
able if the project should prove viable.
Firms or businessmen carrying out demonstration projects involving new energy-saving
appliances, equipment or techniques qualify for the assistance. The new development
must introduce a new technique not previously applied in the Nethedands, involve a
rnajor technological and economic risk and result in considerable energy savings. The
results must be published and available to all.
The Commission felt that the Bill complied with its energy policy guidelines and also,
since it was designed to promote demonstration projects concerning new energy-saving
techniques, with the guidelines of the 'proposal for a Regulation on the granting of
financial aids to demonstration projects in the field of energy-saving' submitted to the
Council by the Commission on 31 May L977.a In this proposal for a Regulation, the
1 COM(77) 187 final of 25.5.1977.
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Commission a.rgued that Community assistance was v/arranted for such demonstration
projects both because of the economic advantages that the introduction of new energy-
saving techniques could bring to society as a whole and of the technical and commercial
risks run by manufacturers and consumers. It also stressed that these projects aim to put
new energy-saving techniques on the market; while they differ, therefore, from research
and developrnent programmes aimed at the conception and design of new technologies,
they are a nahtral complement to them.
Moreover, sinr:e the amount set aside for the financing of the Dutch scherne is small, and
since the number of projects qualifying for the limited sums is also small, and in view of
the publicity g;iven to the results of the aided projects, *re assistance would not adversely
affect trading conditions.
Aids to diversify sources ol energy
25). The Commission also stated its views on bills designed to maintain or increase
diversification of Community energy sources, following the guidelines it advocates for
Community energy poiicy.
Italy: Solar energy
256. The Ital:ian Government inforrned the Commission of a bill concerning the Region
of Sicily designed to promote the utilization of solar energy. Certain grants are to be
awarded to eocourage the production and utilization of plant enabling solar energy to
be used in Sicily and to promote research and developmerrt activities in this field.
The total funcls set aside for the grants amount to LIT 3 700 million for the period from
L978-82, distributed as follows:
(i) research and development activities in Sicilian universities and public research
centres (LIT 700 million);
(ii) low-interest loans for small and medium-sized firrns to encourage them to manufac-
ture equ:ipment using solar energy; they will be grantecl for a fifteen-year period at
a rate of. 7/o and may cover sp to 60% of expenditure (LIT 900 million);
(iii) grants at the rate of 3O/o for the establishment of plant using solar energy in
public organizations, farming and small and medium-sized industrial firms (LIT
1 500 miillion);
(iv) a grant at the rate of SO/o for the study and consrtruction of experimental installa-
tions (LtT 4)0 million).
COMP. REP. EC 1977
STATE AIDS I79
Aids to develop power production trom Community coal
257. ln its Fourth Report on Competition Policyl the Commission took stock of the
various systems applied in the Mernber States to promote the use of coal in electricity
generation.
In its Communication to the Council of Z6 June 1.974 entitled 'Towards a neq/ energy
policy strategy for the Community', it recommended that measures be taken to encourage
the use of coal, which would also help to diversify Community energy supply sources.
On L4 January 1977 it submitted a proposal for a Council Regulationa on Community
financial measures to promote the use of coal for electricity generation.
258. ln 1977 the Commission was informed by the German Government of various
amendments it intended to make to the German Act to promote the use of Community
coal in power stations. The scheme was set up in 1965 and has been amended on various
occasions in L965, 1972, t9744 and L976.5
The assistance provided is mainly intended to ensure a stable outlet for approximately
30 million tonnes of Community coal per year for electricity generation,
Electricity producers using coal (either German or from other Member States) receive a
subsidy to offset the difference between the cost price per calorie from coal and from
fuel oil or natural gas. The subsidy is financed by an equalization charge levied on all
German electricity producers and calculated on the basis of the value of the electricity
produced.
The German Governrnent also grants a subsidy of DM 150 per k\7 installed capacity; it
is intended to offset the additional costs incurred in building coal-fired power stations as
against those using fuel oil or natural gas.
The Commission was requested to authorize the following amendments:
(i) extension until 31 December 1987 of the equalization system which should have
expired at the end of 1977. New coal-fired power stations built between L974 and
1985 arc to receive a ten-year subsidy guarantee paid under the equalization system
and designed to offset the higher costs per calorie of coal;
(ii) the equalization system will now also cover the additional costs of using anthracite;
the domestic market does not provide sufficient outlets for this quality coal;
I Points 161 to 165.
2 Bull. EC I2-L974, points 1201 to 7203.
3 COM(76) 648 final.
a Bull. EC 7/8-L974, point 2131; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 163 to 16r.
5 Bull. EC 3-7976, point 2rtj.
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(iii) finally, the subsidy of DM 150 per k\7 installed capacity has been raised to
DM 180 and granting has been extended until 31 December 1981.
The Commission decided that electricity producers usinig coal gained no advantage over
those using fuel oil or natural gas; it therefore raised no objection to the scheme under
the ECSC and EEC Treaties.
S I 
- 
Appliaation ot the ECSC Treaty to State alds for the steel Industry
Q9. The recession affecting the Community steel industry deepened in 1977. New
orders in the first half were lower than they had been a year eadier and certainly well
below the L974 peak. Production also fell and capaciry utilization remained very low
averaging lessi than 65/a during the year. The recession has been due principally to the
low level of Community demand, but the deterioration in the balance of trade has been a
further contributory factor.
The effects of these volume changes on steel undertakings' finances have been exacer-
bated by the need to align iheir prices on those of imported steel in order to remain com-
petitive, so thrat prices have fallen significantly despite rises in labour, raw material and
other costs.
Although the recession has led the industry to delay new investment proiects and to slow
down the cornpletion of projects aheady under way, new capacity continues to come on
stream as a result of decisions taken in 1973 and L974.
The prospect of a slight acceleration in economic growth in 1978 affords some hope of
an improvement in the steel industry's fortunes, provided that it manages to contain
imports to a more reasonable market share.
However, the crisis in the industry is not solely a conjunctural phenomenon; its main
characteristics are structural. The medium term outlook is for persistent problems owing
to an excess of production capacity and a lack of competitiveness of many production
units.
260. Agairrst this background of a structural crisis, exacerbated by conjunctural problems,
the Commission's policies have been designed to achieve a number of objectives:
(i) to reduce the impact of the adverse conjuncture by a variety of direct measures,
such as fixing voluntary delivery quotas;
(ii) to prormote the restructuring of the industry so as to ensure its future
competitiveness;
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(iii) to minimize the effects of the conjuncture and of industrial restructuring on the
labour force by encouraging the establishment of new industries in steel producing
areas; and
(iv) to avoid distortions of competition against the common interest by coordinating
any State aid measures taken by the Member States to enable their industry to
survive the immediate crisis or to assist its restructuring.
261. ln order to achieve the last of these objectives, the Commission considered that it
should, as a first step, remind the Member States of their obligation to notify all aid
proposals to the Commission in advance of their implementation and indicate to them
the manner in which it intended to apply the ECSC Treaty's provisions during the
period of the crisis. The Commission, therefore, informed the Member States by letter
dated z0 Apill 1977 that any aid measures taken by them should respect the following
general principles:
(i) aids should not be accorded for the sole purpose of preserving existing structures;
(ii) aids for modernizing, rationalizing or restructuring the industry should not lead to
increases in capacity in sectors or subsectors in which there is manifest overcapaciry;
(iii) aids to lescue a steel undertaking so as to enable an ordedy adaptation to the new
market situation should be of strictly limited duration and should take account of
the structural modifications that are required; and
(iv) the form and intensity of aids should always be appropriate to their objectives and
to the problems the aids are intended to resolve.
The definition of principles of this kind cannot be regarded as more than a first step. In
view of the critical situation of the industry, there is a risk that these principles will not
be adequate to avoid distortions of competition against the common interest. The Com-
mission is tlerefore examining with the Member States the possibility of introducing a
greater degree of Community discipline by means of a decision under Article 95 of the
ECSC Treaty, which enables action to be taken by the Community in cases not provided
for by the Treaty itself.
Belgium
262. The Commission applied the general principles outlined above for the first time in
its examination of an aid scheme notified to it by the Belgian Government.
The Belgian steel industry is strongly export-oriented and has therefore been among the
lmost seriously affected by the present crisis. Its capacity utilization rates in L975 and
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1976 were 61/o and 64/o respectively whereas the corresponding figures for the Com-
gnunity as a rvhole were 6)/o and 68/o. A major part of the industry therefore found
itself in grave financial difficulties and the Belgian (iovernment decided to intervene
immediately to enable the undertakings concerned to survive for the period during which
a plan to restructure the industry would be drawn up. The measures taken to implement
the restructur:ing plan would constitute a second stage in its intervention, but could only
be determinedl once the restructuring plan had been prepared.
The first stag;e of the Belgian Government's intervention involved the use of the eco-
nomic expansion lawsl to grant State guarantees and interest rebates on one year loans
amounting to nearly BFR 12 000 million. The bulk of this sum was to provide working
capital while the remainder was to finance current inl'estments which did not increase
production cupacity. To qualify for these aids undertakings had to agree to postpone any
investment decisions which would lead to an incease in production capacity and any
decisions on mass redundancies. They would also hal'e to agree to participate in the
implementation of the restructuring plan.
263. The Commission considered that these measures were compatible with the aids
provisions of the ECSC Treaty and with general principles outlined above. The aids were
not solely intended to preserve existing structures, since the beneficiaries would have to
support the r,e5lgu6tusing plan. The implementation of this plan would be facilitated by
the suspension of investment decisions involving increases in capaciry.
I Second Repo:rt on Competition Policy, point 90; Fourth Report on Competition Policf, point 170.
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Adjustment of State monopolies of a commercial character
264. This year the Commission continued its work with respect to State monopolies of a
commercial character with a view to putting an end to the last remaining practices that
conflict with Article 37 of the EEC Treaty and other Articles relating to the free move-
ment of goods. The investigations pursued and action taken concerned the French and
Italian manufactured tobacco rnonopolies, the French petroleum products and alcohol
monopolies and the Italian matches monopoly.
265. As regards the French alcohol monopoly, the French Government took measures
on 25 July to comply with the reasoned opinion issued by the Commission under Article
169 of the EEC Treaty.l The measures consisted of Decree No 842 adjusting the market-
ing system for alcohol, two Ministerial Orders and a notice to importers, all of which
took effect on 29 July.z
The exclusive right to import and market ethyl alcohol was terminated by the extension
of Article 269 of Annex II to the General Tax Code to Community importers, who are
now free to import and market the product provided they file an import declaration and
p^y an amount of money equal to that payable by French manufacturers also qualifying
,for Article 269. The non-discretionary and non-discriminatory nature of this is ensured
by the following measures:
(a) there is no need for prior administrative approval in the import declaration
procedure;,
(b) the notice to importers published in the French Journal officiel also constitutes a
directive to the customs authorities concerning the removal of the need for
administrative approval;
(c) the form of the import declaration requires only such information as is essential for
determining tariff classification and the amounts payable;
(d) the amount then payable depends neither on the raw material nor on geographical
origin.
r Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 261.
2 JournalofficieldelaR6publiquefranEaiseNo 172 of zl.l.t977,p,3928erreq.
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The discrimin?Ltory aspects of the tax scheme applicable to potable spirits and spirituous
beverages imported from the Member States have also trcen eliminated by the abolition
of the counten'ailing charge levied only on imported spirituous beverages arrd the special
payment due o:r certain imported spirits.
Since in Franr:e there are no more restrictions on imports of ethyl alcohol from the
original Memlber States, the Commission has suspended its Artide 169 proceeding
against France for infringement of Article 37 and wilX terminate it when the French
authorities have formally amended the relevant legislation as required'
These measures apply to products imported from the Member States with effect from
I January 197t3, so that France has also complied with its obligation under Article 44 of
the Act of Accression.
266, Turning to the French and Italian manufactured tobacco monopolies, the Commis-
sion, following detailed scrutiny of the new regulations governing them, has concluded
that certain provisions afe not in line with Articles 30 and 37 of. the EEC Treaty. On
1 August it ac,:ordingly initiated infringement proceedings under Article 16p against the
two governments for their maintenance of the exclusive right to exPort. In France there
is a further irrfringement at the wholesale stage which consists of maintenance of the
exclusive right to import and market manufactured tobacco originating in non-member
countries and a[ready in free circulation in another Member State.
The Commission has also expressed reservations as to rvhether certain other aspects of
the new regulations conform to Treaty requirements and has asked the two governments
for their views.
The main reservation concerned the retail monopoly which still exists in both countries.
On the basis of recent Court of Justice judgments the Commission argues that com-
pliance with A.rticle 37 and the principle of the free movement of goods require that any
provision whir:h may allow for discriminatory treatment between home-produced and
imported goodls at some stage befween importation and purchase by the consumer must
be cancelled.
In the case of France, there were further reservations as 1lo the system used for determin-
ing prices and margins, the rules governing the approval of importers and wholesalers
and those concerning advertising, for they are likely to hinder the market penetration of
imported products.
As for Italy, rrxervations were expressed on the reguladons governing Packagrng, pricing
and the establishment of wholesale depots, and on the arrangements for suPPlying tax
seals to importers.
COMP. REP. EC I97
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267. The Italian matches monopoly has certain features in comtnon with the manufac-
tured tobacco monopoly: they share the same exclusive wholesale and retail distributors
-the AAMS and the official network of retail tobacco outlets respectively. Doubts as towhether the exclusive wholesale selling right referred to by the Cornmission in its letter
giving formal notice really had been abolished have now been cleared up. At the present
stage of scrutiny of the Italian reply, the retail marketing system, that used for determin-
ing prices and the role played for tax purposes by the Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi
would still seem contrary to Article 37 of the XEC Treaty.
268, Lutly, there have been further talks with the French authorities on the petroleum
monopoly, and the Commission hopes that a solution can be reached in 1978. The legal
position until then is conditioned by the direct effect of Articles 30 to 37 of the Treaty,
which is to say that any national provisions incompatible with these Articles are deprived
of their binding force.
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Public undertakings
269. ln its last rePortl the Commission considered the practical and legal implications of
Article 90. Having pursued its theoretical work, it has also continued practical measures
on several fronts. Its action here has followed three main lines.
270. First, consideration of a number of cases raising, among other things questions
concerning the application of Article 90 has begun. The problems at issue are the
following:
(a) the grant of special or exclus,ive rights;
(b) possible abuse of a dominant position and concerted practices contrary to Article 8);
(c) failure of public authorities to act on conduct such as this;
(d) one complaint concerning illegal subsidies to a public undertaking;
(e) application of the EEC Treaty rules on competition where a body doing commercial
business is structurally part of a public authority.
27 1. ln the Sixth Report the Commission also mentioned the difficulties which it faces
in carrying out to the full its duties under Article 90(3) in view of the difficulty of
understanding certain information in the accounts of certain undertakings.2 It referred to
the possibilities offered by the same Treaty Article for taking measures to remedy the
sifuation.
N7ith this in mind, and in response to Padiament's wishes,s the Commission has had a
directive drafted under Article 9O(3); the draft is now at an advanced stage of
preparation.
It has discussed the principles at issue with those of the Mernber States which wished to
make their views known at this stage. The need for these discussions arose from the
importance of the public sector in certain Member States and the scope for econornic
1 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 272 et seq.2 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 275.
3 Resolution on the Sixth Report on Competition Policy: I7ritten Question No 701,277 by Mr
I{iiller"Hermann.
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intervention thereby offered. Moreover, the use of A*icle 90 entails reference to legal
principles on which the Court of Justice has as yet had very little opportunily to elaborate.
272. Lastly, working with an outside research establishment, the Commission has pre-
pared a study ,which will give it an up-to-date and at the same time precise picture of the
public sector in the C.ommuniry. The study will be published eal.l1y rn 1978.
coMP. RtP. EC lt7
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Part Threc
The development of concentration
in the EEC
nl
Inlroducllon
273. The first section below ($ 1) deals with national and international takeovers and
mergers, share purchase and joint ventures in the Community.
The second ($ 2) gives a number of pointers to the development of concentration: the
trend of domestic concentration in a series of industries, the analysis of patterns of
dominance that are characteristic of certain product markets in certain couniries, and a
similar analysis for certain regional and local markets illustrated by reports taken from
the daily press.
Then follows a survey on the relationship between firm size and performance in selected
industries and countries ($ 3).
Recent research on the workings of competition in distribution is then outlined ($ 4),
with a summary of findings on price trends and the differences in prices for selected
products' There is also an analysis of the development in the relat-ive market power
between manufacturers and retailers.
Part Three ends with a sunmary and conclusions ($ :).
s 1 
- 
National and international takeovers and mergers, share purchase
and joint ventures in the Community from 1923 to 1976
Comparison between national and international operations
274. The statistics that follow have been obtained from the,business and financial press
in the EEC Member States. I7hile not all operations of this kind are mentioned in ihese
sorrrces, the figures published here may be assumed to give a reasonably faithful picture
of recent trends.
As in previous years, it has not been possible to reflect the relative importance of the
various operations; and the figures that follow have not been weighted to take account
of the varying sizes of the economic and financial transactions.
Subject to these two reservations, the information below illustrates an important aspect
of EEC business life.
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275. Table 1 sets out the actual numbers of national and international takeovers and
mergers,,acquisitions and joint ventures that took place in the EEC from L973 to L976.
A minimum of two firms were involved in each operation and the acfual number of
firms involved is shown in a separate column for each type of transaction. The total
columo of the 'Number of firms involved' takes account of the fact that a given firrn
may have been involved in more than one operation in the course of the report period.
The breakdown in the last two columns of Table 1 gives the number of national and
international operations involving only two firms (bilateral operations) and those involv-
ing more than two firms (multilateral operations).
The reason for the absence of international takeovers or rnergers is that the company
law of the Member States does not allow cross-frontier firms.
The total number of operations fell from 2 z8j. to 2 0J7 between 1975 and 1976; this
was the first fall since t973.In each of the years considered, share purchase was the most
frequent form of operation, followed by joint ventures, and lastly by takeovers and
mergers. In L976, 65/o of all operations were share purchase, 28/o were joint ventures
and only 7/o were takeovers and mergers. The development of the total number of
operations broken down by number of firms involved shows that between L97) and
1975 bilateral operations increased in number, only to f.allin L976, whereas the number
of multilateral operations kept rising throughout the period. ln L)76, 8o/o of. all opera-
tions were bilateral. Trends in types of operation are dealt with in greater detail in
Table 3.
276. For each year between L973 and 1976 (see TabLe 2), it will be seen that, of the
three types of operation considered, joint ventures involved on average the largest
number of companies followed by takeovers and mergers and by share purchase. In L976
on average 3.29 firms were involved in the formation of a joint venture, 2.38 in a
takeover or merger and Z.t4 in a share purchase transaction.
277. The numbers for national and international operations shovm in Table l are given
in index-number terms in Table 3, t973 being taken as the base year. The index
numbers for share purchase and joint ventures show that by the end of the period
national operations were above their L973 level whereas international operations were
below thr: L973 level. However, a comparison between t9l5 and 1976 shows that the
only increase between these two years was in international joint venfures which were
L6/o up, whereas a sharp fall of 4L/o took the number of takeovers and mergers bad<
down to its t973 level.
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278. The national and international breakdown of operations can be seen from Table 4.
Although, on the whole, national operations have been more numerous than international
operations since L974 with 64/s national against only 36/o international in 1976, there
is a marked difference between share purchase on the one hand and joint ventures on the
other. Since L974 mtional share purchases have been far more numerous than internation-
al purchases, and in L976 they represented 73/o of. the total, whereas international joint
ventures have been more numerous than national joint ventures in wery year except
1975, when )2/o were national and 48/o were international. By 1976 the ratio had
reversed again, with 63/o of all joint ventures being international. The major propor-
tion of all operations accounted for by share purchase explains why nearly two out of
every three operations rn L976 were purely national.
Breakdown of international operations showing share of tirms
f rom non-member countries compared with total share of EEC lirms
279, Table J shows the nationality of firms involved in international operations. The
Percentage figures given there are calculated from the number of individual firms
involved and reveal that firms from non-member countries have substantially increased
their share when compared with firms from the EEC. The number of Community firms
involved fell from 77/o to 67/6 betwee L97i and t976. By contrast the share of
American firms, which had been on the decline since l97j,rosef.rom7/o to B/o,while
Swiss firms raised their share from 5/o to 6/e, Japanese firms from L/o to 2/o and
Scandinavian firms from 2Vo to 3Vo.
280. The increasing role played by firms outside the EEC in international operations is
further illustrated by Table 6. The percentages for all operations show that by 1976 the
share of EEC firms had fallen to equal that of firms from non-member countries. The
decline in the involvement of EEC firur showed similar movements in both types of
operation-share acquisitions and joint ventures. Between L973 and 1976 non-EEC
firms raised their share of acquisitions from 4o/e to 46/6 and their share of joint ven-
tures from 46/o to 54/o.The change in figures between L975 and L976 is most striking
in the field of joint ventures, where EEC firms' share declined f.rcm 55% to 46%.
281. Table 7 shows the Member States in whose territory firms were acquired or
joint ventures were established. In 1975 Belgium headed the list with one quarter of all
such international operations. Gernany ranked second with 23/o and France ranked
third with L6/e. Since 1975, Gemnny has expanded its share by 3 percentage points
while France's share has declined by four points. The United Kingdom was the scene of
LIfr of operations, showing a similar decline of four percentage points. Italy's share
rose by one point from L97 5 to 197 6, but it is still very low at 5/o. However this figure
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should be viewed with caution as the sources of information used for this survey may not
be wholely reliable for Italy.
lndustrial breakdown of national and international operations
282. The industrial breakdown changed very little in 1976 (Table 8). Operations in
metallurgical industries ranked first of all manufacturing industries in all the four years
and accounted for 27/o of operations in 1976. The percentage of operations in both the
food and textile industries rose by one point from T975 to L976, to 8/s and )fu
respectively.
S 2 
- 
The development of concentration in selected industrles
and sub-induslries in the EEC
General survey of research
283. The studies on the development of concentration and on the working of competi-
tion in the various Member States have continued at a steady rate this year. As can be
seen from Table 9 the number of reports published by the Commission was particulady
high in l977-twenty-one in all.
These reports highlight every aspect of the industrial structures analysed. Most of them
also contain a detailed econometric section.
The present report is intended to bring out the aspects and problems of concentration
which are not dealt with by the traditional type of economic analysis.
Concentration i n selected i ndustries
284. Exanination of the studies that have been undertaken since the research prograrnme
began in 1970 (Table 10) leads to afaiily general concluslon-that industrial concentra-
tion is tending to 'stabilize'. This trend is particulady evident from Table 11, and thus
confirms the forecasts made in the last report (point 293).
The three following definitions and symbols have been used:
(a) there is stability (-) when the share of the four largest firms in the total sales of a
given industry (Ca index) does not change or changes by one percentage point or
less (e.g. where Ca moves from 45/o to 46Vo);
coMP. REP. EC t977
2OO THB DEVEI.OPMENT OF CONCBNTRATION
TABLE 9
New reports it L977
(a) ConPleted and pablished:
Studio sull'evo.luzione della concentrazione della industria
cartaria in ltalia
Studio sull'evol.uzione della concentrazione nel settore della
costruzione di macchine per I'industria tessile in ltalid
A study of the evolution of concentration in the D*tcb
paper products industry
A study of thc evolution of concentration in the Danith
food distribution industry
A study of the evolution of concentration in the food distri-
bution industry for the UK
Etude sur l'dvollution de la concentration dans la disttibution
des produits alimentaires en France
L'6volution de la concentration dans I'industrie de la bras-
serie et des boissons en Belgiqne
A study of the evolution of concentration in the Datcb
beverage indusfty
Ent'wicklung der Konzentration in der Getriinke-Industrie
der Bundesrepthlik D eutscbland
Studio sull'evoluzione della concenEazione nell'industria
delle bevande in ltalia
Etude sur l'6volution de la concentration dans les industries
des boissons et des boissons non alcoolis6es en France
Untersuchung iler Konzentrationsentwicklung in der Reifen-
industrie sowie ein Branchenbild der Kraftfahrzeug-Elektrik-
ind,. in Deatschland
Untersuchung :zur Konzentrationsentwicklung in der Nah-
ftngsmitteldistibution in D ezts c bland
Untersuchung zur Konzentrationsentwicklung in ausgewZihl-
ten Branchen und Produktgruppen der Emihrungsindustrie
in Deattcbland
Studio sull'evoluziorie della conc. nel settore delle costru-
zione di macchi:ne per l'industria tessile in Italia
A study of the evolution of concentration in the Danfub
food processing industry
Rescarch establishmcnt
SORIS
Totincr
SORIS
T'orinc>
tiniversiteit van Amsterdam
Institute for Future Studies
Copenhagen
f)evelopment Analysts Ltd
Croydon
I,AM
I\[ontp,ellier
CRID.E - Prof. Jacquemin
l,ouvain-la-Neuve
Frof. de Jong
Stichting Niienrode
Ereukelen
Iristitut fiir
Wirtschaftsforschung (IFO)
l\diinchen
SORIS
Torino
Inst. Nat. de la Recherche
Agronomique (INRA)
lrfontpellier
liienbaum GmbH
Diisseldorf
IFO
Miincl:ren
IFO
Miinchen
SORIS
'Ilorino
Institute for Future Studies
Copenhagen
COMP. REF. EC I9Z
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TABLE 9 (cotrd)
Titlc
Studio sull'evoluzione della conc. nell'industria della costru-
zione di macchine non elettriche in ltali4
Untersuchung zur Konzentrationsentwicklung in verschiede-
nen Untersektoren der Elektrotechnischen Industrie in
Deuxcbland
Studio sull'evoluzione della concentrazione industiale in
ItdJid (1968-74) (pneumatici, candele, accumulatori)
A study of the evolution of concentration in the electrical
appliances industry for the UK
A study of the evolution of concentration in the beverages
industry in the UK (Industry structure and concentration,
1969-74)
(b) ConPleted and being prinred:
Studio sull'evoluzione della concentrazione
tione dei prodotti alimentari in ltalia
Etude sur l'6volution de la concentration
des pneumatiques en Frcnce
A study of the evolution of concentration in the manufacture
and supply of tyres, sparking plugs, and motor-vehicle
accumulators for the UK
Etude sur l'dvolution de la concentration dans l'industrie
des pites, papiers et cartons ea Franee
Die Distribution von alkoholischen und nichtalkoholischen
Getriinken in der Bundesrepublik Deatscltland unter besonde-
rer Beriicksichtigung konzentrativer Entwicklungstendenzen
Studio sull'evoluzione della concentrazione nel settore dei
detersivi per uso domestico in Italia
A study of the evolution of concentration in the food
distribution industry for tJr'e United Kingdom - Volume 1 -
Industry structure and concentration
A study of the evolution of concentration in the press and
general publishing industry in the UK
Etude de l'6volution de la concentration dans le secteur de
la pite, du papier et du carton en Belgiqae
Rcsearch establhhmcnt
SORIS
Torino
IFO
Miinchen
FIS-ATOR
Milano
MLH
London
Development Analysts Ltd
Croydon
SORIS
Torino
DAFSA
Paris
Cranfield School of Managemenl
Bedford
DAFSA
Paris
IFO
Miinchen
ISVET
Roma
Development Analysts Ltd
Croydon
Cranfield School of Management
Bedford
Universitd de Mons
Prof. Labeau
nella distribu-
dans I'industrie
Nore: A series of reports on the press, publishing and school bmks is at an advanced stage. Publication ls
planned for the first balf of 1978.
All reports are published in the original language version only.
coMP. REf. EC r97
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(situation at 31.12.1977)
L962-69
1962-69
1962-69
1962-69 1969-73
1962-69 L969-73
1962-69
1962-69 1970-74
L962-69 1970-74
1962-69
1962.69 L970-74
1962.69 r97O-74
1962-69 1970-74
1962-69 1969-71 | 1962-691962-69 1969-7j I L962-69
1962-69 L969-73 | 1962-69
1962-69 L969-73 | 1962-69t96z-69 r969-7j | 1962.69
L968-73 | L962-7L
1968-73 | 1962-71
1970-74 | 1962-69
1968-74
1962-70 1968-73
1968-74
1968-74
r970-7'
r970..74
t968-72
1968-72
1968-72
r970-76
TABLE 10
Industries and countries studied, and reference periods
Country
Industry
Textile industry
$[ool
Cotton
Knitted goods arnd hosiery
Paper industry a.nd paper products
industrv
Manufacture of paper and cardboard
Processing of pa.per and cardboard
Chemical industty
Manufacture of
pharmaceutical products
Manufacture of machinery other than
elecrical machines
Agricultural ma,chinery and tractors
Office machinerT
Textile machinery
Equipment for civil engineering and
machinery for the mechanical working
of building materials
Hoisting and handling equipment
Electrical engineering
Electronic equipment, audio
equipment, radio and television
receivers
Household electrical appliances
Manufacture of transport equipment
Cycles, motorcycles and power-assisted
cycles
Tyres for motor vehicles
Certain car accessories (batteries,
sparking plugs)
Food industries
(excluding beverages)
Beverages in general
Brewing
Publishing
Press
1962-69
1962-69 1969.7'
1962-69
1962-69 L968-73
1962-69
t962-69 1969-7'
7962-70 1968-74
1962-70 L968-74
1962-70 L968-74
L962-70 1968-71
t962-70 1970-74
1962-70 L970-74
1962-69 1970-72
1968-74
1962-7r
1968-74
r970-75
COMP. REP. EC IW
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196r-69
19$-69 1968-74
7963-69 1970-7'
1963.69
1964-7L
r970-74
r970-74
1962-69 1968-72
1962-69 L968-72
1962-69 1968-72
1962-69 r970-7t
1969-76
1969.76
1962-69
1962-69
1967-72
L969-74
1969-74
L968-7'
1968-73
1968-7)
1968-72
1968-72
1964-73
1968-72
1968-72
1968-72
1968-72
L968-75
1968-7t
1969-75
1969-72
1969-74
t969-74
1970-7t
1968-73
1968-7'
1968-7'
1968-73
1969.74
COMP. REP. EC IN
r970-7' r970-76
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TABI,E 11
Development of concentration in various countrica and industriec of the EEC *
Iadustry r972.71
Cotton
Paper and cardtroard manuf acturing
and processing
Paper and cardtroard manufacturing
Paper and cardboard Processing
Pharmaceutical Products
Agricultural mrLchinery and tractors
Office machine::y
Tertile machioc:ry
Equipment for ,:ivil engineering and machinery
foi the mechanical working of building
materials
F
B
UK
F
I
B
UK
B
F
NL
D
I
D
F
NL
F
I
NL
B
UK
DK
F
D
UKI
D
I
UK
B
D
I
F
UK
D
UK
+1
+a
+1
-1+1
+1
+1
_1
_t
'T'
+1
-t
+1
+1
a1
+1
+1
Country l,l97O-72 l'1972-7,
COMP. RP. EC IN
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TABLE 11 (contd)
Indurtrl
Hoisting and handling equipment
Electronic and audio equipment, radio
and television receivers
Household electrical appliances
Manufacture of cycles
Manufacture of motorcycles and power-assisted
cycles
Tyres for motof vehicles
Food indurtrier
Beverages
of which:
- 
Brewing
of which: bottled beer
draught becr
- 
Non-alcoholic beverages
cotr{t. REP. Ec 197
Countrt
D
I
IJK
D
F
I
DK
D
I
UK
DK
F
D
D
D
FI
UK
D
FI
NL
B
UK
D
FI
UK
DK
D
F
NL
NL
NL
UK
B
D
F
NL
,1970-72
-1
-1
+1
f-
-1
+1
+1
+:'
-l
+
+
-1
+1
+1
-1
-x
+
+
-r
+
,rrr-;;l ,rrr,
-r
+
1
+
I
'1-
+
+
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TABLE 11 (cpnrd)
- 
Alcoholic b,..verages other than beer:
spirits
wine-based aperitifs
liqueur aperitifs
potable sPirit
wines and spirits
distilleries
Publishing
Press
D
D
F
F
I.'K
NL
IJKI
F
DK
IRL
+
:
+
-6'6
:6,7
:2
-*
:2' 7
t Measued by the concentration ratio C. - Iucentage share of the fout largcst firms in the total salcs of e given
industry or madct or of a representativC sample of that industry or markct.
1 1969 instead of 1970.2 197t instead of 1974.I The share of the fout latgest firms is calculated on employment.{ 1976 instead of 1974.6 1968 instead of 1970.6 The share of thc fou largest firms is calculated on circulation'I The share of the four laigest firms is calculated on number of copies printed.
(b) there is itn increate ( + ) where the upward variation in share exceeds one Percen-
tage poin.t of the total;
(c) there is a. lall (-) where the downward variation in share exceeds one Perceotage
point of the total.
T7ith these definitions, the following conclusions have been reached:
(i) of a total of 83 cases between L97o and L972, thete were 35 of stability (approxi-
mately 42%> , 34 increases and 14 falls in the concentrati,on ratio;(ii) of a total of 24 cases from 1972 to 1973, the concentration ratio remained stable
in 14 car;es (approximately )S/o), increased in 3 and fell in 7;
(iii) in a total of 36 cases f.tom L972 to L)74, the concentration ratio was stable in 17
cases (approximately 47%), rose in l.L and fell in 8.
28J. Since L9t72the process of industrial concentration has been moving clearly towards
stability and :is in some czrses even slov/ing down in those industries which arc aheldy
highly concentrated. According to modern economic theory when the level of concentra-
tion passes a certain point in a giveo industry, a trend towards re-equilibrium emerges in
the form of cleclining concentration; it has also been found that maturity in an industry
generally entails a degree of stability.
COMP. REP. EC I9Z
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However, it should be noted that certain groups have developed strategies of establishing
intedocking shareholdings, of entering into specialization or market-sharing agreements,
of setting up joint ventures, and so on. I7hile such strategies have the effect of reducing
the number and the independence of decision-making centres, this trend cannot be
reflected in the statistics which are based on the assumption that each firm counted is
autonomous.
Market concentration
286. A better understanding of the degree of concentration in a market can perhaps be
reached by considering the following:
(i) the identification of the market for the product;
(ii) the share of the entire market accounted for by either the leading brand or the
leading manufacturer;
(iii) the identity of the manufacturer or brand that is the market leader.
For the first time the Commission has attempted, in Table 12, to put forward a tentative
list of markets that it considers to be characterized by a high level of concentration. In
this table however markets where the market leader has a market share of less than 254o
have not been considered.
287. The reasoning behind the choice of this threshold of b/o is based on two assump-
tions:
(i) a concentration ratio Ca : L00;
(ii) a coefficient of disparity 4L: L}o.
oligopolistic situation in which just
between them.l
This means that there is a closely balanced
four firms of equal size share the market
Here, then, there is a simplifying assumption that where a given firm attains a 25Vo
share of a given market, the trend towards oligopoly has begun. This is because smaller
firms are likely to try to achieve a share equal to that of the market leader and this course
may well lead to a four-firm market-incontestably an oligopoly.
The fact that the name of the firm or brand is given together with its market share will
be especially useful in assessing the degree of concentration and market power of large
diversified companies operating in a large number of different markets.
1 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 292.
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TABI-8 12
List of markets where the market leader holds more than 2JVo of the total trational market
(based on a small sample of the products and counffies in these markets)
ALI
ALT
ALI
ALI
TEX
ALI
ELE
PAP
BLE
ELE
ELE
TEX
TRA
CHI
ALI
TEX
ALI
ALI
TRA
ELE
AIJ
CHI
CHI
PHA
ALI
ALI
ALT
ALI
ALI
ALI
PHA
PAP
CHI
ALI
CHI
ALI
PAP
PAPArI
PAP
TRA
86 
1
>8r I
>8' I8rl8rl8rl
84 I
82 1
>80 |80 
180 
180 
180 
180 
1
80 
1
75 
175 1
75 
17rl
I
74 17rl
72 1
-"1tL 
I
>70 |
70 
1
70
70
70
70
70
70
70
69
67
67
66
65
65
65
6'
65
63
6l
> 6Cl
>6Cl
60r
60
6(l
60
60
6t
6ll
60
61,
60
6r)
Rank-
irg
2
2
2
2
8
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
r6
L6
lo
r6
20
2l
22
2t
24
24
24
24
24
24))
14
,4
t6
t7
,7)t
)l
t7
42
4'
14
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
Sugar
Cola bevelages
Spirits
Beer
Threads for needlework
Chewing gum
Electriccoffee machines
Unworked filter PaPer
Ref rigerators and ftcezete
Dishwashcre
Hairdryers
Cotton'sewing threads
Automobilc igoition 
-sysbemtFloor dctergent Powders\(hite rum
lute vrm and fabrics
Concintrated milk. unsweetencd
Baby foods
Sparking plugs..(as oflgroally tlttcd,
Coffee crinders
Frozen Toods
Cinc film (8, super 8, etc.)
still films
Non-barbituratC scdatives
Chocolate powders
Brcakfast cereals (flakcs)
Milk powder
Dog ahd cat food
Instant coffec
Condensed milk
Tranquillizers
Sulphite paper
DetireenI for dishwasheru
Mar*iline
Dete;sent powders
Cannld splsheni. ctc.
Kraft papcrlnd thc likc
N€wsprint
Vermouth
Corrugatcd board
Sparkings plugs
(replacements market)
Car baticries(as originallt fitted)
Frozen foods
Stationery
other hvpertcnsivc drugs
Bulbs aid lamps for motor vehicles
Margarines, oiis and edible fats
Puffed cereals
!Thisky
Canned soups
Dietetic Droducts and babv foods
Dried poiato powdcr
Margarinc
Cenned meats
Spatking pl.ss
Malted bcvcragps
TRA
ALI
PAP
PHA
TRA
ALI
ALI
ALI
ALI
ALI
ALI
ALI
ALI
TRA
ALI
DK
B
DK
DK
F
F
f
B
F
F
F
F
DI
UK
F
F
DK
I
FI
UK
UK
UK
F
F
UK
F
F
NL
B
I
UK
UK
UKI
B
UK
B
UK
I
UK
UK
UK
D
D
F
UK
UK
F
F
FI
D
F
19"t5
r9't6
t9't6
19't5
197'
r972
r975
r975
r974
r974
r975
1971
r974
r976
r974
19'12
r972
r975
r97 4
197t
r97t
r97t
107?
r97t
r972
L972
1975
49'72
r972
1972
r973
rttl 4
ttt76
1 071
r975
tt73
rt72
t97t
lt 74
tt>74
r975
r972
191'
L?72
r91t
1974
1014
1972
197 4
r 071
19'12
r972
r912
r97'
1974
r972
Brand leadcr or natkct lcadct
De danskc sukkerf abrikker
Coca-Cola
United Brtreries r
Dollfus Mieg
General Foods
Mouliner
Intermills
Thomson - Brandf
Thomson - BBndt
Moulinex
Dollfus Mieg
Bosch
Spic'Span (Proctcr & Gamble)
Bicardi - Bass Charriogton
Aeeche-Willot
Gloria (Carnation)
Nestl6
Marelli
Moulinex
Sages ?[oqaK
Kodak
Roche
Poulain
Kelloge
Cadbury SchwcPPcs
Mars (Unisabi)
Nestl6
Iait Mont Blanc t
Denayer
FioisL (Soilsx) |
Van dcr Bergh & tulgens t
Unilever
H.J. Heinz
Impo{ts
Imports
Martini
Imports
Champion
Marelli
Unilever
Dickinson-Robinsoa GrouP
MSD
Osram
Unilevcr
Kellogg
Distillers
H.J. Heinz
Feli 5
Nestl6
Astra-Calv6 r
Simmenthal
Bosch
Sopad - Nestl6
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TABLE 12 (conrd)
Indus- I Couo.try I try Brand lcadcr or markct lerdcr
57
t7
59
,9
,9
596,
6t
6t
65
65
6'
65
65
65
6t
65
74
75
76
76
76
79
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
96
96
98
99
99
99
raz
ro2
t02
105
10,
rot
ro5
105
10,
t05
10,
rr)
r13
rrt
116
Rank-
57 | Cer Ercs
J7 | Analgcsics
17 | Powercd scythcs
55 | Board from rccvcled oaocr
!6 | General-purposi comfuien!1 | Soupo5! | Milk powdcrtt I Instint chocolate dtiaks5! | Canncd soups)) L  
55 | Mustard end condimentsJl I Mopeds and scoote$ t0 cciJ I Canned prepared bcanst, 5! | Lining matetialsJJ I Ncwspdnt)4 | Sugar-
53 | Trinquillizers) )2 | Gcncral-purposc computers) J2 | Gencral.purDos comDutefst2 | c$ battdriei (es orieinaliy fittcd)
,1 | Elcctric coo*€rs
>J0 I Cole beveragcs
>50 | Slimming prepaiations
>50 I Refrigcrators)50 | Anti-angina dtug)i0 I 'Plain-skin' hormooes
Markct
J8 | Ediblc oils!8 | Ptoccssed chccsc
57 | Prcpared potetocs
>!0 | Ttanquillizetsi0 | Tinncd salmon
50 | Ricc
49 | Condensed and cvaporatcd
milks, sterilizcd crcams
49 I Vacuum clcancrs
48 | General-purposc computer3
47 | Dry-cleaoing machincr
47 | Biscuits
47 | Synthetic dctcrgents
Groupe Lcsicut
Bel
Pfanni-Wcrk
Michelin
Thc Danish Pharmacios
BCS
Importg
IBM
Maggi t
France-Lrit
Nestl6
Liebig
G€n6rale Alinentaire(Cavcnham 
- UK)
Piaergio
Heinz
Dollfus, Micg & Cie
rmpoftt
Tatc & LyleDmer -
IBM
IBM
lucas
Ernst Yoss
Coca.Colr
Zanussi
ICI
Glaxo
Rochc
John l7e3t r
Agache-I[i.lIot
Plasmon o
Buitooi-Perusina
Unitcd Biscrits
Flodor
Laogncse-Iglo 2
rmpofts
Moulincr
Cofrariz
Camation Foods
Hoover
IBM
Fiskct or Niclsen
AlimcniEsenticl
Unilcver
Frisko t
Iray Bcntor
IBM
Maggi (Nestl€)
Gtoupe Perrier
Bexters
De Ztan (Gracc Cy.)
Wcstf alischc Metalliodusttic
Findus E
BSN
Hoffmann.La Rochc
Germany (FR)
Unilever
J. Lyons & Co.
5O I Flax tam
t0 | D;ctetic food prcparations
,0 | Precookcd mcals
,0 | Chocolate biscuits
50 | Crisps
to I Ice-crcam!0 | Printing papcr and stationctyto I Electric vacuum clclncl!
F
F
D
F
DKI
BI
D
F
F
F
FI
UK
F
F
UK
DK
UK
D
UK
DK
NL
UKI
UK
UK
UK
UKtI
F
UK
F
D
B
F
F
UK
UK
B
DK
F
UK
DK
UKI
F
F
UK
NL
D
F
F
NLI
F
UK
UK
ALI
ALI
ALI
TRA
PHA
MAC
PAP
MAC
ALI
ALI
ALI
ALI
ALI
TRA
ALI
TEX
PAP
ALI
PHA
MAC
MAC
TRA
EIE
ALI
PHA
ELE
PHA
PHA
PHA
ALI
TEX
ALI
ALI
ALI
ALI
ALI
PAP
ELE
ALI
ALI
ELE
MAC
ELE
ALI
CHI
ALI
ALI
MAC
ALI
ALI
ALI
AIJ
TRA
ALI
ALI
PHA
ELB
PHA
ALI
ALI
7972
r972
r974
r97t
r972
r974
r975
t915
r974
1972
1972
t972
r972
t972
t97t
r972
r974
r97,
1972
r973
r97t
r975
1973
r974
r97t
r97t
7973
r97,
r97t
r97t
r972
r97'
1972
r97'
r972
r974
r915
r975
r972
r973
r975
r97t
r97t
r972
r975
7975
r973
7971
1972
1972
r971
t97t
r974
r972
r972
r97'
r97t
r972
1974
r975
46 | Ice-cream
46 | Canned mcat (comed bccf)
46 | Gcneral-purposc comPutct!4i I Dried soups
45 | Spa waters4t I SD€cial soups4t I Cbcoa (butlcr and powdcr)4l I Motot vehiclc lightiog systcms4, I Frozen foods4t I Beet4t I Sedativcs and hypnotics
44 | Colour telcvision rcts
44 | Cardio-vasolar drugs| (non-reserpioic)
44 | Canncd fish
43 I lcc-ceam
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116
116
119
r19
t2l
t2L
721
t2l
t2!
t2l
t2l
12l
L2l
t2L
t2l
12l
121
t2L
721
t2L
L2l
L2L
721
t2L
12l
t2l
1,21
t2r
121
721
121
t2l
721
150
1t1
t5r
1r1trl
1t1
r56
t56
1t8
1r8
1t8
158
1t8
r63
163
r5t
r0t
10,
to,
!ot
1,61
r6t
76t
TABLE 12 (contd)
Brand leader or market lcader
4,
43
42
42
40
Pasta
Mayonnaise
Colour television sets
School and students' exercise books
Kraft paper fot latge-capacity
sacks
NTashing machines
Condensed milk
Canned tuna
Sauces
ITashing machincs
Large and medium-sized
EDP systems
Vodka
Electric cooke$
Bottl€d beer
Computer terminals
Beer
Other vitamins
Professional calculating machines
Scientific mini-calculators
LaCies' stockinas
Cold-cue prepi.rations
General-purpose computcts
Tomato ketchup
Bronchial dilators
f'ufted carp€ts
Industrial sewing yarns
Dried and powdered soups
Cough remedies
Brandy
Psychotropic drugs
Baby foods
(vegetables, meat, ftuit)
\?oven yarn
Car batteries
Breakfast cereals (flakes)
Sewing thread
Yoghurt
Knitting machincs
Ielevision sets (all types)
Agricultural tractors
Diabetic drugs
Recorders
Vashing machineg
Vitamins
Hyper-cholcsterolaemic dtucs
Firiit and vcgetable condimtnts
Colour television sets
Cardboard
Batteries (replacement market)
Crackers and sandwich biscuits
Sparking plugs(replacement market)
Diuretic drugs
Cotton velou
Fishing oets
Tents
Bed linen
Antibiotics
ALI
ALI
ELE
PAP
PAP
ELE
ALI
ALI
ALI
ELE
MAC
ALI
ELE
ATI
MAC
ALI
PHA
MAC
MAC
TEX
PHA
MAC
ALI
40
40
40
40
40
>40
>40
>40
>40
>40
>40
>40
>40
>40
>4A
>40
40
40
>40
40
40
40
>40
40
40
>40
>40
40
39
38
38
1a
t8)6
'Ttl
,o
,o
,o
to
lo
15
15
I5
1t
1l
PHA
TEX
TEX
ALI
PHA
ALI
PHA
ALI
TEX
TRA
ALI
TEX
ALI
MAC
ELE
MAC
PHA
ELE
ELE
PHA
PHA
ATI
ELE
PAP
TRA
ALI
TRA
PHA
TEX
TEX
TEX
TEX
PHA
r
F
DK
B
F
UK
UK
F
I
I
UKI
NL
NL
UKII
UN
NI.
F
UK
F
F
UK
UK
NL
D
D
UK
UK
UKI
FI
NL
DK
F
DK
F
F
FI
UK
UK
INI
B
F
F
F
NL
r972
'i.912
r97'
r97'
1975
r91 J
r973
191 3
t972
r973
r974
ra74
r9'13
1974
1974
r97 4
7911
197 4
1974
r97 4
1971
r97t
1972
r97'
r972
r97t
197 3
1975
r974
r973
L97t
1968
7974
L97t
r972
t91t
r975
r974
1974
L97t
1.971
r975
r972
r972
r972
7974
rg"t2
r91,
1973
L>t)
r97t
1972
7972
7972
r97'
L97t
Panzani"Milliat {
Mayolande
Philips Popc
Papeterie de Belgiquc
Imports
Hoovcr
Carnation Foods
Iohn West 2
G6n€rale Alimentaire(Cavenham UK)
Zanussi
Grend Meiropolitan Ltd
Zanussi
Heineken
IBM
Heineken
Ciba
Courtaulds
B. lccllcomc
IBM
G6n6rale Alimentaire(Cavenham UK)
Aeache-!trillotD;llfs Mieg s. cic
Unilevcr
Parke Davis
Martell
Hoffmann"La Ror:hc
Hipp
Caffington
Bosch
Kellogg
Coats-Paton
Express Dairy Co.
G€rmny (FR)
Fiat
Hoechst
Philips
The Danish Pharmacies
G€n€rale Alimenteire(Cavenham UK)
Verooa
Chloride
ABM (Ass. Biscuits Man. Ltd)
Marelli
Hoechst
Agache-[illot
Acache-rvrllot
Aiache-Wiliot
Dollfm Mieg & Cic
Beecham
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TABLE 12 (contd)
Indus-
tfy
PAP
PAP
TRA
PHA
ALI
ELE
ELE
ALI
15
34
t4
34
34
3)
t3
31
3'
31
3t
1'
7?
7)
42
tr
3L
3r
3r
3l)t
>30
>30
>30
>10
>30
>)o
>30
>r0
en
>30
30
>30
>30
>t0
>10
>)0
>30
30
30
>30
>30
>10
10
3O
>30
>30
10
30
29
2A
2a
2a
2A
188
188
188
188
192
792
10,
192
192
198
198
198
t98
198
r98
198
198
198
198
198
198
198
r98
198
198
198
794
198
198
r98
198
DA
198
r98
198
198
198
226
221
227
r6,
toJ
L7)
r75
11,
r75
r79
r'19
779
179
'r79
r79
779
119
'r79
Envelopes
Sanitan end household oaoer
Car tyris (as orieinallv fittld)
Gynae-cological d=rugs 
-
beDy toods
Black and white t€levision sets
Electric cookefs
Snack foods
Oral diabetic drugs
lce.cteam '
Psychotropic drugs(non'narcotic uanquillizers)
JUgat
Spinning machines
Spa waters
Pepper and spices
Canned meat
'Weaving machines
Newsprint
Cardboard
Refrigerators and freezers
Liquid detergents
Combine harvesters
\Tmllen knitting yarn
Carded wml
Sulfonamides
Cardboard
Anti-tubercolosis preparations
Oral diabetic drugs
Systemic antibiotics
Parkinson anticoovulsants
Systemic anti-inf larmatory drugs
Dishwashers
Draught beet
Cocoa powder
Non.board packaging mat€iiels
Contraceptives
Broad-spectrum antibiotics
Hematinic druss
Diuretic drugs-
Contraceptives
Anti.nauseants
Gramophones
Lemonades
Batteries (replacement market)
General analgesic drugs
Non-narcotic analgesics
Laxatives
Radios
Peripheral vasodilators
Straight antacids
Knitted fabric
Antibiotics(penicillin and derivatives)
Jonge Genever (Holland's gin)
Motorcycles
Deterg€nts for washing machines
Muhrooms
Surar
Fr6zen foods
PHA
ALI
PHA
AU
MAC
ALI
ATI
ALI
MAC
PAP
PAP
ELE
CHI
MAC
TEX
TEX
PHA
PAP
PHA
PHA
PHA
PHA
PHA
ELE
ALI
ALI
PAP
PHA
PHA
PHA
PHA
PHA
PHA
rLB
ALI
TRA
PHA
PHA
PHA
ELE
PHA
PHA
TEX
PHA
ALI
TRA
CHI
ALI
ALI
ALI
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Coun-
try
B
FI
NL
UK
UK
UK
F
DK
F
FII
DK
F
DKII
F
UKII
F
F
DK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
D
NL
F
UK
DK
UK
UK
UK
UK
TIK
DK
NLI
F
UK
UK
DK
F
UK
UK
F
NL
D
,I
F
F
DK
Year
r97,
r97,
raal
r97,
r975
r975
r97,
r972
101)
1972
r972
r97t
r973
r976
r912
r974
r97t
1972
r97 5
r976
r97 4
1974
t97 4
r912
r972
r975
7971
971
vt5
972
974
972
97201)
973
971
971
97t
973
97t
1974
1972
r972
r97t
197 t
1973
r972
r97t
1968
r972
1974
197 4
1976
r972
I 01t
L97 4
Brand lcadcr or matket leadct
Enveleo (Internills)
B6ghin.Say
Michelin
Organon
H.J. Heinz
Thom
Thorn
G6n6rale Alimentairc(Cavenham UK)
Hoechst
Ortis
Eridania
Germany (FR)
G6n6rale Alimentaite(Cavcnham UK)
Jakz
Suisse
Timavo/Atbatax
Imports
Thotn
Sole Piatti
Laverda
Lainiire de Roubaix
Peienace Am€d6c
Hoifminn-La Roche
Unilever
Pfizet
Geigy
MSD
Miele
Heinekeo
Nestl6
DRG
Schering
Beecham
Hoechst
Schering
Bang & Olufsen
Heineken
FAR
Bang & Olufscn
Boehringer
Courtaulds
Bols
BM\tr
Dash (Procter & Gamble)
Euto-consetves
B€ghin-Say
FDB
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TABLE 12 (contd)
Rank-
ing
c1
(7o)
Coun-
try
UK
DK
DK
UK
DK
F
D
UKI
UK
UK
F
FII
lt74
1t)7 4
1t\1t
tt 7I
Lt7'
1914
r97 4
'L,r1 
'197 4
'r:r76
rt)15
1972
7t72
',Lt)14
LttT 3
Yeat Brand ieadcr or market leader
227
227))1
234
214
2t4
234
240
240
240
240
244
244
2A
28
2A
t1
27
27
a1
26
26
zo
zo
Lager beer
Margarine
Psyc-hopharmacological drugs
Canned meats for seroing hot
Black and white television sets
Non-alcoholic bevcrages
Fishinc industry
Tyres (as origirially fittcd)
Rotary cultivators
Tyres' (rcplacement markct)
Colour television sets
Anti-rhumatismatic drops
Fruits in svrup
Car tyres (replaccment matket)
Icc-crearn
ALI
ALI
PHA
ALI
ELE
ALI
ALI
TRA
MAC
TRA
ELE
PHA
ALI
TRA
ALI
Bass Charington
Unilever
Dumex
Fray Bentos
Bang & Olufscn
Perrier
Nordsee 'Dunlop - Pirclli
MPM. Sicilia
Dunlop - Pirelli
Thorn
Roussillon Alimentairc
Michelin
Algel-Findus 2
I Tuborg-Cadsber:g.2 Controlled by lJnilever.t Controlled by }{estl6.{ Economics Laboratory Inc. Dclaware (USA).6 Conholled by IISN - Genais - Danonc.t Controllcd by lI.J. Heinz - USA.
Abbreviotions
lt) lnd*ty
ALI : Food end bevcragesCHI : Chr:micals
EiE : Electrical applianccs (radio and TY sets, record players, tape decks, ctc; houschold electrical
appliances)
MAC : N6n-electiical machinery (agricultual, office, textile, building, hoisting and handling machincs)
PAP : Papcr manufacturing and ptocessing
PHA = PharmaceuticalsItstr = le):uresTRA 
- 
Vehiclcs, aircraft, etc.
(b) CoantT
B = BelgiumD : Federal Rcpublic of GemanY
DK : DenrnarkF : France
I : Italy
NL : Nctherlands
UK : Unitr:d Kingdom
In the case of c3rtain markets on which imports predominate, reference is made simply to 'Imports', or thc namc
of thc country of origin is given, rather than the name of the leading firm.
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288. Table 12 has h'o puqposes:
(i) firsg to show the importance and number of dominant positions, ranking the
various markets by decreasing order of share held by the market leader;
(ii) and then to highlight the fact, giving actual figures, that markets in the several
member countries are already often so highly oligopolistic that any further increase
in the degree of concentration would seriously endanger competiton.
Ifhat is particulady striking is the number of national markets in which the market
leader controls more that 5O/oi this is the case in 100 or so of the 250 markets listed in
Table L2 and would seern to indicate that dominant market power is widespread.l
289. Table 12 is incomplete and provisional for two reasons:
(i) The studies so far carried out by or for the Commission have covered only a sample
of industries, and they are not necessarily the most highly concentrated; a large
number of oligopolistic and even monopolistic markets have not yet been surveyed.
(ii) In several of the industries surveyed, business secrecy made it impossible to establish
the share held by the market leader, so that the concentration ratio reflecting the
four top firms together (C+) or the coefficient of disparity (4L), had to suffice.
These markets had to be left out of the table. Apart from that, many of the figures
are only estimates, and in many cases it was not possible to give an exact figure but
only an approximation, e.g. more than 4O/o.
290. The information in Table 12 mry be useful to firms planning to penetrate markets
that appear profitable precisely because of the existence of dominance. The arrival of
such firms on these markets would activate the competitive rnechanism and hence lead to
price cutting which would benefit the consumer.
Lastly, research has shown that there is little change over the years in dominant market
positions. It is neady always the same firm that continues to maintain the position of
leader in a market, and sometimes in the same market in several member countries.
Regional and local concentration: the example of the daily press
291. Since the degree of concentration has to be measured primarily in market terms,
the geographical scope of the market has to be determined. An empirical yardstick for
1 This definition of dominant market power is not relevant to the rules of competition in the EEC
Treaty.
2 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 292.
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TABLE 14
Daily press
Regional or local concentration: Getmany 1975
Ranking
1
1
1
,
6
7
8
9
10
10
I2
l2
12
15
r6
10
18
18
2I
24)\
26
)-7
28
)o
30
33
34
100
100
100
100
100
100
99
o5
100
100
100
9i
91
88
94
94
97
89
100
100
88
87
100
o)
83
99
o')
/)
84
100
100
d/
/o
56
98
97
89
100
100
100
97
-99
1C0
100
98
100
100
94
100
100
9r
83
99
100
100
100
99
99
99
99
98
95
04
93
90
87
87
86
do
do
85
77
77
/o
to
t)
7I
70
69
66
64
oz
59
>/
55
53
53
44
?o
r00
>o
Kassel
Karlsruhe
Hagen
Mannheim
Braunschrveig
Hannover
Bremen
Augsburg
Bochum
Wiippertal
l\otn
\Wiesbaden
Stuttgart
f\1eI
Aachen
Miilheim
Harnburg
Berlin
Bielefeld
Bottrop
Miinchen-Gladbach
Gelsenkirchen
Oberhausen
Essen
Nirnberg
l.ribeck
Duisburg
Krefeld
Bonn
Irfi.lnster
Dortmund
Frankfurt
Diisseldorf
Miinchen
City or region
Number
of copies
sold(1 0o0)
55
6r)/
70
70
r4>
20J
t8
109
86
214
68
148
70
t3
t1
711-
8t5
8i
54
>4
8Z
t7
r80
11rB
86
r40
58
10
5c)
r72
zLo
219
561
100
99
100
100
100
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this is that where the sarne market leaders dominate a given market-with similar market
shares-in several cities or regions of a given country, it can be deduced that we are
considering a single, national market. But where the identities and shares of the leading
firms in control of the relevant market change from one city or region to another in the
same country, the conclusion is that there are a number of cleady distinct local markets.
Such is the case of a specific product-the daily press.
292. The importance that concentration in the market for the daily press can have on the
dissemination of news has led the Commission to undertake a survey of this industry in
the various countries of the EEC. The first results for the following countries are shown
in Table L3 for France (Lg7j-76), Table t4 for Germany (L97r>, Table 15 for
Denmark (1976), and Table 76 fotheland. (1975).
The tables show the shares of each of the four largest firms and as a means of assessing
the relative size of each regional or local market they also show the number of copies
sold.
In all the four countries surveyed, dominance, with the market leaders having a share of
more than 5O/o of the daily press, is widespread either regionally or locally.l
If Table 14, on the situation in Germany, slightly understates the position, this is because
it reports only on cities where more than 50 000 copies are sold, whereas the vast
majority of dominant positions-and frequently, cases of virtually absolute monopoly-
are found in cities where sales total less than 50 000 copies.
293, It has also become clear that the danger that monopoly positions will emerge in
markets where there is unlikely to be much trading (such as the daily press) is more
serious and more immediate than in markets where there is the possibility of international
as well as domestic competition. $Zere it not for trade between Member States, dominant
positions in national, regional or even local markets would be still more frequent,
stronger and less susceptible to change.
S 3 
- 
The relatlonshlp between lhe size of a flrm and its performance
Measures of etticiency
294. In the previous report (points 297 to 305) the Commission considered the relation-
ship between the size of a firm and its performance, highlighting one particular fact-
1 This definition of dominant market power is not relevant to the rules of competition in the EEC
Treaty.
cor t. REP. rc r9f7
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the largest firms are hardly ever among the most profitable nor, usually, among the most
efficient.
These conclusiions are based on an econometric methodl designed to estimate the
performance of a firm from its reported return on equity, and on the application of
this method to all Community-wide industrial activities represented by a sample of 292
industrial firms. These firms were selected from the 11975 rankings published by the
magazrne Viion.2
The method itself is based on:
(i) two size variables (01: sales; 07: own capital);
(ii) two per{ormance variables (04: net profit; 0): cash.ilow) 13
(iii) four ratios obtained from these variables, which are:
net profit (04)Rr:
Rz:
sales
net profit
(01)
(04)
for a given firm, expressed as a percentage,
for a given firm, expressed as a percentage,
o'wn cnFital (07)
cash flow (05)
nr : 
-{frl__ [r., for a given firm, expressed as a Percentage,(01)
_ 
cash flow (0t)
Ra 
- --i--I-- );i for a given firm, expres,sed irs a percentage.O'vvn OfPltaI (U/)
By adding tolgether each firm's ranking on each of these four performance fatios, we
obtain the prr:fitability score for each firm expressing its degree of profitability com-
pared with the other sample firms.
The measure ot efficiency applied to the tood industry in the Western nations
295. The analysis of industry in the EEC in general (Sixth Report on Competition
Policy, points 2!p to 303) cannot be updated in this report, as it is necessary to study a
period that is Jlong enough to reveal meaningful trends.
1 Commission, 'tr\ethodology ol eoncentration analysis applied. at lhe stadl of industries and markels',
September 1976, points i2 to 19.
2 Vision, 52 rue Taitbout, 75009 Paris.
3 The symbols 01,07, 04 and 05 relate to the codes used by the Corrrmission for computer calculation
of the variotLs variabies. However the definitions of these variables as given by Vision will not
necessarily coincide with those used for the Commission's spec:ific industry studies, which are
based in particular on net profit (04) and cashflow (OSl before tax (on income and capital),
dividends. et,:.
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TABLE 18
The wenty largest food firms in the \festern natioos' ranked by sales, 1974(Sample: $ :64)
Unilever (UK/I{L)
Nestl6 Alimenta.na (CH)
Swift (Esmark) (USA)
Kraftco (USA)
Beatrice Foods (USA)
Ralston Purina (USA),
General Foods (USA)
CPC International (USA)
Associated British Foods (UK)
Coca-Cola (USl\)
United Brands (AMK) (USA)
PepsiCo (USA)
Gervais Danone (F)
General Mills (tlSA)
Carnation (USli);
CSR (Colonial Sugar Refining) (AUS)
Ranks Hovis N{cDougall (UK)
Standard Brandr; (USA)
Norton Simon IIUSA)
Tate & Lyle (LIK)
13 667
5 601
4 61.6
1 
'4r
1 073
2 987
2 570
2 526
2 522
2 230
2 081
2 015
2 000
I 887
1 680
1 652
r 648
1 600
L 512
I
1
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1,3
r4
rt
16
L7
18
lo
20
36
3L
46
49
23
26
)4
9
28
1
53
8
47
11
l2
44
59
18
29
1t
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On the other hand it can be especially useful to apply the above analytic method to
specific industries, particulady on a national basis. This is all the more interesting as the
structure of firms in a given industry, taken at national level, is likely to be more closely
comparable than at woddwide level, where industry is inevitably much more highly dif-
ferentiated and therefore much more heterogeneous.
296. Table J.7 replaces Table 11 of the Sixth Report on Competition Policy (point 304).
It gives the main characteristics for the twenty most profitable food firms in the wodd
ranked in decreasing order of the measured results according to the ranking held by
each firm in the profitability score.
The profitability score ranking for each sample obtained by each of the twenty top firms
in the sales ranking is given in Table 18.
Comparison of Tables L7 and 18 shows that American firms heavily dominate the food
industry worldwide, since they account for fifteen out of twenty in the ranking of most
profitable firms and twelve out of twenfy in the ranking of firms in decreasing order of
sales.
Among these American firms there are six-CPC International, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo,
General Mills, Carnation and Standard Brands-that appear in both rankings (profita-
bility and size measured by sales).
Profitability and size of firm in the Unlted Kingdom
297. The analysis of the relation between size and profitability is based on the figures
given in Tables 19 to 23r 0or the United Kingdom.
Table 19 lists the twenty most profitable food firms in the United Kingdom in L970,
taken from a sample of 85 food firms excluding those that are primarily in the beverage
business. The profitability ratios in Table 19 arc not the same as those in Table L7,
since the latter refer to net profit after tax and net cash flow whereas all research in the
United Kingdom has been based on net profit before tax and gross cash flow (gross
income).
The rate of corporate income tax tends to vary around 1o/o, so that ratios calculated on
pretax profits are roughly double the ratios on taxed profits. In general terms it would be
better if research into business performance was based on figures not af,fected by tax
considerations.
1 Explanatory notes to Tables 19, 2o,21 and,22: Ratios (r): Ratios are calculated from net profit(o4\ befole ,ax and grorr cash flow (of); IN (2): The IN ratio is calculated between own
capital (07) and sales (01) for each firm i in the table (i : 1,2, i ...) so as to reveal the degree
of (own) capital intensity of each of these firms in relation to its sales.
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Table 20 gives the twenty most profitable drinks firms in the United Kingdom in L974,
taken from a sample of 58 firms. The top firm in profitability terms (Macallan-Glen-
livet) appears right at the bottom of the size ranking, whereas the largest firm (the
diversified Grand Metropolitan Group) ranks last but one in terms of its profitabiliry
scofe.
Two further tables complete this picture of the profitability of firms in various industries
in the UK:
(i) Table 21 concerns food distribution (L974);
(ii) Table 22 concerns household electrical appliances (L97)).
298. Taket together, Tables t9 to 22 suggest two series of comments on the question of
capital intensity (IN figures):
(i) It is not necessarily industries with the highest degree of (own) capital intensity
that are the most profitable. Food distribution (Table 21) would seem to be more
profitable than the other industries considered, which have a f.ar higher degree of
capital intensity.
(ii) Within each industry, it is not necessarily the firms with the highest degree of
(own) capital intensity that rank highest in performance.
It can be seen from the various rankings that the largest firms-as measured by sales-
are hardly ever the most profitable.
299, Table 23 compietes the picture painted by Tables L9 to 22. The ranking approach
does not reflect the difference between the size of the largest firms and the size of the
smail firms, in other words the size disparity. This dispailty can be defined in the
following way:
(i) the sales of a given firm i expressed as a percentage of the aggregate sales (01) of
the largest firm in the sample, the formula being IJtt t 100;
" 01xt'(ii) the own capital of a given firm i expressed as a percentage of the aggregate own
capital (07) of the largest firm in the sample, the formula being 91xi X 100.
The table also indicates the number of firms constifuting each sample and the correspond-
ing values of sales (Ot) and own capital (oz) for the top firm.
In view of the large number of firms in the food industry sample (n* 
- 
85), only the
twenty most profitable firms have been given. In general, as has already been seen, these
tend to be smaller or medium-sized firms.
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300. It is clear from Table 23 that the five most profitable food and beverage firms in
the United Kingdom each account for well below 5/o of aggtegate sales and, with one
exception, of own capital of the top firm in the industry. This points to a very high size
disparity in the relevant industries. The largest firm stands out as an isolated giant,
surrounded by a mass of far more efficient firms.
Size disparity is, on the other hand, far less pronounced in food distribution, while in the
electrical appliances industry there is some measure of equilibrium, and a sort of oligo-
polistic atena can be observed: six or seven of the eighteen groups studied are roughly
comparable in size on several of the variables.
TABLE 23
Corporate profitability and size disparity in the United Kingdom
Ye,': l97O
Profitability
fanKng
- 
First firm 01 (sales) UKL L 292 million : 100: Unilever
- 
First firm 07 (own capital) UKL 388 million = 100: Unilever
UDited Kingdom: Food industry 1
(see Table f9) Sample: n* : 8)
Size
ranking
01 x!
_x100
01 x1
07 xr
_X100
o7\
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
t2
t3
1^
1^
r6
1'7
18
19
20
\falkers Crisps
IJfarburtons
Kellogg - Great Britain
Scot Meat Products
Iil/eetabix
Haverhill Meat Products
Carnation Foods
J.If. Thornton
Brooke Bond Liebig
O.P. Chocolate
Clover Dairies
Quaker Oats
Marshall's Universal
H.J. Heinz & Co.
R. Paterson & Sons
Sayers (Confectioners)
Cranfield Bros
Mars
!Iidland
Associated British Foods
r6
r3
5
t2
9ls
11
20
2
r4
7
6
10
5
17
18
8
4
L9
1
0.38
0.49
2.30
0.80
0.65
o.)2
0.60
o.17
17,79
o.54
1.00
r.04
o.82
6.46
o.25
o.29
0.70
6.2I
0.19
45.29
0,14
o,t4
2.46
o.45
1.18
o.3r
o.57
A 11
6.64
0.39
0.69
0.93
0.t1
a. t)
o.4l
o.24
0.85
3.40
0.22
21..r9
r Excluding firms engaged mainly in the beverage business.
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TABLE 23 (contd)
Yer: 1974
UnitcdKingdom: Bevcrages
(see Table 20) Siample: n* = i8
^, | 01xlr1r." l_y199ranking I Or *,
- 
First firm 01 (sales) UKL 970 million ' Grand Metropolitan Group
- 
Iirst firm 07 (own capital) UKL 817 million - Grand Metropolitan Gtoup
I
2
4
6
7
7
9
10
11
11
r3
15
r6
1'f
18
19
20
)1
22
21
24
)7
lo
)1
)'1
29
t0
11
47
i,
34
15
3'
17
,8
)9
40
40
Macallan-Glenlivet
Highland Distillers Co.
Hiram lWalker & Sons
Glenlivet Distillers
North Btitish Distillery Co.
Scottish & Newcastle Breweries
Mansfield Brewery Co.
Boddingtons' Breweries
\Tolverhampton & Dudley Breweries
Oldham Brewery Co.
Hardys & Hansons
Tomatin Distillers Co.
Home Brewery
Greene, King & Sons
Burtonwood Brewery Co. (Forshaws)
Robert MacNish * Co.
The Distillers Co.
Marston, Thompson & Evershed
St Austell Brewery Co.
S.A. Brain & Co.
Matthew Brown & Co.
Allied Breweries
James Shipstone & Sons
Atthur Guinness Son & Co.
Drambuie Liqueur Co.
James Burrough
McMullen & Sons
Eldridge, Pope & Co.
Fredetic Robinson
J.A. Devenish
Hall & W'oodhouse
Vaux Breweries
Bass Charrington
Higsons Brewery
Teacher (Distillers),
MacDonald Martin Distilleries
Buckley's Brewery
Daniel Thwaites & Sons
H.P. Bulmer
Border Breweries (lfrexham)
Seagram Distillers
,8
25
11
2l
3r
8
29
3,8
14
zt)
:'0
20
'19
'r)
:t7
z
It8
:t6
4j
'>1
:t4
6
:t4
'.24
'40
,4
)9
,49
r)
2t
11
46
22
22
46
9
0.16
1.1 1
).57
I t{
7.3r
20.59
1.06
o.79
o.37
n57
0.85
t.24
r.6r
0.68
0.19
63.64
r.36
o.5)
U,IJ
0.87
oL.z I
0.92
28.Ot
0.95
1.98
o.65
0.69
o.65
0.88
o.77
3.73
59.00
1.00
4.96
0.46
0.42
1.j6
1.54
0.68
7.49
n))
111
).r)
1.16
0.66
11.60
o.99
o.75
r.86
o.42
o.62
o.26
r.)7
1.03
o.53
o.32
4r.r3
r.48
0.18
o.48
L.4r
38.96
0.84
t2.tr
o.83
0.81
o.7r
o.55
0.28
0.61
o.39
2.9r
4.09
1 )i
1.1t
o.65
o.48
0.98
0.95
o.47
+.2)
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TABLE 23 (contd)
l1
44
44
Fuller, Smith & Turner
Long John International
Davenports C.B. & Brewery
(Holdings)
Greenall $Thitley & Co.
Morland & Co.
J.W. Cameron & Co.
Charles Vells
Arthur Bell & Sons
Courage
\X/hitbread & Co.
Everards Brewery
Sam Smith (Tadcaster)
A.G. Barr & Co.
Dalmore, \Zhyte & MacKay
Young & Co.'s Brewery
Grand Nletrooolitan
Tollemache * Cobbold Bre*.
46
M
Sizc
tanking
52
9
51
r4
,,
11
6
t
37
28
JO
4r
29
1
32
07 xt
_x10o07\
0.80
2.60
1.1 1
t.t8
0.42
t.9t
6.22)) 01
15.04
0.61
r.24
1.20
1.00
r00.00
t.0g
o.t7
r.6t
o.72
6.40
0.50
2.12
o.4j
2.07
14.92
1,) 41
1.00
0.92
o.45
0.16
r.02
100.00
0.78
45
46
47
48
49
t0
5l
1)
ti
5X
5'
56
,7
t8
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TABLE 23 (contd.)
YeLt i L974
United Kiogdom: Food distribution
(see Tabte 21)
Size
ranking
Siample: n' : 40
Profitability
rankiog
01 xt
- 
X 10'O
01 q
07 xl
__ x 10o07\
- 
First firm 01 (sales) UKL 514 million - Tesco Store (Holdines)
- 
First firm 07 (own capital) UKL 114 million ' Sainsbury
1
2
3
^
6
7
7
9
10
11
11
11
r4
I)
IO
t7
18
T9)n
2L
22
)s
zo
)-7
')'l
29
29jr
13
34
35
,o
37
t8
39
40
Kwik Save Discount Group
Bejam Group
ts.J. Vallis
rff/m Morrison Supermarkets
Tesco Stotes (Holdings)
Union International (Disirib.)
Lennons Group
Associated British Foods (Distrib.)
Kinloch (Provisions Merchants)
N{organ Edwards
Nurdin & Peacock
lvlatthew-s Holdings
Walter Duncan & Goodricke
Hillards
Gateway Securities
Amos Hinton & Sons
Safeway Food Stores
Linfood Holdings
Baxters (Butchers)
Joseph Stocks & Sons (Holdings)
-brtch Lovell (Distrib.)
J. Sainsbury
lJooker McConnell (Distrib.)
Cuilen's Stores
Geest Industries
Cavenham (Distrib.)
Wheatsheaf Disttibution & Trading
i3ishops Stores
Fyffes Group
Glass Glover & Co.
International Stores
A.J. Ifilis (Holdings)'
rWaitrose
RCA Corporation (Distrib.)
Torvers & Co.
Danish Bacon Co.
Spar Food Holdings
Laws Stores
Deltec Foods
R.H. Thompson & Co.
2:,4
3'5
2.2
,'s
t
1(}
4
2),O
at')
18
2"9
2ij
at.>
ata
1.1
9
1.t
ai6
I
a\3
1t6
t
7
?.0
'!r2
,t0
6
?s
.,t7
I
i\6
9
29
38
31
ta7
8.01
4.78
8.51
6.78
100.00
)-7 11
64.41.
rt.41
3.88
20.o2
16.18
1-.87
6.9r
/. ri'
5.t8
17.67
1r.72
8.82
4.8E
5t.98
86.59
z+.Dz
1.85
9.59
83.25
44 10
10.04
1.2.62
2.4r
44 4)
8.03
16.57
?s oo
4.o4
)o 1a
9.11
2.86
5.20
7.63
2.86
107
A 4')
t.10
60.10
1.o9
1 C)?
11.70
0.)4
1.87
6.80
t.74
I.L4
4.r4
2.41
111
5.19
ro.64
0.90
17.18
100.00
7.17
48.O7
6.85
4.r9
8.ti
0.50
35.69
2.03
5.r4
t.6 t
1.28
6.r4
o.29
o.o2
2.Ot
1 al
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TABLE 23 (eonrd)
Ye^t: L97t
UnitedKingdom: Electricalappliances
(see Table 22)
Size
ranking
Sample: n* = 18
Profitability
lanKrng
O7 xr
_X10o
07\
- 
First firm 01 (sales) UKLr752 million - GEC (Gcneral Electric Co.)
- 
First firm 07 (own capital) UKL L 049 million - GEC
I
z
2
4
4
6
8
9
10
1l
t2
r3
15
r5
r7
18
Hoover
Pifco
Thorn
Rediffusion
BSR
GEC
Electrolux
Lec
Rank
Decca
Tube Investments
Colston
United Gas
Philips
Dimplex
\Wilkins & Mitchell
General Motors
Belling
It
18
3
6
9
1
10
rt
2
7
t7
72)
r6
L2
Ll
r4
9.30
0.58
48.24
6.96
\7)
100.00
4.r6
0.98
20.73
15.32
8.81
o.74
1.93
32.09
0.65
2.62
5.64
1.15
2.56
0.38
14.49
1) 41
a 1)
100.00
? e1
o.54
5i.42
31.14
o.25
1.23
26.92
o.49
1.02
o.99
o.76
The fact that in the industries studied in the United Kingdom a large number of the
most profitable firms have a degree of (own) capital intensity below that of the largest
.firm may well be explained by the nature of the econometric method and the figures
used. But Table 23 does make a contribution to the current controversy about the com-
parative performance of large firms, though the complexity of the industrial structures
concerned means that much more detailed analyses and research will be necessary in the
future. The results obtained in the United Kingdom cannot be extrapolated to other
countries or industries. In food distribution in France, for instance, and in the beverage
industry in Italy, there is a fairly high degree of size equilibrium between the majority of
the most profitable firms.
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s 4 
- 
The research programme on distrlbutlon and prices: purPose and results
Purpose
301. The Commission's research programme on distribution and prices (Sixth Report
on Competition Policy, point 306 et sel') seeks to analyse the development of :
(i) power relationships between manufacturers and distributors (chiefly large
retailers'1;
(ii) national, tegional and local distribution stnrctures, their degree of concentration
and the'various forms and types of marketing;
(iii) prices and mark-ups for the same products in different shops, both in the same
' 
to*r, or region 
".rd 
itr comparison with other towns or regions, sometimes in other
countries.
Power relationships between manulacturers and consumers
302. For the first time the Commission can now give some idea of the development of
these power rr:lationships.
Following the substantial increase in the degree of concentration in distribution in the
last ten years,, several manufacturers of food products now have to contend with rnajor
buying grouPri.
303. Table 24 sets out the results of replies given by ten major food manufacturers to a
questionnaire put out by the European Association of Branded Goods Industries (AIM)
in each of the countries studied (Germany, France, Italy and Belgium).
The results of the survey have been set out in such a tnanner as to illustrate the power
on the demand side with which each of the ten domestic manufacturers is confronted in
his home country. InL976, for example, 54/o of the home market sales of one German
manufacturer (Code No I) went to only five majot retailers or distributorc (29/o in
Lg67), and 7'2/o to only 10 customers (40/6 in 1967).
The manufacltrrers identified by Code No X had the advantage of being confronted with
the least-concentrated demand.
30;4. Table 24 shows that Belgium and Germany are the countries where the concentra-
tion of dema:nd is most developed, whereas Italy is the least oligopsonistic countty.
COMP. REP. EC IW
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In all these countries there is a clear trend towards a higher degree of concentration and
power on the buying side (major retailers or distributors), n'hose multiple effects on the
working of co.rnpetition require analysis. Three particular questions are posed:
(i) To what extent can buyers and major distributors obtain exceptionally favourable
discounts and terms by bringing their bargaining lrower to bear on their suppliers ?
(ii) To what extent do the advantages obtained by ther maior retailers from the manu-
facturers find prac'tical expression in lower prices to the ultimate consumer ?
(iii) $Vhat arre the resulting effects on the structures,, the profitability and even the
viability of manufacturers and suppliers on the one hand and, on the other, of
buyers who are not in a position to obtain these discounts and exceptional terms ?
The first question is easy enough to answer in generali terrns but particulady difficult
when put in specific or quantitative terms. It is well known that major retailers and
buyers can obtain exceptional terms from the manufacturers that supply them, but the
attempt to quantify these advantages raises two highly compiex series of Problems. First,
it is very difficult to express certain benefits (such as prolonged storage at the seller's
cost, sale-or-re'turn arrangements) in terms of figures. Sr:condly, any question concerning
discounts and premiums falls within the general area of 'tlusiness secrecy'.
Briefly, what'q/e need is knowledge of the actual mark-up, which entails not only knowl-
edge of the retail selling price but also the actual price at which the product was bought,
and this is often treated as a business secret.
Determining the actual purchase price also entails 'determining the date when the pro-
duct was boul;ht, which raises a whole series of problems in connection with products
whose prices fluctuate sharply.
The results ol' this second stage of the research will enable an answer to be offered to
the second anil third questions posed above.
frends in distribution and concentration in selected llember States
France
305. lt is not yetpossible to give an assessment in compe,tition terms of the ef{ects of the
recent wave ol'cooperation, integration and diversification agreements such as the forma-
tion of the Savezo-Viniprix-Euromarch6 group, built up around F6lix Potin, a depart-
ment store, Primistdre, a chain store, Euromarchd et Ptomodes, a wholesale and chain
store comPany, which also took over another chain store, l'Economie Bretonne, to handle,
among other things, supplies to Prisunic shops.
COMP. REP. EC I97
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TThat can be observed in I97 6 is that the distributive trades in France were going through
an expansionary phase at the retail level which, by raising the number of self-service sales
points, should help to curb the general rise in prices and reduce mark-ups, provided there
are no anti-competitive agreernents between the major distributive groups and chains.
The total number of self-service shops, which, with sales of FF 103 000 million, handled)l/o of all the grocery business in France, has been tending to rise. In only four years
(frcm 1973 to the end of 1976) shops of this type raised their aggregate sales area by
31/o (f.rcm about l million to 6.7 million square metres). In L976, 1146 new seff-
service shops were opened.
The trend is towards larger selling points, f.or 8O/o of these 1 146 new self-service shops
belonged to department stores with a sales area of more than 400 square metres (e/o
supermarkets and 32/o hypermarkets).
Germany
306. The process of concentration in the retail trade and in the wholesale trade has
developed steadily in recent years. At the central wholesale stage-which has maintained
a constant increase in its degree of involvement in distribution-the central organizations
of the voluntary chains and groups have considerably expanded theif market shares.
At the local wholesale stage the wholesale organizations of the voluntary chains still
rank first with a market share of about 25%.
The number of retail food shops has continued to come down' In L976 there were only
some 110000 left-a 7/o fall on the previous year. Most of the closures were in small
and medium-sized self-service stores. The main beneficiaries were the supermarkets and
the like.
Trading competition works on regional markets. But the various aspects of inter-firm
competition are increasingly dominated by the peculiar features and parameters of non'
regional business strategies.
Regional price surveys in the Greater Munich area have revealed that concentration pro-
cesses generally occur on a regional plane. A whole series of sales points included in the
survey changed hands after the price surveys began in 197). This impression of inten-
sifying regional concentration of the activities of various grouPs and of a kind of corn-
pensation mechanism between them applies not only to the Munich arca but also to
other parts of the Federal Republic.
This is the general context in which we must consider the results of the six-monthly
regional sufveys in Munich of prices and mark-ups on food products, beverages and, for
COMP. REP. EC Iy/7
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the first time, washing powders, detergents and toiletries. 'fhe results of this series of
surveys show the preponderant role that supermarkets and cut-price stores continue to
play in relatio,n to prices in general. For washing powders in particular promotion cam"
paigns were observed for imported products bearing trademarks similar to those of
German products sold in Germany. Although these imports are still relatively few and
far between, they manifestly reflect a new intensification of competition as cross-frontier
trade flows s,well. Even if German manufacturers seern to attach little importance to
them, these iarports can help to stabilize prices.
1;o11s6 Kingalom
307. The figurres for the level of concentration in the United Kingdom given in the last
report call for a few comments. The structure of the British grocery trade is highly
complex by reason of the industry's integration into manufacturing industry in general
and also into the service industries (notably the hotel and restaurant trades).
According to ,:ertain estimates, five major retailers alone controlled 4O/o of sales in 1976
(30/o in 1971t), while the ten top retailers handled 54% (39% in 1971). Other sources
reveal that 51r'o of shops accounted for 44/o of aggregate sales in L976, and lo/o of
shops for 56lo of sales.
The number of grocery-trade buying points fell sharply f.rom 647 to 327 between 1970
and t976. The power of buyers as compared with the power of sellers or maoufacturers
is constantly growing.
All these factors indicate the trend towards oligopolization of distribution in the United
Kingdom. But the information given above needs amplifying with further, more sPecific
information.
The report onr concentration in food distribution in the United Kingdom makes it clear
that there is a long-term trend for expansion in the market share held by chain stores to
the detriment of cooperative societies and independent firms. At the same time the largest
of these chain stores did not increase their combined rnarket share between L969 and
L974. Thrs was because the largest retail firms tended to expand more slowl.y than the
medium-sized groups during that period.
The study shows that the actual effects of economic power may be stronger than is sug-
gested by the level of concentration and variations in it. L;arge-scale purchasing power is
increasingly concentrated in the hands of a steadily declining number of groups. A fairly
large number of chains operate nationwide, so that in certain areas regional concentration
is far higher than would appear from the national analysis.
COMP. REP. EC IW
THE DEVELOPMENA OF CONCENTNATION 2'7
Price ditferences between sa/es points
308. The food and beverages surveys that began in January 1976 continued in L977
(January and July) and t978 (January). The sample was extended by the addition of
other household products sold in food shops.
309. The surveys confirm that there are very wide differences in prices behveen sales
points in the same town or region in a given courtry.
The situation in January 1977 is given for several Community countries in Tables 25 and
26. The corresponding figures for January L976 are given in brackets for comparison
PurPoses.
The tables are based on calculation of the relative percentage difference between the
maximum price observed for a given product at a given sales point and the minimum
price observed for the same product at another sales point.l
The tables show that Germany and Italy are the countries where price differences are the
widest between the various sales points (and where the change on L976 is greatest). In
these two countries competition in retailing is extremely intensive.
310. Thrce kinds of price categories can be distinguished, by reference to differences in
price observed between the sample sales points, corresponding to:
(i) the 'normal case', with a difference between the maximum and minimum prices
expressed as a percentage of the minimum price of LO/o ot more, but less than
4o/oi
(ii) the'divergent case', with a difference of 4O/o or more;
(iii) the'uniform case', with a difference of less than L0lo.
It can be seen from these tables that price differences for the same product from one
sales point to another are neither cyclical nor temporary but structural and characteristic
of competition as it works in retailing.
311. The following questions therefore have to be answered:
(i) \hat in practical tems are the specific products whose prices differ widely between
sales points at a given moment in time ?
(ii) Do these price differences always apply to the same products or do they shift fron
month to month and from Year to Year ?
maxlmum pllce - mmlmum pflce1 The formula is: eRp :
COMP. REP. EC Iy/7
mrnlmum Prlce
x 100.
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312. The surveys of price differences between sales points in selected Mernber States
carried out in January and July L977 rcvealthat:
(i) the proilucts whose prices varied widely from one sales point to another at a given
moment were generally not the same in all the Meurber States;
(ii) in a gi'i'en country and sample of shops, very often it was the same products
which b,oth in January and July differed most widely between the various sales
points;
(iii) the widest shop-to-shop price differences did not necessarily apply to the products
whose prices had risen most sharply; thus there is no automatic correlation between
price inr:reases in any given period and price differences (befween shops) at a given
moment.
Among the various products surveyed, sharp price differences, in excess of. a 4O/o rela'
tive difference, were commonly observed for the following 21 products:
instant coffee (France, Italy, United Kingdom, Germany),
tea, generally tea bags (Italy, United Kingdom),
cola beverager; (Italy, United Kingdom, Germany),
fruit juices (Irrance, United Kingdom) and orangeades (Italy, Germany),
tonic and spa water (France, Italy),
chocolate (France, Denmark),
preserved tuna and salmon (United Kingdom, Italy) and tinned sardines (United King-
rom),
pasta (France, Denmark, Italy),
rice (Italy, United Kingdom),
flour (Italy, LJnited Kingdom) and cornflakes (Germany),
dessert cream$ (France, Denmark),
powdered anil concentrated milk (France),
certain kinds of cheese, varying from one country to another (France, Denmark, United
Kingdom, Italy), particulady sandwich cheese slices (Itany and Germany),
baby foods (Denmark, United Kingdom),
crackers (France, United Kingdom, Germany),
certain kinds of biscuit (France, Germany),
dried soups (France, Germany),
dried potatoes (France, Germany),
stocl cubes (l.taly, Denmark, Germany),
margarine and deep-frying fat (France, Denmark, Unitecl Kingdom),
mayonnaise in tubes (Germany, Denmark),
tomato ketchup (Germany, Italy),
certain kinds of marmalade and jam (United Kingdom, JDerunark, Germany).
COMP. REP. EC I97
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Divergent priee movements
31-1, Consideration of the most recent survey results (Table 27) confirms the hypothesis
of divergent retail price movements between products, countries and sales points.
314. The way prices developed varied sharply according to the group of products and
according to the time-whether in L976 or in the first half of 1977. when the rate of
increase began to slow down in most countries. ln l97G there was a considerable Com-
munity-wide increase in the price of tinned foods, baby foods, prepacked vegetables,
cereals and above all certain beverages (chiefly coffee and tea). In Italy and the United
Kingdom there were also sharp increases in the price of soups, meat extracts and condi-
ments, oil, fat, biscuits and cakes, dairy products and frozen food. The rising prices
intensified in the first half of 1977 for certain products in certain countries, notably the
United Kingdom, France and Denmark.
On the other hand, the price of certain products in certain countries (chiefly Germany)
actually fell, though only slightly.
Obviously these results are valid only for the very small sample of products and sales
points that had been analysed and cannot be extrapolated into general conclusions as to
price trends in the Member States.
-31J. Furthermore, the differences in the degree of price variation are very wide. Of a
total of 120 cases of price variation (Table 28) there ate LO2 divergent variations for the
'same product. In other words, in IO2 cases out of. I2O, or in about go/o of. cases, the
consumer would have noticed that the price had gone up if he had bought the products
in one shop, but he would have observed that the price had fallen if he had bought the
same product in another shop in the same tovm or region of the same country. The
United Kingdom is the only exception to this rule: inflation there has proceeded at such a
sustained rate that synchronous variations arc far more common than divergent
variations.
Furthermore, the gaps or differences are not negligible. Taking just the first ten pro-
ducts on which the widest difference in price variations was observed, we find thaithe
differences ranged from 72.3/o to 39.iVo in France and from L88.7% to 55.L/6 in
Germany.
.316. Most of the products for which a divergent price movement was recorded are the
same products whose prices in absolute terms varied most widely between sales points at
any given time.
There is a definite relationship, then, between the divergent movement of the price of a
given product at a given time between different sales points and divergent priies of the
same product at a given time between different shops.
COMP. REP. EC IW
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TABLE 28
Scale of divergent price variations in selected Community countries
Synchronou
Number of cases
Variations 1
Divergent
Germany
United Kingdom
Denmark
1976
r977
(1st half)
L976
1977(lst half)
r977
(1st half)
1.9
1c)
3
3
r4
"16
L4
-16
r6
rotar I tr | '0, I
1 Tbere is a synchronous price variation when the maximum and minimum price obsened at two extreme sales
Points move in the same direction, either upward or downward. There ls a divergent variation when the
ma:rimum rises and the minimum falls.
Mark-ups
317. It is now possible to give some advance information on current research into mark-
uPs in France, Germany and ltaly. This analysis is based on information obtained from
retailefs and manufacturers and from relevant publications and price scales.
The question of special discounts and terms obtained by large buyers bringing their
bargaining strength to bear on the manufacturers is still wide open, as serious difficulties
are being met in the compilation of informatioq on this point.
318. In France, the largest mark-ups were observed for certain types of preserved food
(vegetable salads and Cassegrain peas), at rates of up to 80% of the purchase price.
co,!lP. REP. EC 1977
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319. For Germany and ltaly, full series of mark-ups have been obtained from estimates
based on the assumption that no special buying conditions existed. Table 29 shows the
article, the pnoduct group and the maximum mark-upr recorded during the reference
period in order of magnifude.
These are ma>rimum rates, sometimes observed at only a single sales point, but more often
in three or four or even more shops from the sample, which generally covered about thirty
shops.
IuThereas the mark-ups for these ten products seem to be increasing in Germany, the
medium-term trend in Italy appears to be towards stabilization.
TABI,E 29
The ten products with the largest mark-ups in Germany
(1977 and, L976) aJjldltaly (L977) t
Germany
r'Birnenkonserven Del Monte 825 I(coN)
Marmorkuchenteig Dr. Oetker
400 s (BIS)
x Ketchup von Kraft 340 g (EPI)
* Klare Fleischsuppe von Maggi
4 Stiick (SOU)
Suppengemiise Iglo 400 g (tEG)
Fanta 0.33 t (BOI)
* Konserve Jun.ge Erbsen
von Bonduelle Z8O g (CON)
Kornflakes von Kellogg's
3ao g (cER)
Kakao Kaba t300 g (BOI)
Biicklingsfilet von Norda
zo0 g (CON)|
Chewing gum Brooklin, Dolcifj.cio
Lombardo, 7 strisce tP g (BIS)
Minestra preparata ortoftesco,
Liebig, 50 I (SOU)
* Pesche sciroppatq De Rica
400 s (CoN)
Coca-Cola, 1 I (BOI)
x Dadi per doppio brodo, Star,
6 cubetti 66 g (EPI)
* Piselli in scatola (sgocciolati)
Cirio, 260 g (CON)
Olive vercli Olipak, Sacli,
90 g (EPi)
Riso Arborio, Frugone e Preve,
950 g (cER)
* Toma.to Ketchup, Cirio,
340 g (EI'I)
Maior:ese Calv6, Unilever,
tubefio 90 g (EPI)
Italy
96%
8oo/o
79%
77%
75%
75vo
7lo/o
67'%
61'%
67%
86o/o
25va
79%
)2%
63'%
67vo
5ovo
67%
50%
61%
t347a
IlJ7o
90%
83%
77ck
tn-/o
66%
65%
6lo/o
55'Vo
1 Thc articles are specificd by thc namc they bear in the country where tbey are sold (Gcrmany ot ltaly).
. The same ariicl,: or a similai product appcars in the list for the othd country,
COMP. REP. EC I9Z
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONCENTRATION 24'
Here we are considering the development of average mark-ups and not the maximum
mark-ups indicated in Table 2), the average being calculated on all sales points in the
sample.
Moaernent of auerage mar6-ups for the ten products in ltalyt
Chewing gum Brooklin,
7 Strisce 1! g (Brs) 6L%
Minestra preparata Ortofresco
5o s (SoU) 26Vo
Pesche sciroppats 400 g (CON) 36%
Coca-Colall (BOI) 34Vo
Dadi per doppio brodo
6 cubetti 66 g (EPI) 3ovo
Piselli in scatola
sgocciolati 260 g (CON) 2s%
Olive verdi Olipak 90 g (EpI) 3L%
Riso Arborio, 950 g (CER) 2L%
Tomato Ketchup, Cnio, 340 g (EpI) 29%
Maionese Calv6, tubetto, p0 g (EpI) 40Vo
t976
lanuary Inly
t977
lanuary Inll
54% 6%
2L% 44% 80%
24% 68/o 68%
22% 39% 38%
22%
3%
40%
10/o
30%
Srvo
27% 24%
-r4% 25%L5% 35%
38% 13%
35% Le%
6% 27%
It will be observed that even a.verage mark-ups (calculation of which takes account of a
number of 'negative mark-ups' observed ai certain shops) would seem to be quite
'comfortable'.
ln L977 there were sharp increases in several beverages (chiefly coffee and tea).2 In our
consideration of the structure of mark-ups, oor comp"rative study extended to:(i) Germany (Tabte 30A) and Itaty (Table 3oB);(ii) only a few typical beverages--coffee, instant coffee, coca-cola, orangeade, tonic
water (Schweppes) and tea;
(iii) not only the largest but also the second, third and fourth, the minimum and the
average, specifying the shop code number;a
1 The articles are specified by the name they bear in the country where they are sold (Italy).
' T[-"il'.,,:f :?:,rid:thp mark-ups here is all the greater as the most rlr"riiJr. 
"l""riJ.,*ingfirms in the world food industry actually make beverages (Coca-Cola, pepsiCo and others - sJTable 17).
3 The maxima are the four Aighest mark-ups given,in decr-easing-order. From them it is possibleto establish the number,oj shops. chargir.rg- one.of these_four f,ighest'markups a.rd tfr.ii,".*(or code numbers), and hence the poisible existence of identicil 
-"tf.-"pr'"t diff.;; ;;;;.
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(iv) the selling Price to the public (maximum, minimum and average);(v) figures for June 1976 and lvly 1977 for the Federal Republic of Germany and
January and July L977 fot ltaly.
The result is a considerable increase in mark-ups and selling prices for coffee in Ger-
many during the relevant period (first half of L977).It was also found that there was a
series of idintical maximum mark-ups charged by several sales points, for which there
are two possible explanations-alignment or concerted pricing.
S 5 
- 
Summary and concluslons
320. T.lte following conclusions can be drawn from the studies and research undertaken
on concentration, competition and prices.
The total number of national and international takeovers and mergers, share acquisitions
and joint ventures fell in L976, for the first tirne since 1973.
The number of international joint veotures was far greater than the number of national
ones, whereal; there was a preponderance of national operations of the other types.
Cornpanies I'rom EEC countries played a smaller role in international operations, of
which they accounted for only a half in 1976. Once again Belgium was the country
where the largest number of international operations took place.
Of the various manufacturing industries, the metallurgical industries were the most
affected.
321. Anzlysl"s of recent developments in concentration confirns that the tendency is
now towards structural stability. One of the reasons for this is the very high degree of
concentrationL in certain product markets.
Neady 250 markets were counted where the top firm has a market share of more than
25/o, and a hundred or so where the top firm has more than a 50% market share.
j22. Analysis of the daily press has highlighted the large number of dominant positions
in regional and local rnarkets that are not exposed to the competition inherent in inter-
national trade. In distribution it is again, for the most part, regional and local markets
that present a high degree of concentration in certain countries. Although this is an area
that is open to international competition, conceotration may nevertheless Pose a serious
tireat to competition.
323. The detailed analysis of the relation between size and pefiormance, primarily in the
United Kingdom, confirms that the largest firms are hardly wer the most profitable.
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Again in the UK, it was also observed that companies and industries with a high degree
of capital intensity in relation to sales are not necessarily the most profitable.
324. Studies on the distributive trades have revealed that the bargaining power of major
retailers (buyers) ois-i-ais the manufacturers (sellers) ha5 grown substantially in all
Community countries in recent years.
For a large number of mass consumption products, analysis of the divergent price move-
ments shows that depending on the shop where the consumer does his shopping in any
given town or region he may end up payrng twice the price he paid six or twelve months
eradier. T astly, it has been observed that mark-ups are very high, and still rising, on
certain products-notably beverages (coffee, tea, etc.), whose prices have risen sharply.
These findings will be given a broader and more solid foundation with further research
into competition and the structure of prices.
coMP. nEP. EC tW
Annex
List of individual Decisions of the Commission and rulings of the Court of Justice made in t97:
concerning the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty and of Artilles 6) and 66 of the
ECSC Treaty.
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DECISIONS ON INDIVIDUAL CASES
1. Concerning Articles 85 dnd 86 ol tbe EEC Trcat1
Decision of 12.4.1977 on a proceeding under Article 86
of the EEC Treaty ',LBG/Oil companies operating in the
Netherlands'
Decision of. 2t.7.1977 on a proceeding under Article 8J
of the EEC Treaty 'De Laval,/Stork'
Decision of 8,9.1977 on a proceeding under Article 8J
of the EEC Treaty 'Cobelp/VNP'
Decision of. 7.11.1977 on a proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Treaty 'BPICA'
Decision of. 2r.lll977 on a proceeding under Article 8J
of the DEC Treaty 'GEC/Veir Sodium Circulators'
Decision of 2.12.1977 on a proceeding under Article 8J
of the EEC Treaty 'Centraal Bureau voor de Rijwiel-
handel'
Decision of. 2.12.1977 on a proceeding under Article 8J
of the EEC Treaty 'Cauliflowers'
Decision of 8.12.1977 on a proceeding under Article 86
of the EEC Treaty 'Hugin/Liptons'
Decision of 2o,12.1977 on a proceeding under Article 8t
of the EEC Treaty 'The Distillers Company Ltd'
Decision of 21.12.1977 on a proceeding under Article 8i
of the EEC Treaty 'SopelemT'Vickers'
Decision of 21.12.1977 on a proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Treaty 'Liebig spices'
Decision of, 2r,12,1977 on a proceeding under Article 81
of the XXC Treaty 'BMW Belgium'
Decision of 23.12.1977 on a proceeding under Article 81
of the EEC Treaty 'Vegetable parchment'
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oJ L rr7 of 9.5.t97t,9. t
IP (77) 97 of 6.4.1977
Bull. EC 4-L977, point 2.r.26
oI L 2rt of. 2r.8.t977, P. LrIP (77) 196 of 3.8.1977
Bull. EC 7/e-L977, point 2.1.32
OI L 242 of 21,9.1977, p. Lo
IP (77) 2ro of 16.9.1977
Bull. EC 9-1977, point 2.1.21
oJ L 299 of 23.Lr.1977, p. 18
IP (77) 26t of r4.1r.r977
Bull. EC ll-1977, point 2.1.38
OI L 327 of 20.12.1977, p.26
IP (77) 287 of. 2.r2.r977
Bull. EC rl-r977, point 2.1.39
oJ L20 of 25.r.r928, p. rA
lP (77) )o8 ot 16.12.1977
Bull. EC L2-1977, point 2.r.45
Ol L 2t of 26.t.r9i8, p. 2t
IP (77) 293 of 6.12.1977
Bull. EC l2-L977, point 2.r.46
oI L 22 of 27.r.r978, p.23
IP (77) 1O4 of 16.12.1977
Bull. EC r2-r977, point 2.1.17
OJ L 50 of 22.2.7978, p. 16
lP (77') t06 of 21.12.1977
Auil. EC 12-1977, point 2.1.47
oI L 70 of rr.3.L978, p. 47
lP (77) 39 of 2).L2.r977
Bull. EC r2-r977, point 2.r.54
OJ L tt ot 24.2.1978, p. 20
IP (77) 3r2 of. 2t.r2.r977
Bull. EC 12-1977, point 2,1.t1
OJ L 46 of 17.2.1978, p. ,,
rP (77) 
'rO 
of 16.12.1977
Bull. EC L2-1977, point 2.1.48
OI L 70 of rt3.r978, p. 54
IP (77) lrt of 23.12.1977
Bull. EC 12-1977, point 2.1.49
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Decision of 2t.12.1977 on a proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Trea.ty 'Jaz-Peter'
Decision of 21.12.1977 on a proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Tteaty 'Campati'
Decision of. 2i.12.L977 on a proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Treaty 'Penneys'
Decision of. 20.72.1977 on a proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Treaty 'Video cassettes'
OJ L 61. of 3.i.r978, p. 17
IP (77) 316 of. 23.12.1977
Bull. IC 12-1977, point 2.1.53
oJ L 70 ol r).j.r978, p. 69
IP (78) p. 17 of February 1978
Bull. EC l2-r971, point 2.1.t6
OJ L 6cr of z.'.tgts, p. t9
IP (78) p.r7 ol February 1978
Bul.l. EC 12-1977, point 2.1.55
OJ L 4't ol 18.2.1978, p. 42
rP (771 3o3 of 23.12.7977
Bull. EC 72-1977, point 2.1.52
2. Concerning Articlet 65 and 66 of the ECSC Trcaty
Decision of 26 Janvary 7977 on a proceeding under
Article 66 of thr: ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition
of a majority shareholding in Franz Kirchfeld GmbH KG
andFrarz Kirchfeld GmbH by Ferrostaal AG
Decision of 26 JanuzLry 1977 on a proceeding under
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition
by Johnson & lFirth Brown Ltd of a controlling share-
holding in Dunliord & Elliott Ltd
Decision 77/251/ECSC of 4 Match 1977 on a proceeding
under Article t55 of the ECSC Treaty extending the
authorization of the joint selling of fuels from Houilldres
du Bassin de Lorraine and Saarbergwerke AG by Saarlor
Decision o{ 7 March 7977 on a proceeding under Article
66 of the ECS,C Treaty authorizing the acquisition by
Fiat SpA of the entire capital of Cofermet Acciai Speciali
e Inossidabili SpA
Decision o{ 29 Tll.arch 1977 on a proceeding under Article
66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition of
67.5% of the capital of Etablissements Vidal & Champre-
donde by Otto Lazar SA
Decision 77/29ct/ECSC of 5 April L977 on a proceeding
under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the
joint-buying of rolled steel products by the steel distri-
bution undertakiings participating in 'Stahlring GbR' and
the purchasing company called 'Stahlring GmbH, Stahl-
einkauf sgesellschLaft'
Decision of 10 May 1977 on a proceeding under Article
66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing Eisen und Metall AG
to acquire a malority shareholding in Siiddeutsche Roh-
orodukten Gmb.fl
Bul.l. EC 1-1977, point 2.r.2r
OJ L 78 of 26.1.1917, p.20
BulI. EC 3-1977, point 2.I.36
Bull. EC 1-1977, point 2.L.34
Bul.l. EC 3-1977, point 2.7.31
oJ L gt ol 21.4.1977, p. )1
BuLI. EC 4-1977, point 2.r.27
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Decision of Z5 May 1977 on a proceeding under Article
66 of the ECSC Treaty extending the Decision of 23
February 1976 aathorizing an exception from Article
2(1) of the Decision of 31 July 1969 authorizing the
acquisition of shares in SA M6tallurgique d'Esp6rance-
Longdoz and in Soci6t6 de participations industrielles de
$Tinterslag by a number of other companies
Decision of 9 June 1977 on a proceeding under Article
56 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing Kldckner & Co. to
acquire all the shares in the capital of Schrottag Bayeri-
sche Schrottgesellschaft mbH, Siidferrum Eisenhandels-
gesellschaft mbH and FrZinkischer Eisenhof GmbH
Decision of 13 June 1977 on a proceeding under Article66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the formation by
Moncheret Aciers SA and A. Devis et Cie of a ioint
trading venture to be known as DEMA
Decision 77/437/ECSC of 17 June 1977 on a proceeding
under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty renewing it!
authorization of an agreement between United Kingdom
steelmaking undertakings concerning a joint buying agency
for steelmaking materials
Decision of Z9 June L977 on a proceeding under Article
66 of the ECSC Treaty on the acquisition by Europiiische
Brennstoffhandelsgesellschaft mbH, Essen, and Hugo
Stinnes AG, Miilheim (Ruhr), of shareholdings in Bruno
Fechner & Co KG, Bottrop
Decision 77/548/ECSC of rz July 1977 on a proceeding
under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing an
agreenent between coal wholesalers strictly analogous to
a joint buying agreement for solid fuels
Decision of f9 July 1977 on a proceeding under Article
66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing Hoesch lferke AG
to acquire a 75Vo holding in Walter Herzog KG
Decision of 2t Septembet 1977 on a proceeding under
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authoizing Gebr. Rdchling
KG. to acquire a 50/6 sharcholding in Flamm-Stahl
GmbH, steel stockholder
Decision 77/7j7/ECSC of 14 November 1977 on a
proceeding under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty atthoriz-
ing an agreement between several Italian steel films
concerning the joint buying of pre-reduced iron ore
Decision 77/774/ECSC of 23 November L977 on a
proceeding under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authoriz-
lng the formation of Framtek, a vehicle-springs manu,facturing company
Decision of 1 December 1977 otr a proceeding under
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing Thyssen
Edelstahlwerke AG to acquire a majority shareholding in
Stinox SA
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OJ L r7i of r3.7.L977, p. 19
Bull. EC 6-1977, point 2.L.4L
OJ L 217 of 2i.8.1977, p. rL
Bull. EC 9-1977, point 2.1..22
Bull. EC 7/8-1977, point 2.1.34
OI L 3o9 of 2.1.2.1977, p. 18
Bull. EC rI-r977, point 2.1.41
oJ L 32O of 15.12.1977, p. 52
Bull. EC 7r-r977, point 2.1,.42
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Decision of 13 Decernber L977 on a proceeding under
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing Stahlwerke
Riichling-Burbach to acquire a majority shareholding in
Lech Stahlwerke GmbH
Decision of 14 Decernbet 1977 on a proceeding undel Bull. EC 12'1977, point 2.1.18
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the merger of
several steel firms belonging to the Bruxelles-Lambert,
Paribas and Fr0re-Bourgeois Groups
Decision of 19 Decembet L977 on a proceeding under
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition
of 67% of the capital of Levacier SA by the British
Steel Corporation
RULINGS OF THE COURT Or JUSTICE
Ruling (1.2.1977) in Case 47/76 'de Nore v Brouwerij
Concordia'
Ruling (9.3.1977) in Cases 4t, 4) and 4U1\-(lntet'
pretadon) 'Soci6t6 anonyme G€n6rale Sucridre v Commis-
iion of the European Communities'
Ruling (24.t.1977, irr Case 107/76'Hoffmaon'La Roche
v Centrafarm'
Ruling (9.6'1977) in Case 90/76'Herrry van Ameyde v
ucl'
Ruling (25.10.1977) in Ctse 26/76 'Metro v Com'
mission of the European Communities'
Ruling (16.11,t977) in C-ase 1J/77 'GB-Inno-BM v
ATAB'
Ruling (14.r2.L977) in Caf,e 59/77 'De Bloos v Bouyer
OJ C 60 of. ro.3.r977, P. 7
Bull. EC 2-1977, Point 2.3'4J
ll977J ECR 6t
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Bull. EC Lo-r977, Point 2.3.1
u9771 ECR r87'
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Th€ Report on Comp€tition Policy ls pubtished annually by the Commission of the European Com-
munities in response to the request of the European Parliament made by a Resolution of 7 June
'1971' Thls Report, which forms an annex to the General Report on the Activities ot the Communities,
is designed to give a general view of the competition pollcy follow€d during the past year. part
One covers the appllcation of this poticy to entarprises. Part Two deals with State aids, adjustment
of State monopolies of a commErcial charactEr and public undertaklngs. Part ThreE ls concerned
with the development of concenlration in the Community.
